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Abstract 
 
This dissertation connects the claims of James and Dewey (and to a lesser extent Peirce) 
to historically specific concerns that occasioned them, attending particularly to claims made with 
respect to the centrality of the reconstructive practices of art to those of experience.  In unpacking 
these claims, I employ exegetical methods that R. G. Collingwood advocated when he 
emphasized that we cannot understand what philosophers have said without first comprehending 
the questions they meant to answer. At the same time, I also connect what classical pragmatists 
said to what others have said since, thereby heeding Dewey’s admonition that it is only from the 
standpoint of where we have arrived that we can coherently register anything at all. By 
approaching the ideas of pragmatists in these ways—and by drawing occasional support from 
other thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein—I especially endeavour to establish that 
pragmatic conceptions of “experience as art” show that interactions in the world achieve 
outcomes traditionally attributed to inner operations of mind or brain; that insensitivity to this 
fuels seriously misplaced conceptions about how we relate to “reality”; and that these misplaced 
conceptions promulgate subjectivism on such a scale that even scientists become unwitting 
promoters of it. My overarching aims are to demonstrate, first, that classical pragmatists, contrary 
to what some recent interpretations suggest, understood their projects to be anti-sceptical; and, 
second, that classical pragmatists have bequeathed to us means by which we, too, may counter 
scepticism.  Throughout this dissertation, I bear in mind that James called pragmatism “a new 
name for some old ways of thinking” and that Dewey repeatedly stressed that new ideas are 
reconstructed out of old ones.  So while arguing that classical pragmatists challenged scepticism 
by turning traditional modern Western conceptions of experience inside out, I also examine how 
their work might be used to reorient and reinvigorate certain traditional notions. 
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Introduction 
 
I shall be attending in this dissertation to the core tenets of pragmatism, 
particularly as articulated by William James and John Dewey. Others have done so before 
me. What could I possibly hope to achieve by attending yet again to them?  
Robin Collingwood (1939), nearing the end of his life, put his finger squarely on 
the problem that has led so many philosophers to render unfruitful accounts of their 
predecessors. Most have presumed they can register and weigh what others have said 
before them by attending to the statements they have made. As Collingwood protested, 
however, we “…cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or 
written statements” (p. 31). We cannot, he insisted, because a statement is an answer to a 
question, and identically worded statements can have very different meanings when they 
are responses to different questions. Hence we are not in a position to “…think [we] 
understand any statement made by a philosopher until [we] have decided, with the utmost 
possible accuracy, what the question is to which he means it for an answer” (p. 74); and 
we are not in a position to ascertain this unless we investigate the historical context in 
which the question arose as a viable provocation to inquiry (see pp. 61-63). This kind of 
investigation is open-ended and subject to ongoing revision, for the scope and limits of 
our own historical context of inquiry differ from those of the past, changing what we 
must do if we are to understand what others did before us (see pp. 75-76 & 114; also see 
Cameron 2004, pp. 21-26). 
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In the case of classical pragmatists, Collingwood’s approach is especially helpful, 
for their choice of words was, as James (1909a) admitted, “unguarded” at times (p. 824).  
Consequently it is easy to misconstrue what they said, especially if one abstracts their 
statements from the contexts out of which they arose.  Along just such lines, James 
complained that his detractors engaged in “vicious abstractionism” (p. 964), treating his 
words as “self-sufficients [sic.] with no context of varying relation that might be further 
asked about” (p. 964). This, in turn, led them to wrongly convict him and other 
pragmatists of “self-contradiction and absurdity” (p. 964).  The mistake, James argued, 
was that critics assumed that “meanings and things meant, definitions and things defined, 
are equivalent and interchangeable, and nothing extraneous to its definition can be meant 
when a term is used” (p. 964).  They failed to recognize, for example, that “[t]he social 
proposition that ‘other men exist’ and the pragmatist proposition ‘it is expedient to 
believe that other men exist’”—though similarly worded—“come from different 
universes of discourse” (p. 965), and thus have different meanings. “The first expresses 
an object of belief, the second tells of one condition of the belief’s power to maintain 
itself” (p. 965). Hence we “can believe [one] without being logically compelled to 
believe the [other]” (p. 965).  We can also believe both, and even if one turns out to be 
false, we will not be guilty of a logical contradiction.  We will not be because the two 
propositions answer different questions, and, as Collingwood observed, “[n]o two 
propositions . . . can contradict one another unless they are answers to the same question” 
(1939, p. 33). 
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If past critics easily misconstrued the questions that preoccupied James and 
Dewey, then the potential to misconstrue them today is especially great.  It is, in the 
words of Collingwood (1939), because most philosophers “…write for their 
contemporaries, and in particular for those who are ‘likely to be interested,’ which means 
those who are already asking the question to which an answer is being offered” (p. 39). 
This means that “a writer very seldom explains what the question is that he is trying to 
answer.  Later on, when he has become a ‘classic’ and his contemporaries are long dead, 
the question has been forgotten” (p. 39), and if the question is forgotten, the import of his 
response is obscured. 
To weigh fruitfully the claims of pragmatists, therefore, we must identify the 
questions they were asking (for only then can the richness of their answers be assessed 
with respect to them), and then link those questions as historical precedents to the 
questions that concern us today. My aim in this dissertation, accordingly, is to revisit the 
questions that prompted James and Dewey, in particular, to say what they said as they 
said it, registering those queries at once more broadly and exactly than many have 
thought worth doing. I hope to show, by doing so, that many of the judgments that other 
philosophers have deemed objectionable, having failed to register the questions they were 
intended to answer while misconstruing them as answers to questions never asked, were 
not only worth pondering at the time but, when linked to others of resonant kind 
comprehensible only within our own era, remain uncommonly provocative even now. 
I particularly wish to unpack the context of inquiry within which James and then 
Dewey developed a cumulative sequence of claims about “experience” and then “art” that 
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they deemed central to understanding what they were doing and why, for, as 
Collingwood would have stressed, only from within the historical context of questions 
that preoccupied these philosophers can we register and weigh the significance and 
usefulness of their claims. 
James maintained that we play a role in making our own experience (1979a, p. 12; 
1890i, p. 403). Dewey advanced a similar position, and, in his Experience and Nature 
(1925), he likened the making of experience to the making of art (p. 354 ff.).  “Art” here 
meant tekhne, a kind of experienced knowing that brings things into appearance and 
realizes certain designs, as when a master artisan puts hard-won experience to the task of 
making new works; and in comparing experience to art, Dewey asserted what most 
pragmatic philosophers have agreed upon: that our experiences and ultimately our worlds 
are structured and built around practical handlings and doings carried out in the interest 
of realizing certain designs. 
Almost a decade after making this assertion, Dewey published the book Art as 
Experience (1934).  Here, too, the practical arts were used to model a general theory of 
experience.  As compared to its predecessor, however, this book was more preoccupied 
with fine arts and aesthetic experience, by which Dewey meant experience that builds 
dramatically in time, culminating into an integrated whole, albeit a whole within which 
and through which individual elements acquire heightened distinctiveness.  Dewey was 
particularly concerned with establishing that aesthetic experience occurs not just in the 
presence of artistic objects, but also in the course of everyday living.  He was concerned, 
furthermore, with establishing that aesthetic experience entails a redeployment and 
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restructuring of our habitual ways of dealing with things; and since, on his account, our 
practiced habits structure our worlds, aesthetic experience also entails a restructuring or 
reconstruction of our worlds.  
The notion that our worlds are built around our own practical interests and that we 
reshape worlds we have already constructed seems, on the face of it, to be a recipe for 
hopeless scepticism.  James and Dewey clearly understood this not to be so. By 
measuring their work against questions that concerned them, I aim to cast new light on 
how they understood themselves to be pursuing an anti-sceptical agenda; and by relating 
their agenda to debates that persist today, I hope to develop a provocative account of how 
useful their work remains when grasped as a precursor to answers that we might offer in 
response to questions that currently preoccupy us.  
I begin by explicating James’ position that it is a mistake to suppose that we 
register a world that we come upon already existing; that this mistake fuels the 
empiricistic view that beliefs are “inner representations” that the “outer world” impresses 
upon the mind; and that this empiricistic view generates confused and hopelessly 
sceptical theories of knowledge.  I also review how James’ well-known pragmatic 
defence of our “right to believe” is, in fact, an attack on and alternative to sceptical 
theories of knowledge that undermine the basis upon which we can justify belief in 
anything whatever.  It is well to note ahead of time that I situate James’ critique of 
mainstream empiricism in the context of 19th century evolutionary theory.  I do so 
because James held that empiricist psychologists and neo-Lamarckian evolutionists 
perpetuate the same basic model of mind, and he used Darwinian thinking to challenge 
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both schools. He particularly used it to justify his claim that subjective interests can 
emerge independently of environmental stimuli, and this claim was key to his critique of 
mainstream empiricism. It was key because he maintained that interests affect what we 
attend to and consequently what we experience.  He also maintained that they shape our 
actions, and actions of a certain shape engender experiences of a certain shape. Thereby 
he was able to argue that our experiences are structured by factors that arise 
independently of the sensible world—a position that undercuts empiricistic theories of 
knowledge that start with the assumption that sense experience moulds the mind.  In 
making this claim, I do not mean to suggest he completely rejected mainstream 
empiricism. On the contrary, I will argue that he strived to effect a kind of reconciliation 
between competing empiricist and rationalist schools. 
Here it is worth stressing that it is not, as many might suppose, the emphasis on 
“adaptation” that particularly drew James to Darwinism.  If this were the case, he might 
have just as easily embraced Spencer’s neo-Lamarckism—which, incidentally, he did for 
a brief period in his late teens or very early twenties (Richards 1987, p. 424).  What 
James (1880), in fact, thought most crucial about Darwinism is that it discriminates 
between causes that generate and maintain a variation, and teaches us to see that the “two 
sets of causes belong to two . . . irrelevant cycles” (p. 622). It therewith teaches us to 
recognize the existence of “different cycles of operation in nature” that are “relatively 
independent of one another” (p. 621). Versions of this idea undergird everything from his 
theories of mind and knowledge to his attempts to justify the pragmatic grounds upon 
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which he defended certain beliefs to his pluralistic and indeterministic worldview.1  In 
spite of this pervasive influence, Robert Richards is the only author I have encountered 
who develops a detailed historical account of how Darwinism informed James (see 
Richards 1987, chap. 9). Yet Richards does not show, as I will, that James used 
Darwinian thinking to broker a middle way between empiricism and rationalism.  Nor 
does he specifically tie James’ anti-sceptical project to the evolutionary debates that 
raged in his day. 
Insofar as James held that actions in the world engender experiences, and insofar 
as he treated subjective interests as regulatory structures around which actions and 
therewith experiences are organized, his emphasis on subjective interests had a 
counterintuitive effect: it shifted the locus of human experience from the private, 
subjective level to that of the world.  Dewey did likewise when he proposed that the 
phenomenon of experience emerges in much the same way as the phenomenon of art.  In 
making this point, he emphasized the ancient roots of the word “experience” and other 
related terms.  “Experience” comes from experiri—Latin for “try”—and is related to the 
word “expert,” which implies skill. The word “empirical,” which means based on 
experience, comes via Latin from the Greek word empeirikos; empeiria means 
“experience,” and empeiros means “skilled,” based on “experiment” or “trial,” and thus 
based on action, for experimenting means acting on things in systematically varied ways.  
 
1 I will not attend particularly to how James’ pluralistic and indeterministic worldview relates to 
Darwinism.  However, I invite the reader to compare the passages from which I quote above to the 
definitions of pluralism and indeterminism that James offered in subsequently published works (1884, p. 
570; 1907a, p. 556; 1909, p. 777), and to notice that they are not merely similar, but practically 
interchangeable.  
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For the ancient Greeks, wrote Dewey (1925), “[e]xperience . . .  signified a store of 
practical wisdom, a fund of insights useful in conducting the affairs of life” (p. 354). 
Even today skilled people are called “experienced.”  People become experienced when 
they acquire practiced habits of action that enable them to proficiently negotiate 
affordances and constraints of their world in such a way as to bring about certain desired 
ends; and the practiced actions they deploy fundamentally shape their experiences of the 
world.  “Thus understood, experience is exemplified in the discrimination and skill of . . . 
good . . . [artisans]; experience is equivalent to art” (p. 354). 
If Aristotle’s words are to be trusted, then Dewey exaggerated when he suggested 
that ancient Greeks equated experience (empeiria) to art (tekhne), for while Aristotle 
relates the two, he also differentiates them (see Met. 981a1-20). That Dewey embellished, 
however, does not undermine or alter his position that much of human experience 
emerges through practical transactions in the world. Nor does it threaten his notion that 
the human subject and other factors in the world of which the subject is a part behave 
simultaneously as artists and artistic media. This means they mutually work upon one 
another, as when a hiker’s stride presses into a sandy trail, and the trail presses back, 
modulating and patterning the hiker’s gait, so that a series of interactions integrates into 
experience.  Here experience is not merely integrated in the sense that it pulls together 
like an artistic composition, but also in the sense that it arises out of a “thoroughgoing 
integration of what philosophy discriminates as ‘subject’ and ‘object’” (1934, p. 277). 
Again, the yielding sand modifies the hiker’s tread, the hiker’s tread the sand; and 
through this mutual shaping—this integration of one to the other—the sandy quality of 
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“soft give” is realized and brought concretely into experience. Through a range of 
descriptions too elaborate to summarize here, Dewey illustrated that what is so of the 
hiker’s stride is generally so of perception, experience and knowledge: they integrate, 
cohere and coordinate around actions in the world. 
From this it may seem to follow that we can, by means of action, arbitrarily bring 
whatever we want into experience.  However, this was clearly not Dewey’s point, for he 
recognized that we cannot act however we want.  Our capacities for action are limited in 
scope, and the objects we encounter further constrain our actions. Once again, our 
situation is analogous to that of artists. Artists create, but not out of nothing.  “Art is a 
process of production in which natural materials are re-shaped…” or reconstructed 
(1929a, p. xv), and the materials at hand impose structural limits on what artists can 
produce. If one defines “structural limits” as available potentialities, then experience 
itself becomes reconstructive, for the mutual adaptation of subject and object—the very 
heart of experience, according to Dewey—becomes a process of structures acting upon 
and exploiting the potentialities of one another; therewith it becomes a process of 
restructuring or reconstruction.  To speak of things as “structures” in this sense is not to 
characterize them in terms of what they “are,” but in terms of what they allow, or as 
Dewey put it, in terms of “what they can do and what can be done with them” (1920, p. 
115).  In a very lose sense, it is to characterize them in terms of a priori limits. 
The term “a priori” is especially associated with Immanuel Kant, a philosopher 
many pragmatists spurn. Yet some pragmatists identified with him, most notably, Charles 
Sanders Peirce, C. I. Lewis and Nelson Goodman.  Goodman, in particular, identified his 
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Ways of Worldmaking (1978) as a book “belonging in that mainstream of modern 
philosophy that began [with] Kant” (p. x). Whereas thinkers predating Kant generally 
held that we only know what an object is when our cognition conforms to it, Kant 
famously proposed that knowing an object might mean bringing the object into 
conformity with cognition. He proposed, more specifically, that logic sets a priori limits 
on how the world can be cognized, and that people have knowledge and coherent 
experience only insofar as the phenomenal world is pulled into arrangements that 
conform with these limits.  On the Kantian view, therefore, the phenomenal world is not 
simply given; it is constructed, put together and made—albeit not, for the most part, 
through any intentional decision making process. 
It might be said, therefore, that pragmatism combines the Kantian insight that 
people play a role in constituting the phenomenal world with the American mythos that 
people make their world by the work of their own hands. It is a vision that Ralph Waldo 
Emerson (1936), who was, in fact, James’ godfather, anticipated with remarkable clarity.  
Though not a pragmatist or even a proto-pragmatist, Emerson, like Dewey, emphasized 
art as tekhne or craft. Relating the artistic to the practical, he suggested that artistic 
actions are modes through which “being” and “reality” pass into appearance; and with the 
aid of a peculiar mix of Kantianism, Platonism and a typically American “hands-on” 
ideology, he arrived at a philosophy of building and world-making, and so came to 
declare: “Whilst the abstract question occupies your intellect[,] nature brings it in the 
concrete to be solved by your hands.  . . . So shall we come to look at the world with new 
eyes” and see that “Nature is not fixed but fluid.  Spirit alters, moulds, makes it.  . . . 
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Every spirit builds itself a house; and beyond its house a world.  . . . Build, therefore, 
your own world” (p. 48; emphasis added). 
While this vision of personal authorship is empowering, some are wont to object 
that it fates us to a subjective realm of merely personal perspectives.  As stated at the 
outset, classical pragmatists believed we are actually saved from this fate by the very fact 
that we exercise some authorship over our worlds, and I have already outlined a number 
of reasons why they thought this is so: it undermines the notion that knowing is an affair 
of having mental representations of realities we never directly encounter; it shows that we 
are never in a position to arbitrarily experience things in any way whatever; and it shows 
that whatever may go on “inside our heads,” experience is not reducible to it.  
In this dissertation, I will explicate and occasionally expand these lines of 
argument.  In doing so, I will put before the reader a range of anti-sceptical claims that 
can be developed out of the philosophy of James and Dewey.  I will especially strive to 
establish: 
i) That interactions in the world achieve outcomes traditionally attributed 
to inner operations of mind or brain; that insensitivity to this fuels 
seriously misplaced conceptions about “reality” and how we relate to it; 
and that these misplaced conceptions promulgate subjectivism on such a 
scale that even scientists become unwitting promoters of it. 
  
ii) That a worldly situation is, as Dewey puts it, a “form or scheme . . . in 
which meaning and understanding occur” (1925, p. 181).  In advancing 
this view, Dewey challenges the doctrine that conceptual forms are merely 
nominal and projected onto an inherently meaningless world.  
 
iii) That perception—especially aesthetic perception—occurs when 
different sensitivities and capacities coordinate into joint action by 
synchronizing around objects and events. If we recognize this, we will 
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realize that contrary to what the old saw says, perception is not easily 
deceived. 
 
I will develop these various lines of argument with the overarching aim of showing that 
the philosophical question of how we can ever get outside of private consciousness so as 
to come to know the world is not as serious a problem as might be supposed. I will also 
argue that the feeling of being isolated within our own private sphere of subjectivity is 
symptomatic of a kind of pathology or breakdown.   For Dewey, aesthetic experience is 
the contrary of such breakdown (e.g., 1934, p. 19), and in later chapters of this 
dissertation—which are dedicated to his work on aesthetics—I address this point. 
I recognize that the account offered so far may strike some readers as “mushy” 
and vague, especially readers committed to Anglo-analytic philosophical traditions.  
Worse still, it may seem to unwittingly perpetuate the subjectivistic view that the worlds 
we experience are, as the expression goes, “mere constructions of reality.” In the brief 
space of this introduction, I cannot easily deflect such impressions, though I would point 
out that all living beings modify and in this sense build their worlds, and this does not in 
any way diminish the reality of these worlds. I will also make a concession. James was a 
leading psychologist of his day and his writing was occasionally burdened by a 
promiscuous use of conventional, psychological vocabulary.  While such language can be 
put to good use, its casual deployment often imposes questionable compartmentalizations 
on human experience. It also invites vague explanations involving equally vague 
“psychological processes” on occasions when significantly more concrete explanations 
are available.  
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In this respect, Dewey was very different than James.  In his mature works, he 
avoided speaking about psychological states and processes, even when discussing 
perception, experience and knowledge. He was able to do this largely by virtue of 
employing a basically Kantian precept.  Though Kant inquired into how we cognize 
things, he was not preoccupied with discovering specific processes that lead to cognition. 
His chief aim, rather, was to show that regardless of what processes are involved, objects 
of cognition must be brought into conformity with logic or not be cognized at all.  
Whereas Kant focused on how logic limits possibilities of intelligible experience, Dewey 
focused on how possibilities of worldly action set boundaries on how things must be 
experienced if they are to be experienced at all (see Dewey 1906, pp. 469-475).  These 
limits are factual, not logical.  This means there is no set list of limits and that limits can 
change, though in many cases it is practically certain that they will not.  That limits are 
factual also means that they are delineated by worldly interrelationships—a point that 
turned out to be crucial to Dewey’s anti-sceptical project. 
While acknowledging the aforementioned shortcomings in James’ work, I still 
maintain that he successfully challenged empiricistic conceptualizations of experience; 
that he showed that they lead to confused and hopelessly sceptical theories of knowledge; 
and that he began to build alternatives to these theories.  I ask readers to focus upon this 
contribution when considering what I have to say about James. I also ask them to 
remember that Dewey, though only seventeen years younger than James, had the benefit 
of surviving him by some four decades. This gave Dewey time to learn from James in the 
twofold sense of building upon his work and learning from his mistakes (see Dewey 
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1930, pp. 23-26), and in chapters on Dewey, I revisit the ideas of James with an eye to 
amending some of his missteps. 
As is likely evident from what I have said so far, there are a number of things 
conventionally done in dissertations that I do not do in mine. I do not, to begin with, 
include an extensive review of contemporary literature on classical pragmatism. In the 
case of James, I have already explained that I am unable to find scholarly pieces that 
attend closely and clearly to the issues with which I am concerned, even though I am 
convinced these issues are centrally important to his work. When it comes to Dewey, I 
have found one book that resonates with certain core issues addressed in this dissertation, 
namely, Victor Kestenbaum’s (1977) The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey: Habit 
and Meaning. Following Kestenbaum’s example, I occasionally draw support from 
phenomenologically oriented thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin 
Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Yet I do so sparingly and only 
when it highlights the import of what Dewey was trying to do. Kenstenbaum’s book, 
moreover, directed my attention to a number of key passages in which Dewey detailed 
the relationship between habitual actions, experience and art. Having acknowledged this 
debt, neither Kestenbaum nor anyone else I have encountered emphasize the radical 
extent to which Dewey held that hands, feet and other parts of the motor body function as 
perceptual organs.  This is a troubling gap in the literature, for the omission obscures how 
powerful Dewey’s account of perception is, and how fundamentally it departed from 
most other accounts of its day, with the notable exception of one Merleau-Ponty 
developed during the last decade of Dewey’s life.  The omission, as will become evident 
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later in this dissertation, also obscures how Dewey attempted to answer problems that he 
identified with both empiricist and rationalist schools. 
An additional way in which I break with what is conventionally done in 
dissertations is that I do not spend much time criticizing classical pragmatists.  However, 
this does not mean I engage with them uncritically. It means, rather, that I accept 
Collingwood’s view (which should be commonplace) that we cannot effectively criticize 
a thinker if we are unclear on what that thinker intended to say. It also means that while I 
grant that James and Dewey occasionally advanced questionable ideas, I will focus 
particularly on those that were uncommonly fruitful in their day, and I will endeavour to 
show that they remain so today.  I will defend the aforementioned ideas by presenting 
them as clearly as I can and by defending them against misunderstandings. In doing so, I 
will render a service to critics of classical pragmatists, for the arduous task of getting 
clear on what pragmatists meant to say is a preliminary step in honest and cogent 
criticism. 
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-One- 
Sculpting Experiential Worlds:  
James and his Darwinian Concept of Consciousness 
 
Because James described himself as a “radical empiricist,” and because the 
Anglo-American tradition is largely hostile to rationalism, many have the impression that 
James unequivocally opposed rationalists. Yet contrary to his reputation, James explicitly 
sided with rationalists on certain issues, and reserved some of his harshest criticisms for 
British empiricists.  He particularly criticized empiricists such as Herbert Spencer, who 
suggested that the world moulds the mind through “…a kind of direct pressure, very 
much as a seal presses . . . wax into harmony with itself” (James 1880, p. 622). Not only 
did James reject the tenability of this position; he also showed that it fuels hopelessly 
sceptical theories of knowledge—a point taken up in the next chapter. 
To appreciate how James responded to Spencer, it is important to recognize, first, 
that Spencer was not only a British empiricist, but also an evolutionary theorist 
committed to the neo-Lamarckian notion of “direct adaptation” that holds that 
environmental pressures elicit adaptive variations, as opposed to merely reinforcing 
them; and, second, that James regarded direct adaptation as an analogue to the British 
empiricist claim that environmental stimuli mould the mind. Because the Darwinian 
theory of “indirect adaptation” was an obvious alternative to neo-Lamarckism, and 
because James equated neo-Lamarckism to British empiricism, he saw Darwinism as a 
useful weapon in his lifelong fight to remediate empiricism. He co-opted the Darwinian 
idea that the environment reinforces adaptive variations that arise independently of the 
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pressures it exerts.  He used this idea to explain how certain psychological proclivities 
emerge independently of environmental stimuli.  By doing so, he established grounds 
upon which he could justify his conviction that we do not passively receive a world that 
we come upon already existing, but rather experience a world that we help make. 
 
Pre-Darwinism and Darwinism 
Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace, co-founders of evolution by natural 
selection, were not first to declare that organisms evolve—that idea dates to antiquity. 
Nor, observed James, were they first to proclaim that the environment preserves adaptive 
variations, so that, for example, the long neck of “[t]he giraffe . . . is preserved by the fact 
that there are in his environment tall trees whose leaves he can digest” (1880, p. 622). 
What they were first to do was to realize the extent to which different forces are 
responsible for the production and preservation of variations. 
On the pre-Darwinian view—by which James primarily meant Jean Baptiste 
Lamarck filtered through Spencer—environmental pressures that preserve adaptive 
variations also elicit them: tall trees actually make necks “…long by the constant striving 
they [arouse] in [the animal] to reach up to them” (1880, p. 622).  On the Darwinian 
view, by contrast, the role of the trees “…is much more that of selecting forms . . . than 
producing [them]” (1890ii, p. 636, fn.). Animals are, for reasons independent of the trees, 
born with varying neck lengths. Those who happen to have longer necks enjoy higher 
rates of survival and reproduction, and from a “strong principle of inheritance,” as 
Darwin called it, the variation propagates, thus increasing average length of neck. 
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Comparing this process to the agricultural practice of selectively breeding for desired 
traits, Darwin remarked: 
…when man is the selecting agent, we clearly see that the two elements of 
change are distinct; variability is in some manner excited, but it is the will 
of man which accumulates the variations in certain directions; and it is this 
latter agency which answers to the survival of the fittest under nature 
(1872, pp. 129-130). 
 
Darwin, wrote James, discriminated “between causes which [produce a variation] and 
causes that maintain it after it is produced,” an achievement James extolled as “the 
triumphant originality of Darwin” (1880, p. 622).  
James did not offer this complement disinterestedly, however, for he wanted to 
show that human cognition can fit the environment, and yet, like the neck of the giraffe, 
not be directly elicited by it. He proposed this on a phylogenetic level and, more 
innovatively, on an ontogenetic level. In doing so, he claimed to challenge mainstream 
empiricism, and even to side with the rationalistic psychology of “apriorists”—a position 
from which he normally distanced himself. No longer, he flatly stated, “…can we believe 
[the empiricist view] that the coupling of terms within the mind are simple copies of 
corresponding couplings impressed upon it by the environment” (1890ii, p. 688).   “On 
the whole, then, the account which the apriorists give . . . is that which I defend” (1890ii, 
p. 618; also see 1878a, p. 897, fn.).  In fact, on the whole James did not champion one 
side over the other; rather, he used the Darwinian concept of “selection” to bridge the 
two. 
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Rationalism, Empiricism and Neo-Lamarckism 
James (1890ii) drew—in fact, somewhat overdrew—the distinction between 
rationalist and empiricist psychologies much as commentators today do. By the former he 
meant the view that the mind has native structure (p. 676); that it grasps certain universal 
and necessary truths independently of sense experience (p. 661); and that it uses this a 
priori knowledge to actively structure the phenomenal world (p. 619). By the latter he 
meant the view that simple ideas first enter the mind via sensation, and that these—like 
atoms bonding into molecules—mechanically adhere into complex ideas in 
configurations matching  “…the order of combination in which [they] were originally 
awakened by impressions of the external world” (p. 619).  James attributed this second 
view to any number of British empiricists, yet none more so than Spencer, whom he 
accused of reducing the sentient organism to “absolutely passive clay” upon which the 
environment impresses its order (1878b, p. 929; 1890i, p. 403). 
 Spencer was not only a noted British empiricist, but also a prominent 19th century 
evolutionist. He was friends with both Wallace and T. H. Huxley, “Darwin’s bulldog,” so 
called for his vociferous defence of natural selection, and it was Spencer who coined the 
phrase Darwin made famous: “survival of the fittest.”  Some of Spencer’s evolutionary 
writings pre-dated Darwin’s and loosely anticipated natural selection. However, his 
thought—even his so-called “social Darwinism”—more closely resembled “neo-
Lamarckism.”  That is to say, it resembled and indeed contributed to a late 19th century 
reworking of Lamarck that overemphasized his principle of “inheritance of acquired 
characters,” and abandoned his “cardinal idea that evolution is an active, creative 
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response by organisms to their felt needs,” describing it instead as an outcome of “direct 
impositions by impressing environments on the passive organism” (Gould, 1979, p. 77).  
Recognizing the resonance between this vision of “direct adaptation” and stock empiricist 
accounts of cognition, Spencer mingled the two into what James called “evolutionary 
empiricism.” 
It is not only the mind, wrote Spencer (1855), that is ordered “in correspondence 
with the order of phenomena in the environment” (p. 507), but all living activities: a yeast 
cell reacts “in correspondence with the chemical changes of the elements bathing its 
surface” (p. 385), a tree “in correspondence with . . . seasons” (p. 413). Thus where 
earlier British empiricists held that relations between ideas “in” the mind correspond to 
relations between objects of the “outer” world, Spencer described everything from 
vegetative processes to muscular and nervous actions on up to human intelligence as an 
“adjustment of inner to outer relations . . . initiated by the actions of things . . . outside of 
the organism” (p. 498). To this he added the Lamarckian principle of inheritance of 
acquired characters, arguing that features impressed upon an organism during its lifetime 
are in some measure inherited by its progeny. This meant a departure from the classic 
empiricist tenet that each mind enters the world as a “blank slate.” Even so Spencer’s 
psychology remained essentially empiricist. As James noted, it retained the core 
empiricist thesis that each “mind owes its present shape to experience,” only in this case 
experience included both that “of the individual” and that “of ancestors as well” (1890ii, 
p. 620). 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
21 
James questioned inheritance of acquired characters, particularly its applicability 
to human psychology.  In Brute and Human Intellect (1878b), he complained that  “…we 
do not observe that children of great travelers get their geography lessons with unusual 
ease, or that a baby whose ancestors have spoken German will . . . learn Italian any less 
easily…” (p. 948).  In the last chapter of his Principles of Psychology (1890ii), written 
shortly after the neo-Darwinian biologist August Weismann published his famous attacks 
on Lamarck, James more forcefully declared: “…we have as yet perhaps not one single 
unequivocal item of positive proof” supporting the Lamarckian mechanism  (p. 688). He 
concluded, therefore, that if humans do come pre-equipped with adaptive psychological 
endowments, it is likely a legacy of “…congenital variations, ‘accidental’ in the first 
instance, but then transmitted as a fixed feature of the race” (p. 618). 
Even more than he objected to inheritance of acquired characters, James protested 
direct adaptation and the analogue empiricist claim that experience—here understood as 
impositions of impressing environments—directly moulds the mind. Impressions, he 
urged, cannot by themselves determine how the mind relates objects together, 
[because e]very phenomenon or so-called fact has an infinity of aspects or 
properties.  Even so simple a fact as a line which you trace in the air may 
be considered in respect to its form, its length, its direction, and its 
location.  When we reach more complex facts, the number of ways in 
which we may regard [and consequently relate] them is literally countless 
(1878b, pp. 921-922). 
 
Supposing, therefore, that experience were “equivalent to the mere presence to the senses 
of an outward order,” and supposing further that the contents of mind were arranged after 
this order, then, wrote James, experience would be “utter chaos” and consciousness “a 
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gray chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for us even to conceive” (1878b, p. 929; also 
see 1890i, pp. 402-403). This not being so, he conjectured the mind must have means—
for example, organizing principles—with which it attends to certain relations while 
ignoring others.  
In pursuing this conjecture, however, James did not reject British empiricists’ 
emphasis on experience, but rather their concept of it. Whereas British empiricists tended 
to conceive of experience as the world imposed through the senses, James regarded it 
chiefly as that to which the mind consciously attends. “Millions of items,” he wrote, greet 
the senses, and yet do not “properly enter . . . experience”  (1878b, p. 929; 1890i, p. 402). 
They do not because “…consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency”; it 
chooses  “…one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice, emphasizing 
and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible all the rest” (1890i, p. 139).  
James, in fact, agreed that experience of the world significantly shapes each mind, but 
with the proviso that each mind is empowered to select what it experiences. “My 
experience,” he declared,  “is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice 
shape my mind…” (1878b, pp. 929-930; 1890i, p. 402). 
James thereby combined the empiricist claim that the world imposes form on the 
mind with the rationalist claim that the mind imposes form on the world—this, however, 
with another proviso. Whereas rationalists held that innate knowledge of necessary 
relations is the template upon which cognition relates content into intelligible forms, 
James—while tentatively acknowledging a few such a priori rational principles (e.g., 
1890ii, pp. 661-662)—emphasized another mechanism: selective interest, which he called 
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“the real a priori element in cognition” (1878a, p. 897, fn.). Place different people in the 
same environment, he wrote, and each will have “selected, out of the same mass of 
presented objects, those which suited his private interest.” Ask how each “proceeds 
rationally to connect [objects],” and once again “we find selection . . . to be omnipotent” 
(1879a, p. 12; 1890i, p. 287). Interests “cooperate with the environment in moulding 
intelligence” and thus justify both the empiricist emphasis on the environment and the 
“…refusal of a priori schools to admit the mind [is] a pure, passive receptivity” (quoted 
in Commager, 1950, p. 92).  
Here the crucial point of agreement between James’ account of consciousness and 
the a priori account of rationalist psychologists was not that the mind has certain native 
proclivities, but that factors that are logically prior to or independent of experience shape 
how the world appears to the mind.  This is a subtlety Spencer missed when he suggested 
his neo-Lamarckian account reconciles a priori and empiricist psychologies because it 
agrees with the former that each mind comes pre-equipped with certain endowments, and 
yet agrees with the latter that an individual’s mind is nevertheless wholly a product of 
experience, albeit experience that includes both that of the individual and that of 
ancestors (see Spencer, 1855, §197).  As James pointed out, Spencer’s interpretation not 
only maintained the basic British empiricist model, but radically extended it to a 
phylogenetic level.  And James, as will soon be seen, countered empiricistic psychology 
by using a Darwinian line of reasoning to argue that the mind cannot be affected by 
environmental stimuli unless it first possesses interests and functionally similar 
sensitivities that make it receptive to the stimuli; that some of these sensitivities must 
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arise independently of experience; and that these sensitivities are therefore a priori 
elements in cognition that limit what appears to consciousness. 
 
Assimilating the Darwinian Idea of Indirect Adaptation 
It was not simply by evoking the concept of “selection” that James appropriated 
natural selection into his account of consciousness. Rather, it was by using the concept to 
allow for a separation between that which generates content and that which makes it 
inhere—a separation he described in two ways.  First, he maintained that the environment 
generates different varieties of sensory content, which selective interests then occlude or 
reinforce, even “…as to give the least frequent [varieties] far more power to shape our 
forms of thought than the most frequent ones possess” (1878b, p. 930; 1890i, p. 403).  
Second, he theorized “that accidental out-births of spontaneous variation in . . . the 
excessively instable human brain” spawn new ideas, new mental ways of relating things 
(1880, p. 641; also see 1890ii, p. 636). While many of these new ways “perish through 
their worthlessness” (1890ii, p. 636), some help us draw useful connections between 
things in the world and are therefore reinforced. Here the observable world “…is the 
cause of their preservation, not that of their production” (1890ii, p. 636). 
James cited the two aforementioned cases as violations of Spencer’s position that 
the “outer” world determines the whole of our “inner” life. In the first case, interests 
direct our attention to certain things, and influence how we relate one to another, all of 
which is to say: “…interests precede the outer relations noticed” (1878a, p. 897, fn.). The 
second case is similar. New ideas are preserved because they help us draw connections 
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between things in the “outer” world.  So once again, there is a sense in which “…‘inner 
relations’ are what engender experiences [or ‘outer relations’] here” (1890ii, p. 638).  
This view has an analogue in both pre-Darwinian and Darwinian transactional 
ecology, according to which organisms are not only shaped by the “outer” environment, 
but are also shapers of it.  It aligns, however, more intimately with the transactionalism of 
the latter than the former, a distinction the contemporary evolutionist, paleontologist and 
historian of science Stephen Jay Gould elucidated in a 1979 article. “In a classic and 
recent case,” he wrote, 
several species of tits learned to pry the tops off English milk bottles to 
drink the cream within.  One can well imagine a subsequent evolution of 
bill shape to make the pilferage easier […].  Is this not Lamarckian in the 
sense that an active, nongenetic behavioral innovation sets the stage for 
reinforcing evolution?  Doesn’t Darwinism think of the environment as a 
refining fire and organisms as passive entities before it? (p. 81). 
 
No, Gould answered. Though commentators “…praise Lamarck for emphasizing 
organisms as creators of their environment,” the scenario with the tits is, in fact,  
…thoroughly Darwinian. The tits, in learning to invade the milk bottles, 
established new selective pressures by altering their own environment.  
Bills of a different shape will now be favored by natural selection.  The 
new environment does not provoke the tits to manufacture genetic 
variations directed towards the favored shape.  This, and only this, would 
be Lamarckian (p. 81). 
 
That is to say, while Darwinism and Lamarckism both leave room for the organism and 
the environment to change one another, only Lamarckism emphasizes the environment’s 
power to elicit—as opposed to reinforce—heritable, adaptive variations.  
In his (1809) Zoological Philosophy, Lamarck proposed that simple organisms 
spontaneously come into being at regular intervals, and that each progressively evolves 
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through an inbuilt “complexifying” force.  Lamarck added, however, that if this 
progressive tendency were the only factor influencing “…the shape . . . of animals, the 
growing complexity of organisation [in the taxonomic ladder] would everywhere be 
regular. But it is not” (p. 69).  So he proposed a secondary factor that neo-Lamarckians 
later made primary: environmental irregularity. Significant “…alterations in the 
environment of animals lead to great alterations in their needs, and these alterations in 
their needs necessarily lead to others in their actions” (p. 107). Altered actions, in turn, 
lead to the increased or decreased use of certain anatomical structures, and this to a 
corresponding augmentation or deterioration of structures. On the assumption of the 
heritability of acquired characters, future generations inherit these changes. 
Here the environment exerts a “direct” influence, though not in the sense of being 
unmediated since behavioural responses stand between environmental and anatomical 
changes.  Rather, the influence is direct—or “directed”—in the sense that anatomical 
variations are preferentially pushed in adaptive directions (Gould 1979, p. 79).  It is also 
direct in the sense that the altered environment belongs to the causal sequence leading to 
the production of anatomical changes. Darwinian evolution, by contrast, is “indirect.” 
Variations arise “with no preferred orientation in adaptive directions” (Gould 1979, p. 
79), for the environment does not cause and in that sense direct them. Instead, it 
reinforces or suppresses what has been produced independently of the pressures it exerts.  
This Darwinian conception of organism-world transactions informed a two-part 
argument that James fielded against the empiricist view that the mind is like clay upon 
which the world impresses its order. He began the argument by stressing the world-
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making power of mind. On the basis of interests, ideas and functionally similar 
mechanisms, the mind works on sense data “very much as a sculptor works on . . . stone” 
(1890i, p. 288), and thereby “makes experience” of the world (1890i, p. 403; also see 
1879a, p. 12).  Insofar as the aforesaid mechanisms influence action, and actions change 
the social and physical world, the world-making power of the mind extends to even the 
material conditions of life (1878a, p. 908). James insisted, therefore, “…that the knower 
is not simply a mirror . . . passively reflecting an order that he comes upon . . . [already] 
existing. The knower is an actor,” who registers “[that] which he helps to create” (1878a, 
p. 908). 
However, this first part of James’ two-part argument did not by itself align him 
with Darwinism. Nor by itself did it threaten environmental determinism.  After all, 
Spencer too had argued that the mind changes conditions of life. He had observed, for 
example, that the mind introduces technological and social complexities that transform 
the human world into one that increasingly favours “motor coordination,” “intelligence” 
and moral “power of self-regulation” over brute prowess (1852, pp. 496-497). And 
despite this, Spencer’s psychology had remained environmentally deterministic.  His neo-
Lamarckian stance, which emphasized the environment and downplayed behavioural 
innovation, implied that world-changing acts of mind are themselves determined by the 
actions of things outside the organism. The point James wanted to advance, therefore, 
was not merely that the mind shapes its world, but that it does so using mechanisms that 
emerge independently of environmental stimuli. This he did by raising a couple 
counterfactual objections. As already discussed, he protested that if the mind did not 
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come to the world already equipped with mechanisms that narrow its attention, then 
experience would be chaos; he further protested that if the environment were the sole 
shaper of mind, then all sentient beings in a shared environment should eventually 
develop “an identical mental constitution” (1878a, pp. 929; 1890i, p. 403). Based on 
thinking that resembled Darwin’s, he rejected this outcome as extremely unlikely.  
In pondering variation, Darwin (1859) had noted instances of the same variation 
arising “…under conditions of life as different as can well be conceived; and, on the other 
hand, of different varieties being produced . . . under the same conditions” (p. 133). This 
defying what one would expect if environmental pressures directly elicit variations, he 
judged that the “…facts show how indirectly the conditions of life must act” (pp. 133-
134). Along similar lines, James joked that if the environment exclusively and directly 
shaped the mind, then dogs bred amongst sculptures, 
…ought to become, if time were given, accomplished connoisseurs of 
sculpture. Anyone may judge of the probability of this consummation. 
Surely an eternity of experience of the statues would leave the dog as 
inartistic as he was at first, for the lack of an original interest to knit his 
discriminations on to (1890i, p. 403; also see 1878b, p. 930). 
 
Put another way, dogs could acquire artistic taste, but not solely as a result of 
environmental stimuli, for the environment can only reach dogs on an aesthetic level if 
dogs already possess sensitivities—or what James calls “selective interests”—that make 
them receptive to aesthetic stimulation. Therefore their interests must change before the 
environment can reinforce an aesthetic appreciation. “Interests,” wrote James, “are an all-
essential factor which no writer pretending to give an account of mental evolution has a 
right to neglect” (1878a, p. 897, fn.). 
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The view offered here mirrors the Darwinian position that environmental 
pressures shape only what already exists in some degree. Many evolutionists, for 
example, now believe that proto-birds possessed feathers for thermoregulation, not flight. 
However, it so happened that feathers enabled them in some slight degree to exploit 
aeronautic factors that slow descent, and thus to leap greater distances. Because this 
behaviour was advantageous, accidental congenital variations that further facilitated it 
were selectively reinforced. Future generations consequently became increasingly 
flightworthy. The point, once again, is that Darwinian evolution follows principally from 
changes in organisms that are reinforced but not caused by environmental pressures. This 
was also James’ point about the dogs: “The interests precede the outer relation noticed” 
(1878a, p. 897, fn.).   Just as creatures cannot be shaped by flight-enabling properties of 
atmosphere unless they first possess features that exploit such properties, dogs cannot be 
shaped by aesthetic phenomena unless they first possess interests that make them 
sensitive to such phenomena. 
James directed this argument against conventional British empiricist psychology, 
as well as neo-Lamarckism.  In either case, however, his point was not that the 
environment is unimportant or unnecessary for mental development, but that it is 
insufficient. Breaking eggs, he quipped, “…is a necessary condition of [an] omelet. But is 
it a sufficient condition? Does an omelet appear whenever three eggs are broken?” (1880, 
p. 634).  So he argued of the mind. He noted, for example, that the ancient Greek mind is 
revered for its versatile intelligence, and it may be “…that such commercial dealings with 
the world as the geographical Hellas afforded [were] a necessary condition” of its 
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development. “But if they [were] a sufficient condition, why did not the Phoenicians 
outstrip the Greeks in intelligence?”  They did not, James answered, because an 
environment cannot “…produce a given type of mind.  It can only foster and further 
certain types fortuitously produced, and thwart and frustrate others” (1880, p. 634). 
In the same way that environmental pressures do not solely determine the 
evolutionary course of a species, environmental stimuli do not solely determine how 
individual minds develop during the course of a single lifetime. James argued this on the 
factual grounds that minds do, as a matter of record, adapt to similar environments in a 
plurality of ways; on the conceptual grounds that environmental stimuli can only shape 
mental content that already exists in some degree; and on the functional grounds that we, 
as conscious subjects, “can be efficient at all only by picking out what to attend to” 
(1880, p. 620). On the basis of selective attention, we focus on this or that, but never 
everything at once. On the same basis, we draw certain connections between things, 
while suppressing others. To some extent, therefore, we limit what sorts of things appear 
to us and how these things are put together, meaning we play a role in sculpting our own 
experiential worlds. 
 
Copernican and Darwinian Revolutions 
 
Unlike pragmatists such as C. S. Peirce, C. I. Lewis and Nelson Goodman, James 
little appreciated Immanuel Kant’s famous “Copernican revolution,” and was at times 
flippantly dismissive of it (e.g., 1890ii, p. 275; 1898, p. 1096).  However, his knowledge 
of Kant was scant.  So consequently were his remarks about Kant, and they are to be 
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taken lightly. While his assimilation of Darwinian evolution did, at certain points, break 
decisively from Kant’s Copernican revolution, the two philosophical projects had 
noteworthy parallels. These breaks and parallels are worth considering, especially if, as 
Goodman suggested, Kant pioneered a movement that set the stage for pragmatic 
philosophies of world-making (see 1978, p. x). 2 
An initial point to note is that the British empiricists provoked both Kant and 
James.  For Kant it was David Hume; for James it was Spencer. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Kant respected Hume enough to recognize that Hume’s well-known 
sceptical conclusions could not be dismissed out of hand. Kant’s solution was not to deny 
the British empiricist position by burying his head in rationalism, but rather to effect a 
reconciliation between the two philosophical schools.   In this regard Kant may be 
compared to James.  By assimilating the Darwinian notion of indirect adaptation into his 
theory of mind, James was able to agree with empiricists that it is by experience that 
beliefs are justified, and yet also agree with rationalists that legitimate beliefs can arise 
independently of experience.  
In responding to British empiricists, Kant and James both inverted the way in 
which western philosophers traditionally look at knowledge.  According to Kant, thinkers 
before him had held that to know objects, “our cognition must conform to the objects” 
 
2 In the pages that follow, I summarize claims from the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
that are relevant to issues addressed in this dissertation. No synopsis of Kant could be uncontroversial to 
anyone familiar with his work and its diverse receptions, but I shall presume—without argument—that 
readers who have long pondered both of them will recognize my approach as defensible. I shall cite 
sections of Kant’s Critique that are of especial weight, giving page numbers of the second edition as 
republished within the standard German edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, edited by 
the Royal Prussian [later German] Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer [later Walter de Gruyter & 
Co.], 1900 -). 
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(Bxvi). Citing difficulties with this approach, Kant explored an alternative possibility, 
“namely that we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into 
them” (Bxviii). In other words, we can only cognize and thus come to know what is 
brought into conformity with our cognition—a clear inversion of the traditional view just 
mentioned.  Kant described his approach as analogous to that of Nicolaus Copernicus,  
…who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the 
celestial motions when he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves 
around the observer [i.e., the Earth], tried to see if he might not have 
greater success if he made the [Earth] revolve and left [the Sun and other] 
stars at rest (Bxvi). 
 
In this sort of case, cognition is not made to conform to the objects, but rather the reverse.  
The thought that the Sun is at rest literally changes how we must picture the paths of 
planetary objects if we are to picture them coherently at all. Our cognition thereby pulls 
objects into an arrangement, makes them appear in conformity with it.  
Kant conjectured that the same occurs on a more basic level, arguing that there 
are a priori limits on how the mind can interpret the world, and that people have 
knowledge and coherent experience only insofar as the world is brought into conformity 
with these limits (see Bxvi-Bxix).  Kant maintained, accordingly, that knowledge and 
experience are actively constituted by the mind. James advanced an analogous thesis. He 
maintained, first, that there are “a priori element[s] in cognition” (1878a, p. 897, fn.), 
only where Kant named specific a priori forms such as “quality” and “quantity,” James 
spoke primarily of subjective interests. He maintained, second, that interests and 
functionally similar mechanisms limit what sorts of things we notice and how we proceed 
“rationally to connect them” (1879a, p. 12; 1890i, p. 287). Similarly to Kant, therefore, 
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who argued that the mind encounters the world through certain a priori structures—that 
is, structures logically prior to experience of the world—James suggested that “interests 
precede” our experience of “outer relation[s]” (1878a, p. 897, fn.). 
That Kant and James shared this commonality led them to adopt analogous, 
though by no means identical, approaches to metaphysics—metaphysics being a field 
concerned with the conditions under which anything can be said to have “reality” at all.  
Taking a cue from the burgeoning experimental sciences, Kant maintained that reality 
can only be registered through some sort of active manipulation of it (Bxii-Bxiv)—that 
the mind not only acts to impose form on reality, thereby reconfiguring it, but that the 
mind must act so in order to coherently register anything as reality at all.  The mind does 
so, again, by operating within a priori limits that dictate how reality—which here means 
the phenomenal world—is put together, and thus how it shows up to the perceiving, 
experiencing and thinking mind (B161-B166).  This “putting together” is an interpretive 
act; things are united or synthesized—albeit often automatically and pre-reflectively—by 
means of a priori conceptual forms; and acts by which things are united by means of 
concepts are, in effect, acts of judgment, that is, acts in which certain affirmations are 
made about certain things.  Kant implied, accordingly, that human experience of reality is 
necessarily judgmental: any consciously registered reality is always already constituted 
through interpretive and hence judgmental acts of mind.  Kant’s approach to metaphysics, 
then, was not to start with a theory about how reality is, and from there move to an 
account about what sorts of judgments can legitimately be made about reality.  Rather, he 
began with the assertion that the human mind is limited to making certain kinds of 
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judgments, and from there developed a theory about how reality must be for the mind—a 
theory, that is to say, about the structures to which reality must be made to conform if it is 
to be registered at all.  His approach, therefore, to legitimating metaphysical judgments 
such as the principle of causality—that is, the judgment that all changes have causes—
was not to show that the principle is a fact observed in reality, but that it is a necessary 
condition of humans experiencing reality as they do.  For Kant, this meant that the 
experiential basis upon which empiricists challenge the principle actually presupposes the 
principle, thus rendering their refutation self-contradictory (B233-B248). 
Where Kant justified certain metaphysical judgments on the basis that they are 
pre-conditions of having any experience of reality whatever, James justified them on the 
grounds that they are pre-conditions of particular kinds of experiences.  James thus 
approached metaphysics from the same “inverted” direction as Kant, but understood 
metaphysical inquiry more narrowly as “nothing but an usually obstinate attempt to think 
clearly and consistently” about fundamental tenets that underlie a given field of human 
thought (1890i, p. 145). Put otherwise, he understood the task of metaphysics to be the 
elucidation of fundamental guiding beliefs that enable certain forms of life activity and 
therewith certain forms of experience. Oncologists, for example, encounter their world 
armed with the belief that cancer necessarily has causes.  This means that in the same 
way that a statistician can only account for that which is quantifiable, oncologists can 
only explain that to which causes can be ascribed. In Kantian terms, oncologic realities 
can only appear as realities insofar as they conform to the principle of causality.  Thus the 
principle demarcates a boundary beyond which oncologists cannot see—a limit, it might 
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be said, of the experiential world of oncology. The principle is justified, then, not because 
oncologists show it to be an observable fact in the realities they encounter, but because it 
is a precondition of them encountering and dealing practically with the reality of cancer 
as they do.   
A point at which James very noticeably departed from Kant, therefore, was in his 
refusal to recognize any clear separation between what Kant calls “constitutive” and 
“regulative” principles.   A constitutive principle is one such as the principle of causality, 
which, for Kant, is a necessary condition of anything appearing coherently to us. Because 
constitutive principles delimit how things must appear, they also delimit the sorts of 
objects about which one can have knowledge (B218-B21). A regulative principle, by 
contrast, is essentially a pragmatic principle (see Axinn 2006, pp. 84-88); it is a guideline 
for action, a teleological rule “…for seeking something we desire” (Axinn 2006, p. 85).  
A regulative principle does not, on Kant’s account, play a role in constituting how reality 
appears, and consequently does not postulate the existence of objects about which 
humans can have knowledge. Kant cited belief in God as an example (B647).  The belief 
guides human action, particularly in moral spheres (B661-663). Yet God, Kant insisted, is 
not a reality about which one can have genuine knowledge (B667-B670).  James agreed 
that reliable knowledge about God is unavailable; and he agreed that belief in God can 
only be justified on pragmatic grounds.  As will be seen in the next chapter, however, he 
also held this to be so of causality, especially the principle of causality.  Against Kant, 
furthermore, he suggested that belief in God—indeed, any belief that affects human 
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actions—is constitutive of human experience, and thus of how reality is experienced by 
humans.   
More broadly, James broke with Kant by extending—and some would say 
conceptually confusing—the a priori to include interests, inclinations and personally held 
beliefs.  Kant tried to show that logical constraints delimit a priori how reality must 
appear to all conscious beings who encounter things under the spatiotemporal conditions 
that humans do.  In calling these constraints “logical,” Kant asserted that they are 
universal and necessary. In some sense, James recognized that a priori constraints limit 
how reality appears.  Yet he suggested that while many of these constraints are necessary, 
relatively few are universal.  That is to say, he suggested many constraints are only a 
priori or necessary in relation to particular purposes and activities and also in relation to 
particular biological and psychological constitutions (see 1890ii, chap. 28). Thus his task 
was not really one of establishing logical limits, but of breaking such limits down by 
denying their universality.  As will be seen in the next chapter, this denial contributed to 
his anti-sceptical project, for a metaphysical judgment about all reality is a negative 
judgment.  Materialism, for example, makes the universal claim that all real objects are 
physical. More formally, it states that for any x, if x is real, then x is physical (Λx[Rx  → 
Px]), and this is equivalent to negating the existential claim that there is no x such that x 
is real and not physical (~Vx[Rx ^ ~Px]). Thus on a concrete or existential level, the 
universal statement is a negative or sceptical judgement about certain kinds of reality.  By 
denying the universality of metaphysical judgements, James did not abrogate sceptical 
judgments, but he did restrict how far we may cast our sceptical nets in a given instance. 
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Where James fundamentally agreed with Kant, however, and where he arguably 
amplified one of Kant’s profound insights, was in his conviction that we add to reality. 
“In point of fact,” he wrote, our world   
…seems to grow by our mental determinations… Take the ‘great bear’ or 
‘dipper’ constellation in the heavens. We call it by that name, we count the 
stars and call them seven, we say they were seven before they were 
counted, and we say that whether any one had ever noted the fact or not, 
the dim resemblance to a long-tailed (or long-necked?) animal was always 
truly there. But what do we mean by this projection into past eternity of 
recent human ways of thinking? Did an ‘absolute’ thinker actually do the 
counting, tell off the stars upon his standing number-tally, and make the 
bear-comparison […]? Were they explicitly seven, explicitly bear-like, 
before the human witness came? Surely nothing in the truth of the 
attributions drives us to think this. They were only implicitly or virtually 
what we call them, and we human witnesses first explicated them and 
made them ‘real.’ A fact virtually pre-exists when every condition of its 
realization save one is already there. In this case the condition lacking is 
the act of the counting and comparing mind (1904a, pp. 472-473). 
 
Our judgments, James concluded, change reality; or “[our] judgments at any rate change 
the character of future reality by the acts to which they lead” (1904a, p. 473). 
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-Two- 
The Right to Believe: 
 Turning Darwinism against Empiricistic Scepticism 
 
James is remembered for challenging empiricistic scepticism about spiritual 
realities by expounding a more encompassing “radical empiricism” that takes all 
experiences seriously, including spiritual ones. Strangely he is not much noted for 
applying the same strategy to Darwinism, yet this was what he did. By extending and 
assimilating the idea of indirect adaptation into a teleological theory of knowledge, he 
developed alternatives to confused empiricistic outlooks that compromise not only our 
“right to believe” in spiritual realities, but our capacity to justify belief in anything 
whatever. 
At first blush, this thesis might seem problematic.  It might seem so, to begin 
with, because Darwin promulgated an anti-teleological concept of nature. Yet this 
objection fails to appreciate that James grounded his teleological theory of knowledge on 
the premise that genuine teloi or ends only appear when consciousness posits them—a 
premise he could not have defended, for example, had he accepted Aristotle’s notion that 
nature is teleological, yet non-conscious and non-deliberative. James thus went out of his 
way to affirm the anti-teleological side of Darwinism when advancing his own 
teleological theory (see 1879a, p. 7).  A second reason some may doubt that Darwinism 
significantly influenced his teleological theory of knowledge is that he only occasionally 
described it in explicitly Darwinian terms. What this misses, however, is that the theory 
derived from his concept of consciousness as a selecting agency, which clearly has a 
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Darwinian basis. Also missed is the fact that James had a frontline view of the Darwinian 
debate during his student years; that he was well versed in Darwinism, having published 
and lectured on it early in his career; and that threads of his teleological theory appeared 
as early as 1865 in a piece discussing Wallace, who was himself becoming disenchanted 
with materialism, and increasingly convinced that certain aspects of humanity exist 
beyond the reach of brute forces of the physical environment. 
James’ anti-sceptical project is, in fact, elucidated considerably by recognizing, 
first, that he used Darwinian thinking to support his thesis that the mind is a “teleological 
mechanism,” by which he meant an agency that pursues teloi or “ends that do not exist at 
all in the world of impressions we receive by way of our senses” (1881, pp. 544-545); 
and, second, that he used this thesis to challenge the view that beliefs are “inner 
relations” that the “outer” world impresses upon the mind. Against this view, he asserted 
there are cases in which we only register “outer relations” insofar as we already hold 
beliefs that dispose us to draw certain connections between things. Perhaps more 
importantly, he suggested that beliefs are regulatory structures around which actions are 
organized; that actions generate experiences; and that by acting on a belief we sometimes 
generate experiential support for what was initially believed in the absence of evidence.  
Here it is worth repeating that James identified himself as an empiricist, and 
subscribed to the empiricist position that “[s]ensible objects . . . are either our realities or 
the tests of our realities. Conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be 
disbelieved” (1889, p. 1038; 1890ii, p. 301).  However, James also insisted that the test of 
a reality—or a belief about reality—is not necessarily its source.  In Darwinian terms, he 
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insisted that empirical verification of a belief is the cause of its preservation, but not 
necessarily that of its production. He argued that the failure to recognize this led many 
mainstream empiricists to prematurely reject beliefs that might turn out to be legitimate. 
He also argued that this failure led mainstream empiricists to perpetuate theories of 
knowledge that would, if followed consistently, cast doubt on core tenets of science and 
even what we are wont to regard as relatively straightforward empirical facts.  Thus while 
James’ anti-sceptical project has often been characterized as a defence of our “right to 
believe” in spiritual realities and other “tender-minded” notions, it was actually an attack 
on and alternative to sceptical theories of knowledge that undermine the basis upon 
which we can justify belief in anything whatever. 
 
Early roots in Darwinism 
Though evolution by natural selection first became public in 1858 when papers by 
Darwin and Wallace were presented to the Linnean society in London, the theory was not 
widely noticed until the late 1859 publication of On the Origin of the Species. Thus when 
James entered Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard in 1861, the controversy was 
relatively new, and he landed in the middle of it. Asa Gray and Louis Agassiz, after all, 
were both on the Lawrence faculty. The former was probably the leading proponent of 
Darwinism then in the United States, and the latter was undoubtedly the foremost 
scientific critic. 
It is fitting, then, that James’ first two publications—both from his student 
years—addressed Darwinism. The first (1865a) reviewed a work by T. H. Huxley. In it 
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James mildly rebuked Huxley’s “left wing” (i.e., anti-religious), radical materialism, yet 
credited him for inquiring into whether humans are, like other species, subject to 
transmutation (pp. 290-291). The second (1865b) discussed Wallace’s 1864 The Origin 
of the Human Races, a work arguing that humans are not subject to natural selection in 
the same way as other species, for humans are “social,” “sympathetic” and intellectually 
complex. Thus, in the case of humans, 
less robust health and vigour than the average does not entail death. . . . 
Some division of labour takes place; the swiftest hunt, the less active fish, 
or gather fruits; food is to some extent exchanged or divided. The action of 
natural selection [on the physical man]3 is therefore checked; the 
[physically] weaker . . . do not suffer the extreme penalty which falls upon 
animals so defective (Wallace, quoted in James, pp. 262-263). 
 
Similarly, whereas other species survive changes in the physical environment only by 
alterations in their own physical structure, humans adapt “…for the most part by [their] 
intellect alone” (p. 263), for example, by conceiving better tools. Insofar as social and 
intellectual capacities are more important to survival, and physical constitution less so, 
human evolution proceeds more on a “moral” and “mental” level than on a physical one 
(p. 263).  
It is not clear whether James, in his mature work, continued to hold that such 
factors check natural selection on the “physical part of man” so that “[t]he physical part is 
left immutable” (1865b, p. 263). Crucially, however, James (1878a) did retain the idea 
that “social affections” and intelligence alter the “survival formula,” so that individuals 
“may survive, even though [they] be ill-adapted to the natural ‘outer’ environment” (p. 
899). Such individuals include “[t]he story-teller, the musician, the theologian” and 
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others who receive a livelihood in return for satisfying wants of their community—
“wants,” James urged, that “are pure social ideals, with nothing outward to correspond to 
them” (p. 899). In his magnum opus, The Principles of Psychology, James (1890i) 
similarly maintained that human consciousness pursues what is beyond the immediate 
world of sense experience: “The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for 
their attainment are . . . the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a 
phenomenon” (1890i p. 8). 
His point was that conscious intelligence reacts not only to environmental stimuli. 
It pursues interests, “…which it creates, and which, but for it, would have no status in the 
realm of being whatever” (1890i, p. 140).  It strives towards ideals, which are ideals 
precisely because they do not correspond to anything in the world as it factually appears 
(see 1878a, pp. 894-897; 1890i, p. 639). Thus “[e]very actually existing consciousness 
seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, 
would not be ends at all” (1890i, p. 141). 
 
A Pragmatic Challenge to Materialism 
 
Charles Sanders Peirce articulated the first formal pragmatic definition of 
meaning when he declared that thought-distinctions are never “so fine as to consist in 
anything but a possible difference of practice” (p. 265) and that “[o]ur idea of anything is 
our idea of its sensible effects” (p. 266).   To ascertain the meaning of an idea or concept, 
therefore, we need only “[c]onsider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
 
3 James’ addition, not mine. 
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bearings, we might conceive the object of our conception to have” (p. 266).  An object 
conceptualized as “hard” and “heavy,” for example, means one that might conceivably 
have the effect of injuring toes upon which it falls. 
James (1879b) adopted this view, yet broke somewhat with Peirce by strongly 
emphasizing the extent to which individual interests decide what effects get attached to 
objects of conception. “One man conceives [oil] as a combustible, another as a 
lubricator,” and still another “as a darkener of wood,” he wrote (p. 952). For different 
people, the object—in this case, oil—is valued and thus noted for producing different 
effects. James argued, accordingly, that an object’s “essence”—that is, the key set of 
features that make an object what it is—“varies with the end we have in view” (1879b, p. 
952).  Hence essence is nothing more than those key properties that are 
…so important for my interests that in comparison with [them] I may 
neglect the rest. . . . The properties which are important vary from man to 
man and from hour to hour. . . . But many objects of daily use—as paper, 
ink, butter, horse-car—have properties of such constant unwavering 
importance, and have such stereotyped names, that we end by 
[erroneously] believing that to conceive them in those ways is to conceive 
them in the only true way. Those are no truer ways of conceiving them 
than any others; they are only more important ways, more frequently 
serviceable ways (1890ii, pp. 335-336).  
 
A concept, James maintained throughout his career, “…is a teleological instrument. It is a 
partial aspect of a thing which for our purpose we regard as its essential aspect…” 
(1979b, p. 952). 
By locating the “[o]rigin of concepts in their utility” (1911, p. 1015), James 
injected an analogue of natural selection into his theory of concept formation. As he put 
it, a concept may be considered as  “…a ‘spontaneous variation’ in some one’s brain.  For 
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one that proves useful and applicable there are a thousand that perish through their 
worthlessness” (1890ii, p. 636). However, whereas natural selection measures utility 
simply as the brute fact that some variations happen to help some organisms survive and 
propagate, James held that the human mind confronts “…the utility of selection [as] 
obviously created and measured by [its own] interests…” (1879b, p. 19). Thus it 
confronts the utility of concepts as a teleological matter involving value judgments about 
what teloi or ends are worth pursuing. One person values art; another not; hence one 
person has use for aesthetic concepts, while the other does not. 
In arguing that subjective interests guide thinking, however, James did not mean 
that thought is “merely subjective,” “just in one’s head,” “without basis in the world.” 
Rather, he meant that subjective interests direct attention to realities in the experienceable 
world that are germane to pursuits that interest the conscious subject; and that they hone 
conceptual instruments so as to handle and negotiate these realities in fruitful ways. 
Instead of equating the meaning of concepts to “images in one’s head,” therefore, he 
equated it primarily to the functions concepts serve in the world of human activities, 
writing that “…if [concepts] have any use they have that amount of meaning” (1907a, p. 
606).  James thought this so of relatively concrete concepts such as “circle” and “man,” 
and even more so of highly abstract ones.  “There are concepts,” he observed, in which 
…the image-part . . . is so faint that their whole value seems to be 
functional.  ‘God,’ ‘cause,’ ‘number,’ ‘substance,’ ‘soul,’ for example, 
suggest no definite picture; and their significance seems to consist entirely 
in their tendency, in the further turn which they may give to our action or 
our thought.  We cannot rest in the contemplation of their form, as we can 
in that of a ‘circle’ or a ‘man’; we must pass beyond (1911, p. 1013). 
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By advocating a functional or pragmatic reading of such metaphysically charged 
concepts, James broke with many empirically oriented thinkers before and after him who 
dismissed some of them as nonsense. Such concepts, he insisted, “…bring new values 
into our perceptual life, they reanimate our wills, and make our action turn upon new 
points of emphasis” (1911, p. 1020). Consequently they have discernable effects in our 
activities, thus also our experience, including sensible experience. Hence they have sense 
or meaning.  
Of course, these concepts also point beyond the immediate perceptual order.  Yet 
this is something James (1911) argued nearly all concepts do. Without concepts, he 
maintained, “…we should live simply ‘getting’ each successive moment of experience, as 
the sessile sea anemone . . . receives whatever nourishment the wash of waves may 
bring” (p. 1015).  But “[w]ith concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the remote…” 
(p. 1015); we connect experiences from different times and places, project forward, look 
behind; we “…string [experiential] items on as many ideal diagrams as our mind can 
frame” (p. 1015).  “All these,” wrote James, 
are ways of handling the perceptual flux and meeting distant parts of it; 
and as far as this primary function of conception goes, we can only 
conclude it to be . . . a faculty superadded to our barely perceptual 
consciousness for its use in practically adapting us to a larger environment 
than that of which brutes take account (pp. 1015-1016). 
 
If we gaze upon unexploited oil sands in Alberta, for example, and ponder the energy, 
pollution, jobs and political strife stored in them, we conceive of them in terms of 
interests or ends that exist in the broader human world, but not in sensations received 
from the current, physical environment.  Moreover, the notions we employ—“energy,” 
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“pollution” and so forth—indicate future consequences the object of conception—in this 
case, the sands—might have. Thus by emphasizing aspects of the object that are 
important to our interests, the concept actually postulates future ends—say, greater 
energy security and a cleaner environment—around which future actions, experiences 
and worlds are likely to be organized.  
This view of concepts played a key role in James’ struggle against materialists, 
especially those who think science shows that reality is solely made of causally 
determined physical constituents. Empiricists predating James had questioned the 
concepts of “matter” and “cause.” George Berkeley challenged the distinction between 
secondary and primary qualities, and therewith the notion that the phenomenal world 
depends upon an independently existing material substrate. David Hume noted that we 
observe successions of events, but never an additional quality of “necessary causal 
connection” joining them. Under their sway, even Huxley, who James regarded as a 
radical materialist, granted the materialist position is indemonstrable. Yet he nonetheless 
advocated that scientists adopt it, and for reasons James could, in fact, respect. As Huxley 
explained: 
All physical science starts from certain postulates. One of them is the 
objective existence of a material world.  . . . Another postulate is the 
universality of the law of causation; that nothing happens without a 
cause… The validity of these postulates is a problem of metaphysics; they 
are neither self-evident nor are they, strictly speaking, demonstrable. The 
justification of their employment . . . lies in the circumstance that 
expectations logically based upon them are verified, or, at any rate, not 
contradicted, whenever they can be tested by experience (1887, pp. 335-
336). 
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James too suggested that these basically pragmatic grounds justify scientists postulating 
physical and causal realities. However, he denied they justify the stronger claim that all 
realities are physical and causal—that physicality and causality are essential characters of 
anything that is. “[T]he whole doctrine of essential characters,” he reminded his readers, 
“is intimately bound up with a teleological view of the world” (1890ii, p. 336, fn.). Thus 
if scientists say physicality and causality are essential, they in practice mean essential for 
scientific purposes. 
In fact, Huxley’s use of “physical science” in the above-cited work emphasizes 
just this point. He used it to connote not just physics, but also chemistry, biology and 
geology; his use of the term, in other words, coincides with what are today 
unambiguously considered “sciences,” which is to say, reasonably “hard sciences.”  The 
term “scientist” as a designation for those who investigate material nature was in 
Huxley’s day a fairly recent linguistic innovation, coined by William Whewell at the 
prompting of Samuel Coleridge in the 1830s. Before then “science”—from Latin scientia 
for “knowledge”—meant any corpus of “systematic and orderly thinking about a 
determinate subject-matter” (Collingwood 1940, p. 4). So by using the term “physical 
science,” Huxley made clear that he was referring to systematic and orderly thinking 
directed towards a particular end—namely, that of acquiring knowledge about physical 
processes in nature. Thus Huxley’s metaphysical postulates did not merely state 
conceptual means by which science pursues its ends; they also indicated ends science 
pursues. Science pursues physical accounts of observable phenomena, which in most 
cases means causal accounts. Research procedures and other modes of action that fail to 
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further this end typically fall outside the cannon of accepted scientific methodology, just 
as a science that so fails typically ceases to count as a bona fide science (see James, 1896, 
p. 463).  In today’s terms it becomes mere “soft science” or no science at all. 
The problem, then, that James had with those citing scientific evidence in support 
of materialism is that science has historically pursued ends that discourage it from 
affirming anything else. “Science,” he wrote, needs to be “…reminded that her purposes 
are not the only purposes, and that [postulates] which she has use for, . . . may be 
enveloped in a wider order, on which she has no claims at all” (1890ii, p. 576). His 
general point—and, in fact, a central point of many pragmatic philosophies—was that 
particular affirmations do not amount to sweeping negations. To affirm the existence of 
physical realities is to claim that some physical realities exist, not that nothing other than 
them exists. However, to the extent that one emphasizes scientific purposes to the 
exclusion of others, the former claim becomes practically equivalent to the latter. This 
leads to what James regarded as monistic, “half-way empiricism”—monistic because it 
acts on the assumption that existence is made of one kind of stuff, namely, physical stuff, 
and half-way because it prejudicially dismisses experiences (empirical data) that do not 
square with this assumption (see 1897a, p. 447). Seen thus, scientific affirmations of 
materialism, though couched in empirical terms, mark a retreat from a genuinely 
empirical attitude.  
James expressed hope that the future would deliver a more radically empirical 
science (see 1909b, p. 773). “[I]n its essence,” he writes, “science only stands for a 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
49 
method and for no fixed belief” (1897b, p. 698).  So although historically engrained habit 
has tied science to materialistic belief, James held that science might move beyond it. 
 
A Darwinian Challenge to the Concept of Belief as Correspondence 
Correspondence theories of truth were targets against which James directed his 
pragmatic philosophy. He particularly associated them with Spencer’s view that “outer 
relations” determine how things get related “in” the mind; and that a belief, considered as 
an “inner relation,” is true inasmuch as it “copies” or “corresponds” to a relation in the 
“outer” environment (see 1878a, pp. 902-903; 1904a, p. 468).  
James suggested, to begin with, that Spencer did not appreciate the 
epistemological ramifications of his own evolutionary psychology. Again, it was 
Spencer, not Darwin, who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest”; and if fitness is 
measured by usefulness to life, it should matter little whether an idea copies the world, so 
long as it guides people into beneficial interactions (see 1904a, p. 468; 1907a, p. 579). 
People’s idea about how to get from point A to B, for example, often misrepresents 
streets as intersecting at right angles. Yet so long as it reliably and efficiently gets them to 
their destination, few will call it “untrue.”  
A second reason James (1890ii) rejected Spencer’s position is that it implied that 
the most unshakable beliefs should correspond to the most frequently observed “outer 
relations.” While granting this sometimes occurs, he cited science as a domain where it 
often does not, arguing that scientists have produced many laws precisely “by ignoring 
conditions which are always present” (p. 636). Physicists have pondered how bodies 
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would move over a frictionless surface, or respond to a force as point-like objects; and 
aided by these ideal objects that are never actually observed, they have noticed 
fundamental tendencies in nature. This being so, James considered it absurd to think that 
scientists acquire beliefs (“inner relations”) by merely absorbing salient “outer relations.” 
He proposed, therefore, just the reverse of Spencer: “Instead of experiences engendering 
the ‘inner relations,’ the ‘inner relations’ are what engender experiences here” (p. 638). 
Nascent scientific beliefs sometimes arise in a manner “…akin to that of the flashes of 
poetry and sallies of wit to which the instable brain-paths equally give rise” (p. 636). 
Many direct attention where nothing is to be seen, and are consequently abandoned. 
Others, however, help scientists notice and connect what once seemed unconnected, and 
are therewith empirically verified. Using Darwinian language to express the point, James 
wrote that scientific beliefs must, indeed, “…prove their worth by being ‘verified.’ This 
test, however, is the cause of their preservation, not that of their production” (p. 636).    
A third objection James raised against Spencer was that observable phenomena 
relate in myriad ways, so that there is rarely a single “outer relation” to which an “inner 
relation” ought to correspond (1878b, pp. 921-922). The belief, for example, that the 
Earth goes around the Sun is not justified by brute correspondence to observed spatial 
relations. Indeed, if one were to spend a year plotting distances between the Earth and 
Sun, the observations would correspond equally to the belief that the Sun goes around the 
Earth—in fact, it does go around the Earth if the latter is regarded relativistically as a 
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stationary point of reference.4 From here one could construct a solar system, in a vein 
similar to the 16th century astronomer Tycho Brahe, in which the Sun goes around the 
Earth, and the other planets around the Sun. If updated with elliptical orbits and 
perihelion shifts, this Tychonic model would faithfully represent the paths of objects in 
the solar system relative to one another; it would account for why Venus appears largest 
during its crescent phase, and so on. For all this, however, it would not work nearly so 
well as the currently favoured Keplerian model does. Whereas the Keplerian model has 
one centre of motion, the Tychonic is more complicated with two; whereas the former 
uses the Earth’s orbit to account for annually reoccurring displacements and aberrations 
of stars, the latter must assume stars actually undulate lockstep with the Earth-based year; 
and whereas the former—or something close to it—meshes with both classical and 
modern physics, the latter integrates poorly. Of the two models, then, the Keplerian is 
favoured for what James regards as pragmatic reasons of workability. It is more workable 
both in terms of its simplicity and in terms of its compatibility with basic physics. It is 
more efficiently able to make sense of accumulated theoretical and observational 
experiences about physical nature, and in the context of these experiences easier both to 
use and to understand.  
 
4 This is easily grasped in the following way. Place your right index finger through the hole in a compact 
disc, and then, while keeping it stationary, move your left index finger around the exterior edge. Next keep 
your left finger stationary, and use your right to move the edge of the disc around it. Though the spatial 
relations between the fingers remain the same (in these two cases, everywhere equidistant), the left appears 
to circle the right in the first case, and the right the left in the second. This reversibility works not just with 
circles, but also ellipses or any other shape, and it works regardless of the location of the point within the 
bounded figure. 
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That many beliefs are not directly elicited by brute facts; and that few, if any, 
have a one-to-one correspondence with them suggests that strict correspondence is either 
a useless criterion for truth or a hopelessly sceptical one. There are, in fact, not just two, 
but an infinite number of possible models that capture the relational order of the solar 
system, for any arbitrary position can be adopted as a stationary point of reference. If 
mere correspondence determines truth, then all these models are equally true; and if one-
to-one correspondence is the criterion, then all are equally false. Matters are worsened by 
the fact that we cannot maintain any model without assuming the future will resemble the 
past; and this assumption, as Hume and others have shown, cannot be affirmed on the 
basis of correspondence to facts.  
For James, the solution was to recognize that correspondence is not the only 
standard for evaluating beliefs. We have long employed additional criteria such as 
elegance, economy, sense-making power and fit with other accepted beliefs.  These 
criteria are not evidential, for a belief can satisfy all of them without corresponding to 
facts. Rather, they are pragmatic.  Beliefs that meet these criteria are usually more 
workable than those that do not.  So too, it should be added, are beliefs that fit the 
evidence—that some pragmatic criteria are not evidential does not mean none are, and 
James included fit with evidence among his pragmatic criteria.  As already intimated, 
then, we can escape the difficult situation with the models of the solar system if we 
acknowledge that the legitimacy of beliefs depends more on their overall workability than 
on their brute correspondence to facts; and as will soon be seen, James maintained that if 
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we adopt this pragmatic attitude, we acquire a basis not only for legitimating scientific 
beliefs, but also spiritual ones. 
 
A Pragmatic Account of Belief 
James described “belief” as the “mental state or function of cognising reality” 
(1889, p. 1021; 1890i, p. 301), and “cognition” as an intermediary stage in “what in its 
totality is a motor phenomenon” (1882, p. 65).  He meant by this that cognition, when 
confronted by some thing or event, is more concerned with the question of “What is to be 
done?” than the question of “What is that?”—that “[c]ognition . . . is incomplete until 
discharged in act” (1882, p. 66). Not surprisingly, then, he associated belief with action, 
arguing that “the test of belief is willingness to act” (1882, p. 70), and that  “there is some 
believing tendency wherever there is willingness to act at all” (1896a, p. 458). He meant 
not only that action measures strength of belief, but also that belief functions 
psychologically to facilitate action. When one wavers between contradictory options, 
unsure of what to believe, one hesitates to act, especially if acting carries weighty 
consequences.  With belief, however, there arrives “…an idea which is inwardly stable, 
and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory ideas. When this is the case, 
[actions] are apt to follow” (1889, p. 1021; 1890ii, p. 283).  On the grounds that beliefs 
enable and guide action, James proposed that the truth of a belief  “is not a stagnant 
property,” but something that happens through “a process of valid-ation” (1907a, p. 574), 
or what we might also call “valid-action.”  Belief in atomic particles, for example, has led 
to scientifically fruitful theorizing and experimentation.  Hence it has led scientists to act 
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in ways that benefit their field.  So long as the belief continues to reliably cultivate 
beneficial or “valid” actions, scientists are apt to continue trusting it.  
Based on the intimate connection between action and belief, James further 
speculated that people, by willing themselves to action, can actually will themselves into 
a state of belief: “we need only . . . ACT as if the thing in question were real, and keep 
acting . . . [so], and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life 
that it will become real” (1890ii, p. 321). Yet James did not mean, as critics charged, that 
people can capriciously come to believe whatever they want, for they cannot act however 
they want.   Most will find it impossible to act on the belief that they can walk on water; 
maddening to act on the belief that they can get to Toronto from Montreal by going east; 
and embarrassing to act on the belief that John A. Macdonald was the first president of 
the United States. This does not mean beliefs are inevitably correct. Many are not even 
tested, but merely held through “the negative fact that nothing contradictory . . . comes to 
interfere” (1907a, p. 579). Yet it does mean, on the one hand, that the world—including 
everything from the physical world to the world of already existing beliefs—checks 
certain actions, and therewith certain beliefs; and on the other, that it tends to reinforce 
any belief that  “adapts our life” to a setting (1907a, p. 579), helps “in life’s practical 
struggles” (1907a, p. 520) and has “value for concrete life” (1907a, pp. 518-519). So 
while beliefs can turn out to be wrong, people are rarely in a position to believe anything 
they want about matters that significantly concern them; and while many beliefs are not 
elicited by and do not correspond to brute facts in the experienceable (i.e., empirical) 
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world, the experienceable world nevertheless reinforces those that prove valuable to life, 
and suppresses those that prove positively incompatible (see 1880, p. 634). 
Thus when James (1907a) famously (or infamously) observed that beliefs are 
justified when they “work,” he hastened to add that this “means something extremely 
difficult” (p. 580).  It means choosing beliefs “that mediate between all previous truths 
and entertain new experiences”; beliefs that “derange common sense and previous 
belief[s] as little as possible”; and beliefs that “lead to some sensible terminus or other” 
(pp. 580-581).  “To ‘work’ means . . . these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is 
little loose play…” (p. 581).  
 
From Belief to Action to Experience 
On James’ pragmatic account, beliefs do not merely assert the existence of 
realities.  As instruments of “making sense,” they also create frameworks through which 
certain orders cohere into appearance—to re-quote James, “‘inner relations’ . . . engender 
experiences” (1890ii, p. 638).   This is seen with the Keplerian model: the belief that the 
Sun is the approximate centre of the system establishes the Sun as a stationary frame of 
reference relative to the planets, and this brings into appearance an arrangement of neat, 
concentric planetary paths.  This is also seen with Huxley’s (1887) postulates of 
science—not just the two already mentioned, but also a third, namely, the principle of 
uniformity, which holds “…that any of the rules, or so-called ‘laws of nature,’ by which 
the relation of phenomena is truly defined, is true for all time” (p. 336).  Science lives by 
this last postulate, for it engages in systematic observation and experimentation with the 
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expressed aim of inducing general rules from particular instances.  That which cannot be 
captured in enduring formulae is of little interest to science; it does not get reported in 
journals; it does not establish professional reputations, save in cases when it happens to 
refute a widely accepted theory. To engage in scientific activities, then, is to act on the 
belief that certain unchanging realities endure the transience of the phenomenal world. 
Acting on this belief often means studying things in controlled settings; employing 
experimental designs that isolate the influences of select variables; and using statistical 
tests to wrench order from untidy heaps of data.  It means establishing not just a frame of 
reference, but a frame of procedural methods or actions that selectively emphasize what 
is mathematically predictable and experimentally replicable, so engendering experiences 
that reinforce a vision of nature as well-ordered and rule-governed. 
James, in fact, maintained that the “…experiences which are used to prove a 
scientific truth are for the most part artificial experiences of the laboratory gained after 
the truth itself has been conjectured” (1890ii, p. 638). By “artificial,” however, he did not 
mean “unreal.” “Artificial” comes from the Latin words ars and facere. Ars can connote 
“art,” as in “skill,” “handicraft” or “manner of acting,” and facere means “make.” By 
“artificial experiences,” then, James described “experiences made or created through 
action.” Thus when he famously declared we can will ourselves into a belief by acting as 
if the thing in question were real, he did not merely mean we can convince ourselves on a 
psychological level; he meant also that actions can generate experiences, data and 
phenomena that support our belief. In science this is easy to see. The use of the proton 
collider to produce exotic particles is but one example of scientists acting to create 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
57 
phenomena that support their beliefs. This occurrence is also easy to see in everyday life. 
A woman who acts on the belief that she is not, after all, too sick to get out of bed for 
hockey practice actually eliminates a symptom and therewith part of the experiential 
basis upon which she judged herself to be so very ill in the first place.   
Of particular interest to James (1882) were cases in which a person acts on a 
belief prior to having justification for it, which is to say, acts on faith. “Faith” here meant 
believing what might well be doubted; “and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one 
may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not 
certified to us in advance” (p. 70). Put otherwise, “[f]aith is synonymous with working 
hypothesis” (p. 73)—“working” in the twofold sense of being unverified and of being a 
way of working or acting in the world. As a fallibilist, James held that nothing is ever 
completely certain, and consequently that all belief involves a degree of faith.  However, 
degrees vary radically: 
A chemist who conjectures that a certain wall-paper contains arsenic . . . 
[needs only] faith enough to lead him . . . to put some of it into a hydrogen 
bottle, [and so find] out by the results of his action whether he was right or 
wrong. But theories like that of Darwin . . . may exhaust the labors of 
generations in their corroboration, each tester of [the theory] proceeding in 
this simple way, that he acts as if it were true, and expects the result to 
disappoint him if his assumption is false. The longer disappointment is 
delayed, the stronger grows his faith in his theory (pp. 73-74).  
 
If longer delays correlate with stronger faith, and delayed disappointment merely means 
observable facts do not refute a belief, then metaphysical belief—which in this case 
meant belief in what is “beyond the physics,” beyond what can be observed in space and 
time—should be capable of inspiring unshakable faith. Belief in the divine is a common 
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example of this. Two others, which James particularly dwelt upon, are the principles of 
uniformity and causality.    
 The first of these follows from the idea that nature is lawful, so that things behave 
according to the same rules regardless of time or place; and this, wrote James (1890ii), is 
an idea “…that has to be sought under and in spite of the most rebellious appearances” 
(p. 636). After all, for every phenomenon accounted for by an established rule or law, 
untold others are not. The tendency is to take utterly for granted that these untold others 
only appear random and inexplicable because their connection to underlying laws is yet 
undiscovered. On the very basis of what it asserts, however, this belief cannot be based 
on observation, on what actually appears, for it specifically claims things are other than 
they appear. Hence James considered belief in the uniformity principle to be  “…far more 
like a religious faith than like assent to a demonstration” (p. 637; also see 1882, p. 71; 
1884, pp. 567-568; 1895a, p. 498). He reached a similar conclusion about the principle 
that all changes have causes, partly because “cause” is one of those previously mentioned 
concepts he identified as having a weak “image-part.” Again, what one concretely 
perceives are successions of phenomena, with some types consistently preceded and 
hence “caused” by others. But what the principle and indeed the concept of “cause” 
inspire is a “…demand for some deeper sort of inward connection between phenomena 
than their merely habitual time-sequence […]. The word ‘cause’ is, in short, an altar to an 
unknown god; an empty pedestal still marking the place of a hoped-for statue” (p. 671; 
also see 1884, pp. 567-568; 1895a p. 498). 
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These words were partly drawn from the New Testament, which mentions an altar 
to an unknown god (Acts 17: 23), and describes faith as “…the assurance of things hoped 
for, the conviction of things not seen” (Heb 11: 1 RSV), and the use of “hoped for” by 
both James and the New Testament is instructive. It emphasizes a subjective, emotional 
impetus in faith, as well as a teleological one. People do not leap chasms when they are 
indifferent to what is on the other side. Rather, they reserve leaps of faith for what they 
care about, long for and desire to be real; and in leaping—“leaping” almost always 
connoting action—they sometimes become actors in realizing the object(ives) of their 
faith (1909b, pp. 779-780). James (1882) explained this with an example in which life 
itself hinges upon literally taking a leap. “Suppose,” he wrote, 
…I am climbing in the Alps, and . . . work myself into a position from 
which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Being without similar 
experience, I have no evidence of my ability to perform it successfully; 
but hope and confidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, 
and nerve my feet to execute what without those subjective emotions 
would perhaps have been impossible. But suppose that, on the contrary, 
the emotions of fear and mistrust preponderate; […] why, then I shall 
hesitate so long that at last, exhausted and trembling, and launching 
myself in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll into the abyss. 
In this case, and it is one of an immense class, the part of wisdom clearly 
is to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of the indispensable 
preliminary conditions of the realization of its object (pp. 74-75). 
 
Whether by moving mountains or empowering people to leap from them, faith makes 
things happen. These happenings can constitute evidence for what was initially taken on 
faith, meaning faith, and more particularly acting on it, sometimes “creates its own 
verification” (p. 75).  
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James held that scientists who act on the principles of uniformity and causality go 
through a process comparable to that of the trapped mountaineer. They too are motivated 
to believe what they desire; and as individuals pursuing a scientific life, this usually 
encompasses variants of the two principles. Some, it is true, shy from strict causality;5 
some replace laws with approximate rules; yet very few operate on the assumption that 
occurrences are wholly without cause, and the rules describing them prone to change 
erratically. An oncologist who concludes on weight of overwhelming evidence that a type 
of cancer spontaneously erupts without cause, or that its causes are not worth mentioning 
because they never remain the same, will not be praised for contributing to science, but 
condemned for abandoning the pursuit. Uncounted scientific studies do, in fact, turn up 
only random data, but these are understood to mean: “you are not looking carefully 
enough or in the right direction.” This makes evidence against the aforementioned 
principles practically impossible, for scientists automatically dismiss such evidence as 
illusory, as non-evidence. What this effectively means is that the principles are deemed 
true not because of evidence, but regardless of it.  
Yet this is not to say the actions of scientists engender no experiential basis 
whatever for continued faith in the principles. Rather, it is to compare their situation to 
biblical characters of old, who never come face-to-face with the divine object of their 
 
5 Quantum mechanics—with its probabilistic atomic half-lifes, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the 
like—challenges strict causality. I do not, however, attempt to defend James’ position that science 
overwhelmingly assumes the principle of causality from this counter-example, first, because quantum 
mechanics only emerged after his death; second, because I intend this work primarily as a historical 
exegesis, not a defense; and, third, because the principle of causality is, in fact, still alive in most scientific 
fields. 
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faith, yet find their willingness to act on faith rewarded. One of the chief rewards, strange 
to say, is strength to persevere when concrete rewards are withheld (see 1895a, pp. 500-
501). When an experiment fails to uncover a generalizable cause-and-effect relationship, 
more trials are run; and when a lifetime of work fails, other scientists pick up the task, 
ever confident the phenomenon under study must have a cause and must follow some 
general rule. Whether or not this confidence will be rewarded in any given instance is a 
question akin to whether or not a slot machine will pay on the next pull. Over time, 
however, acting on the principles will intermittently yield results, and therewith 
experiences that reinforce continued action, all the more so because behaviour rewarded 
on an unpredictable schedule typically dies hardest—a fact well established by 
behaviourist psychologists, not to mention gambling addicts. Because these intermittent 
results could be reached in a universe not completely lawful and causally determined, 
they do not require what may casually be called the “truth” of the principles. They do, 
however, depend a great deal upon faith in their truth. Scientific breakthroughs often 
come only after years of failures. Without faith, scientists might well abandon an inquiry 
after a few failures on the grounds that the phenomenon under study is perhaps one to 
which rules and causes do not apply. 
In addition to strengthening resolve, faith brings certain world-orders into 
appearance. One of the earlier cited New Testament passages goes on to say that faith is 
the understanding “…that the world was created by the word of God, so that what is seen 
was made out of things which do not appear” (Heb 11: 3 RSV); or as another translation 
reads, so “that the world which we can see has come into being through principles which 
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are invisible” (Heb 11: 3 PME). Just so with the principles of uniformity and causality. 
Each is beyond what can be observed; yet each shapes how the world appears to 
scientists. The scientific mind often sees nature as fundamentally mathematical, but this 
“mathematical world-formula,” as James (1890ii) called it, is not “forced on the mind ab 
extra” (p. 667); rather, it is actively pursued as an ideal end. The ideal theory in science is 
one that holds without exception and predicts outcomes with inexorable accuracy. It is 
just the sort of theory that can be expressed in the uncompromising terms of mathematics, 
and just the sort sought by believers in the principles. Not surprisingly, then, scientists 
focus on quantifiable aspects of the world. More than this, they make the world 
quantifiable.  Using sophisticated laboratory techniques they generate easily quantifiable 
observations, and using increasingly powerful statistical methods they convert 
observations into mathematical expressions that are easy to compare, replicate and 
ultimately generalize into predictive formulae.   It is almost to the point where the 
legitimacy of a scientific theory depends on it having a mathematical basis, and 
consequently approaching a point where science does not merely observe mathematical 
realities, but demands them.  James claimed there are cases where “[y]our ‘things’ realize 
all the consequences of the names by which you classed them” (p. 666). The situation 
here is similar. The principles upon which scientists act help realize the world in its 
mathematical aspect.    
Yet if empirical observation neither affirms nor denies the principles, on what 
basis do scientists act on them in the first place? A very straightforward one, according to 
James. When alternative positions mesh equally with data, “…we choose between them 
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for subjective reasons” (1907a, p. 581; also see 1882, p. 59). This happens when we 
choose the more elegant (aesthetically pleasing) and economic (easier to use) of two 
otherwise equally compelling positions; and it happens in the case of the principles. 
Scientists are emotionally committed to maintaining that which sustains their activities. 
As empirical evidence pushes in neither direction, they act according to their own 
interests, and act on belief in the principles.  
For James, however, it was not merely that we are licensed to choose according to 
our own emotional inclination when evidence is neutral, but that we must so choose. 
After all, “…to say, under such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question 
open,’ is itself a passional decision” (1896, p. 464)—that is, a decision based on 
inclination, not evidence. If delayed decision does not have significant costs; or if going 
forward has enormous risks or means sacrificing other cherished beliefs, then delay in the 
absence of evidence may be the more practical and emotionally appealing option. Yet for 
scientists the situation is the reverse. Not committing to the principles sacrifices scientific 
life. Committing, by contrast, does not carry enormous risks—while some scientific 
activities are risky, the principles do not necessitate these specific activities. Nor does 
committing necessarily threaten cherished beliefs ostensibly opposed to the principles, 
for example, James’ cherished belief in freewill. To act on the principles for scientific 
purposes is to assume, in effect, that phenomena with which science deals tend to be 
lawful and caused, not that all phenomena are. Under such circumstances, James thought 
the better “…part of wisdom is clearly to believe what one desires” (1882, p. 75).  
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Hence James did not object to scientists taking principles on faith. What he 
objected to, rather, is the “arbitrary caprice” with which some regard this instance of faith 
as rational, while rejecting others—most notably, religious ones—as irrational (1882, p. 
71), for faith plays strikingly similar roles in scientific and religious life. Though the 
principles are beyond empirical confirmation, scientists generally act on them because 
doing so is adaptive: the principles fit and make sense of much of the world scientists 
encounter; they do not conflict with data; acting on them rewards scientists with 
knowledge; and faith in them gives scientists strength to persevere when phenomena 
seem jumbled, governed neither by law nor cause. The Gospel of John says whoever 
believes shall have life (6: 47), and those who believe in the principles secure tools that 
help them work as scientists and pursue a scientific life. So similarly with religious faith. 
It “works” for some people: it fits and makes sense of the world they encounter; it does 
not conflict irrevocably with data, especially if, as many scientists complain, religious 
belief is unfalsifiable; it enables spiritual enlightenment and spiritual lifestyles; in some 
cases, it also helps people survive when life is tough and seemingly devoid of divine 
presence.  
A second commonality between scientific and religious faith is that both can 
function to realize desired object(ives). Faith in the principles often translates into a felt 
need for mathematical harmonies; and without this “imperious inner demand,” scientists 
might fail to see 
…that such harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and interstices of 
the crude natural world.  Hardly a law has been established in science, 
hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often with sweat 
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and blood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs come from we do 
not know: we find them in us, and biological psychology so far only 
classes them with Darwin’s ‘accidental variations.’ But the inner need of 
believing that this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual 
and eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel 
it, as the inner need of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a 
professionally scientific head. The toil of many generations has proved the 
latter need prophetic. Why may not the former one be prophetic, too? And 
if needs of ours outrun the visible universe, why may not that be a sign 
that an invisible universe is there? What, in short, has authority to debar us 
from trusting our religious demands? (1895a, p. 498). 
 
Nature hides many of her secrets from those who do not act on the principles, and James 
argued the divine can do the same to unbelievers. This may happen because their minds 
are closed, their attention selectively misdirected from signs indicating a divine presence. 
Or it may be that doubt prevents them from making a personal acquaintance with the 
divine in the same way that excessive mistrust prevents people from forming social 
relations (1896, p. 476). But whatever the case, James maintained that in religion, as in 
science, it can happen that “our faith beforehand in an uncertified result is the only thing 
that makes the result come true” (1895a, p. 500).   
A third commonality between faith in the principles and faith in the divine is that 
both are, practically speaking, insulated within teleological centres of life. Acting on the 
principles for the purposes of oncology does not presuppose that all phenomena conform 
to them, but merely that a subset of physical processes do. And while Christians are 
monists in the sense of believing one God accounts for all, they are epistemologically—
which here means pragmatically—pluralists. In practice they allow that religious forms of 
know-how are relatively independent from other forms. To be sure, there are notorious 
instances of religion overstepping its jurisdiction, as when fundamentalists try to abolish 
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Darwinism from science classes. Yet most fundamentalists visit medical doctors without 
worrying whether or not the health sciences make use of religious precepts. Most, in 
short, typically allow scientists to operate without factoring the divine into their 
equations, and most, moreover, happily partake in the fruits of science. 
James did not claim that the foregoing account demonstrates that there are, in fact, 
lawful and causally determined regions of the universe. Nor did it demonstrate the 
existence of the divine. Yet his aim was not to demonstrate what actually is, but to 
articulate a basis upon which people can rationally believe something is. He took for 
granted that science is largely rational, and in defending people’s “right to believe,” he 
drew liberally from scientific methodology that was then emerging. First, he appropriated 
the scientific tendency to define concepts functionally, so that concepts mean sets of 
operations enacted for particular purposes (see 1907a, pp. 506-508). Second, he adopted 
the scientific view that theories are never “proved,” but merely shown to be consistent 
with data and existing knowledge. This is another way of stating that theories are 
generally accepted because they usefully handle data and knowledge (see 1907a, pp. 512 
& 569-570); and this, in turn, is a way of saying they are accepted more for their sense-
making power than for their brute correspondence to facts. Third, James held to the 
empiricist tenet that “[s]ensible objects . . . are either our realities or the tests of our 
realities. Conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be disbelieved” (1889, p. 
1038; 1890ii, p. 301). His strategy, then, in defending the rationality of religious beliefs 
was to show that they have functional meaning, sense-making power and some relation to 
sensible effects. 
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Religious beliefs meet these conditions, for they entail actions enacted for 
particular ends and thus have functional meaning (see 1911, p. 1013); they constitute 
“world-grammars” through which experiences cohere and therefore have sense-making 
power; and they shape actions, and actions generate sensible effects (see 1911, pp. 1019-
1020). As James (1902) elaborated, “I find it hard to believe that principles,” even those 
that bespeak invisible realities, “can exist which make no difference in facts” (p. 465). In 
such cases,  
…the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects 
in this world. When we commune with it, …consequences in the way of 
conduct follow […]. But that which produces effects . . . must be termed a 
reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the 
unseen or mystical world unreal (pp. 460-461).  
 
Here it might seem that James was on shaky ground. After all, it is in 
consequence of subjects’ actions that religious beliefs engender functional meaning, 
coherence and sensible effects. Hence they seem subjective in a way that scientific facts 
do not. Yet as pragmatists have generally noted, even scientific facts are produced 
through actions of subjects. Wave-particle duality in quantum mechanics provides an 
excellent illustration. If one acts on the belief that an electron is a wave phenomenon, and 
sets up the detecting apparatus to measure it accordingly, the electron behaves like a 
wave; the electron is, as far as can be determined, at that moment and from that point of 
view, a wave. If, however, one acts on the belief that an electron is a particle, and sets up 
the detecting apparatus accordingly, then the electron is, at that moment and from that 
point of view, a particle. It is, as one contemporary physicist puts it, as if we have entered 
an age of “non-objective physics.” Werner Heisenberg developed his “…quantum theory 
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in the same city and decade in which Kandinsky coined the phrase ‘non-objective art’,” 
and one may speculate that he “…borrowed from Kandinsky when he called quantum 
theory ‘non-objective physics.’”  Whereas “…classical physics . . . represses the observer 
and the act of observation and talks naively about ‘things as they are’[,] . . .  [t]he main 
idea of quantum theory is to talk about what you do, not about ‘things as they are’” 
(Finkelstein 2003; emphasis added).6 Wave-particle duality cogently demonstrates that in 
science, as in other spheres of life, acts of observation—i.e., actions of subjects—
radically affect what shows up. This is not to say, however, that the divine—or for that 
matter, the principles—can be affirmed in the same way that the existence of electrons 
can. The point, rather, is that if the subject’s role in engendering meaning, coherence and 
sensible effects is not in itself an objection in experimental science, then neither should it 
be when it comes to belief in the divine.  
The broader point is that the actions beliefs generate—far from making validity 
“merely subjective”—are one of the primary bases upon which beliefs can be judged 
valid. As James put it, “…the possession of true thoughts means everywhere the 
possession of invaluable instruments of action” (1907a, p. 574). Beliefs deemed “valid” 
are typically those that entail actions that put people into fruitful relations with the world 
they experience. This can be by generating new experiences that make our world more 
coherent and manageable, which is to say, liveable; or by helping us negotiate our world 
 
6 I am unable to provide a full reference for this quotation. I originally read it on-line, but the paper, which 
appeared in a 2003 conference, is no longer posted.  I have, however, received confirmation from the 
author, David Finkelstein, that the words I quote are his, though he too is unable to specify the particular 
source. 
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both concretely and intellectually, so that we are, as it were, better able to find our way 
about.  For such reasons James described “…truth as something essentially bound up 
with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other moments 
which it will be worth while to have been led to.”  Truth “…means this function of a 
leading that is worth while [sic]” (1907a, p. 575). 
The issue of  “worth” invariably leads some to defend the rationality of the 
principles of uniformity and causality, while denying the rationality of religion on the 
basis of the following sort of argument: Science, in contrast to religion, has split atoms, 
cured diseases, built automobiles; hence belief in the principles is more valuable than 
belief in the divine. The problem is that this makes a value judgment about what ends are 
worth achieving, but then seemingly fails to note that worth is “relative to the temporary 
interests of the conceiver” (1879b, p. 952). If a person conceives an automobile to be a 
greater fruit than spiritual edification, this is because the person is more interested in 
obtaining a consumer good than a spiritual one. 
James speculated that confusions over the issue of worth were, in his own day, 
compounded by the fact that 
…our own day prides itself particularly on its love of Science and Facts 
and its contempt for all metaphysics.  Just weaned from the Sunday-school 
nurture of its early years, with the taste of the catechism still in its mouth, 
it is perhaps not surprising that its palate should lack the discrimination 
and fail to recognize how much of ontology is contained in the “Nature,” 
“Force” and “Necessary Law,” how much mysticism in the “Awe,” 
“Progress” and “Loyalty to Truth” or whatever the other phrases may be 
with which it sweetens its rather meager fare of fragmentary physiology 
and physics.  But its own inconsistency should teach it . . . [of the 
impossibility of the] suppression of Metaphysics which it aspires to 
accomplish.  Metaphysics of some sort there must be. The only alternative 
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is between the good Metaphysics of clear-headed Philosophy and the 
trashy metaphysics of vulgar Positivism (1879b, pp. 976-977).  
 
That metaphysics is unavoidable is a reminder that human beliefs always imply principles 
that are beyond available evidence.  Those who opt for the anti-metaphysical metaphysics 
of ill-conceived forms of positivism obviously contradict themselves; so too do 
individuals who disbelieve certain ideas on the grounds that they are metaphysical and 
therefore unscientific; and by adopting this irrational prejudice, James maintained that 
these individuals set themselves up to reject—to be sceptical of—what might well be 
worth believing.  
 
James, Dawkins and the Necessity of Faith 
About a century after James published his first Darwin-inspired challenges to 
empiricistic scepticism, the evolutionist Richard Dawkins published his now famous The 
Selfish Gene  (1976).  Readers familiar with the last chapter of the book, in which 
Dawkins developed his theory of  “memes,” may notice that he and James arrived at 
strikingly similar views about how religion propagates, yet reached very different 
conclusions about its legitimacy: unlike James, Dawkins has dismissed spiritualistic 
belief as irrational. Pondering these points of agreement and disagreement is worthwhile, 
for it helps to clarify and articulate the continued relevance of James’ defence of our 
“right to believe.”  It helps, furthermore, to introduce his position that faith is a practical 
necessity, without which we cannot believe in anything at all, either religious or non-
religious; that even scepticism involves a kind of mistrusting faith; and that a mistrusting 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
71 
attitude is, if all else is equal, less rational than a trusting one.  In addition to all this, 
considering James in the context of Dawkins makes for a convenient segue into the rest 
of this dissertation.  It does because Dawkins has advanced arguments that exemplify the 
loosely Cartesian—but still widely accepted—view that the mind is a sort of representing 
machine that generates simulations of the “outer” world.  James and especially Dewey 
challenged this view. So too does the remainder of this dissertation.   
Dawkins (1976) coined the term “meme” by melding “gene” with “mimema,” 
Greek for “that which is imitated.” A meme is “a unit of cultural . . . imitation” (p. 206), 
and meme theory is an account of how beliefs, customs and other cultural “units” 
propagate. It is an account, more specifically, that Dawkins modelled after his “selfish 
gene” theory, which holds that the “fundamental unit of selection” is not the individual 
organism, but the gene (p. 12). This means that natural selection does not, strictly 
speaking, favour a gene because it bestows adaptive advantages on the organism. Rather, 
it favours any gene good at getting replicated, and this incidentally includes those 
bestowing advantages. Transferring this precept to beliefs, Dawkins argued that beliefs 
need not be rational or true to spread, nor serve our interests in any way; they need only 
have characteristics that induce us to copy and maintain them.  
Dawkins has cited Christian belief as a case in point. It comforts believers and 
thus spreads by dint of “psychological appeal” (1976, p. 207). It eulogizes “faith” and 
“blind trust” (1976, p. 212), discouraging tests that might undermine it. It equates belief 
to virtue (2006, p. 199). It peddles the cliché that science cannot adjudicate religious 
claims, shielding itself from scientific rebuke (2006, pp. 54-61). It threatens doubters 
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with “ghastly torments” (1976, p. 212), scaring them into belief. It fosters cultural 
environments that favour its continuation (1976, pp. 212-213; 2006, pp. 197-199). So 
while Christian belief is, according to Dawkins, fallacious, its characteristics ensure its 
spread. 
Before considering how James might have answered Dawkins, it is well to note 
that James, while professing vague belief in God (see 1904b), rejected both “popular 
Christianity” and “scholastic theism” (1902, p. 465). His pragmatism, moreover, was a 
basis upon which he, like Dawkins, dismissed much of traditional Christian theology as 
idle hair-splitting (1902, pp. 399-401; cf. Dawkins 2006, pp. 33-34). James, in fact, 
advanced a surprising number of other points that Dawkins would later repeat. 
 First, James (1879b) granted that psychological appeal—especially sentimental 
appeal—induces belief.  He added, however, that sentiments (feelings, etc.) can help 
distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs, and motivate us to seek the former. 
Inconsistencies obstruct the flow of thought; obstructed thought—like gridlocked 
traffic—is an irritation we flee; and the transition from inconsistency to “rational 
comprehension” is marked by feelings of  “relief and pleasure” (p. 950). Extreme 
complexity similarly agitates us, while excessive simplicity bores us, so that we seek 
parsimony, yet not oversimplification (see pp. 954-956). The point, for James, was that 
what we call “rational comprehension” is a product of certain of our subjective 
preferences.  That a belief persists because of its psychological appeal, therefore, 
sometimes means that it persists because it is rational. 
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Second, James agreed that religion involves faith in things that are not affirmed 
by what conventionally counts as evidence. Yet this does not translate into a refusal to 
test beliefs. Strong faith, after all, entails a commitment that has central importance in our 
life—a commitment, therefore, that affects how we live and act. Actions, in turn, produce 
experiences that may support but also challenge the practical wisdom of our commitment. 
Thus having strong faith means testing and even risking it by acting on it. 
Third, James did not deny that religious individuals equate belief to virtue, almost 
as if to justify it on the mere grounds that “believing is the right thing to do.” But this is 
hardly unique to religion.  James noted that one of his contemporaries called “…it ‘guilt’ 
and ‘sin’ to believe even the truth without ‘scientific evidence’” (1982, p. 71). More 
crucially, he noted that even our basic concepts—for example, our concepts of what “oil” 
is—are shaped by what we value.  It is, in short, unavoidable that beliefs should rest on 
value judgments of one sort or another. 
Fourth, James (see 1909b, p. 773) shared Dawkins’ impatience with the platitude 
that science can say nothing about alleged spiritual realities.7 However, whereas Dawkins 
has fingered polite society and religious propaganda as primary progenitors of this 
platitude, James (1897b) insisted the scientific community shares blame. It ridicules 
serious discussion of spiritualism, and thus scares scientists from the pursuit (pp. 681-
693), much as fear of God scares theists from religious heterodoxy. Scientists also 
withdraw from spiritual debates by adopting a “half-way” empiricism. For example, 
 
7 Some caveats: James is more interested in investigating spiritual phenomena of a psychical nature than of 
a specifically religious one; and Dawkins does not in practice promote scientific investigations of religious 
claims, but merely encourages scientists to pass judgment on them. 
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some presume that reality is exclusively mechanical, and consequently that alleged 
evidence for non-mechanical realities must always be fallacious (p. 698). This means 
they hold the presumption not because of evidence, but regardless of it. It further means 
that if spiritual phenomena are not amenable to mechanistic conceptualizations, then they 
too will be ignored regardless of evidence (pp. 693-698; cf. Dawkins 2006, pp. 59 & 91). 
Fifth, James allowed that religious belief fosters environments that favour its own 
continuation. Once again, however, this is not unique to religion. Behavioural scientists, 
for instance, create laboratory environments that pace participants through structured 
tasks that limit responses to a finite number of discrete possibilities. By doing this, the 
laboratory environment corrals behaviours into orders that can be mathematically 
converted into generalizable cause-and-effect relations. By consistently not publishing 
null (statistically random) results, the academic environment does much the same. James 
said that “our thoughts determine our acts,” and “acts redetermine the . . . nature of the 
world” (1909b, p. 774). By acting on faith in the principles of uniformity and causality, 
scientists nurture environments or worlds that perpetuate their own metaphysics. 
When it came finally to developing his thesis that religious believers are 
delusional, Dawkins, in his (2006) The God Delusion, reaffirmed key arguments that 
James had directed against Spencer’s neo-Lamarckian psychology. He did so, first, by 
using his meme theory to show that we readily acquire beliefs that do not correspond to 
“external reality”; and, second, by using Darwinism to emphasize that the brain actively 
constructs the world rather than passively receiving it (pp. 361-374), which means it can 
also misconstruct it and thereby suffer delusion (pp. 88-92). That said, Dawkins seemed 
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to share Spencer’s devotion to a psychology organized around an inner-outer divide. He 
explained that there is “simulation software in the brain” (p. 89), so that “[w]hat we see . . 
. is not the unvarnished real world but a model of [it]” (p. 371) built “inside our head” (p. 
361).  Perceived hues, for example, are “internal labels” having “no intrinsic connection 
with lights of particular wavelengths.”  They are “tools” used to construct a “model of 
external reality” that tags “important distinctions in the outside world” (p. 373). Dawkins 
stressed that an animal’s “world-representing software” is adapted to its particular “way 
of life,” and speculated, accordingly, “…that bats may ‘see’ colour with their ears. The 
world-model that a bat needs,” after all, “…must surely be similar to the model that a 
swallow needs […].”  Granting, therefore, that perceived hues are arbitrary markers, bats 
may use them “as internal labels for some useful aspect of echoes.” “The point,” Dawkins 
wrote, “is that the nature of the model is governed by how it is to be used rather than by 
the sensory modality involved” (p. 372). 
For many pragmatically minded thinkers, the point should be rather that perceived 
qualities are not mere representations “in” the organism, but “…qualities of interactions 
in which both extra-organic things and organisms partake” (Dewey 1925, p. 259). Thus 
the quality of “smoothness” includes the way in which a surface allows fingertips to glide 
over it; it characterizes a “style” of interaction in the world (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. 315). 
The point, more generally, is that “[t]he properties of a thing are effects on other ‘things’: 
if one removes other ‘things,’ then a thing has no properties…” (Nietzsche 1967 [c. 1885-
1886], §557; also see Peirce 1878, pp. 266-268). The yellow of a lemon, for instance, is a 
property conditioned not only on the presence of a sensate being, but also on that of light. 
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The colour even depends on the lemon’s relative velocity since light reflected from 
rapidly approaching objects is “blue shifted,” while light from receding objects is “red 
shifted.”  Thus even before the perceiver is introduced, it remains true that properties are 
effects of interrelationships. If properties are effects; if effects count as “real”; and if one 
does not arbitrarily deem them “unreal” merely because a perceiver participates in an 
interrelation, then something startling happens. The yellow of the lemon—which 
Dawkins regards not as a real property but as a way in which the mind represents the 
object—becomes every bit as real as heat arising as an effect of two objects rubbing. 
Indeed, it becomes every bit as real as so-called “primary properties” such as length, for 
as with colour, length varies with an object’s velocity relative to the observer.8  Indeed, 
even mass—defined as resistance to acceleration—varies with relative velocity.   
For all their emphasis on subjective interests, classical pragmatists resisted the 
notion that thought and perception are “representations in the subject’s head.” James 
shifted the locus of conceptual meaning from an ideational or mental level to that of the 
actively lived world, and Dewey, as will soon be seen, did much the same for perception. 
Dawkins (2006), by contrast, has suggested that consciousness is a simulated sphere of 
inner representation, and thus easily deluded (see pp. 87-92  & 361-374).  And as with 
many who see the brain or mind as a representing machine, he seems to have adopted a 
correspondence theory of truth very much in the vein of Spencer.  He has described the 
search for “truth” as “a model-building enterprise” (p. 361), and characterized models as 
 
8 I am indebted to Evan Cameron of York University for pointing out to me that this feature of relativity 
theory undermines the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
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internal templates that tag distinctions in the “outer” world. Given that Dawkins has 
invited us to mistrust our perceptions; given that he seems to have advocated a theory of 
truth that cannot, for reasons discussed, even affirm a heliocentric model over a 
geocentric one, much less affirm the principles of uniformity and causality; given, in 
short, that Dawkins has cast his sceptical net so wide, it is hardly surprising that he has 
rejected spiritualistic belief as delusional.   
James, of course, did not claim to demonstrate that either the principles or 
spiritualistic claims are true in a straightforward factual sense. He claimed, rather, to 
establish that in certain world-contexts it is rational to believe they are true. However, 
from his standpoint—and indeed from a scientific standpoint—this is about as close as 
one can get to the truth: practically speaking, calling something “true” means it is 
reasonable to believe it is true. James recognized, moreover, that sceptical empiricists in 
the vein of Hume would likely see his pragmatic account as further demonstrating the 
absence of any philosophically sound basis for the beliefs in question. Indeed, while he 
tried to establish an equivalency between scientific and spiritualistic beliefs in order to 
increase the range of what it is possible to rationally believe, the strategy might work in 
either direction. Those who grant both the rationality of scientific belief and the aforesaid 
equivalency should also grant the rationality of spiritualistic belief. Yet for those who 
cannot accept the rationality of spiritualism, the equivalency may merely make them 
sceptical of science. 
James’ final response to sceptics, delivered in the last paragraphs of his 
posthumously published Some Problems of Philosophy (1911), was to call upon faith—to 
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call upon it not merely as an attitude that may be taken, but one that must be. Human life 
is uncertain. “Its destiny hangs . . . on a lot of ifs” (p. 1099), so that “[n]o insurance 
company can . . . save us from the risks we run…” (p. 1100). In struggling with the 
question of what kinds of belief we ought to risk in this uninsurable world, James 
maintained there are four basic attitudes we can adopt:  
1. …[W]ait for evidence; and while waiting, do nothing; or 
2. Mistrust . . . and, [feeling] sure that the universe will fail, let it fail; or 
3. Trust […]; and at any rate do our best, in spite of the if; or, finally, 
4. Flounder, spending one day in one attitude, another day in another (p. 
1100). 
 
James quickly distilled this list to two options. He dismissed the fourth as “no systematic 
solution,” and collapsed the first attitude into the second on the grounds that the two are 
practically indistinguishable (p. 1100). The basic choice, therefore, is between mistrust 
and trust—a dilemma James articulated by way of analogy. When first we meet other 
people, we can mistrust them until they demonstrate their worth; or we can trust them 
until such a time—if it ever comes—that evidence shows them untrustworthy (see pp. 
1098-1099; also see 1896, pp. 476-477; 1904a, p. 473). In both cases we act on a belief 
about other people, even if we do not consciously declare it; and in both cases we initially 
act in the absence of evidence. Thus in both cases we act on faith, only where the first 
case “spells faith in failure” (p. 1100), the second spells faith in success. James held, 
accordingly, that adopting a sceptical position in the absence of evidence still amounts to 
adopting a belief without evidence, so that even scepticism involves a strange sort of faith 
(see 1882, pp.85-86). The choice, then, is not between faith and non-faith, but between 
two varieties of faith: one based on mistrust, the other on trust.  
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 Of these two options, James thought the second wiser. It is wiser because living 
on trust and believing what we desire is—if all else is equal—the more emotionally 
fulfilling option. More importantly, it is a path that is likely to bring us closer to truth. 
Scientists often believe a theory before obtaining compelling evidence for it. Yet by 
trusting the theory—which here means acting on it—they may generate evidence for it. 
They may also generate evidence against it. Thus as natural selection works to extinguish 
maladaptive variations, “[t]he long run of experience may weed out the more foolish 
faiths. Those who held them will then have failed” (1911, p. 1101), and so much the 
better, James argued, for this also sets us on a truer path.   
James’ answer to sceptics, then, was that their faith in failure is self-fulfilling. By 
refusing to act on trust, they discard powerful tools by which they might support 
particular beliefs, acknowledge certain truths and therewith ameliorate scepticism. For 
this reason, he insisted it is intransigent scepticism—not faith founded on trust—that is 
irrational. As he put it in The Will to Believe: “...a rule of thinking which would 
absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth 
were really there would be an irrational rule” (1896, p. 477). By this he did not mean 
that we should always believe in the absence of evidence. He meant, rather, that there are 
times when doing so is the better part of practical wisdom, and that if we were to forever 
refuse to do so, then we would relinquish our capacity to believe anything at all. 
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-Three- 
Art, Experience and Mutual Participation 
 
 “Art,” as Emerson (1836) put it, is “applied to the mixture” of our “will” with 
“Nature,” as when we express our will upon natural materials in order to make “a house, 
a canal, a statue, a picture” (p. 8). While this is a commonplace conception of art, it is one 
that James—with his notion of the “will to believe,” which he might also have called the 
“will to make”—would have appreciated.  It is also a conception Dewey would have 
liked, for it hints at the two-sided nature of making.  It hints, that is to say, that making 
occurs within the limits of what we are able to do and what materials allow us to do, and 
this, in fact, is the basic spirit in which Dewey conceived of experience when he likened 
it to art.  
The human subject is endowed with certain potentialities—that is, with certain 
capacities and proclivities, both native and acquired. These, in combination with 
constraints and affordances in the environment of which the subject is a part, limit 
possibilities of interaction.  As Dewey explained, we act “in accordance with [our] own 
structure” (1920, p. 86), yet also in accordance with “checks, resistances, [and] 
furtherances” encountered in our environment (1934, p. 147). This does not mean we are 
forced into specific actions: flexibility is ever present, in addition to which we have some 
ability to restructure both our environments and ourselves. What it does mean, however, 
is that we can never act in any manner whatever.  There are always limits, and in the 
same way that selective attention brings order to what would otherwise be chaos, these 
limits exert a selective influence on what we do and what we undergo in consequence of 
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our doings. This brings unity and structure to what would otherwise be a disjoint 
collection of happenings, and this, according to Dewey, forms the basis of what we call 
“experience.”  
Thus where James suggested that interests are regulatory structures around which 
actions are organized and that interests shape experience by shaping actions, Dewey 
maintained that experience issues from interactions that are integrated and organized 
around “structural loci” in the world. “Loci” here refers to “meeting places” where 
subjects and objects interact; and “structure” refers to a “limiting function” (1925, p. 72), 
more particularly, to possibilities of action that are limited by what subjects can do and 
by what objects allow them to do.  With this as a guiding principle, Dewey turned 
modern western notions of experience inside out: he showed that worldly interactions 
perform work traditionally attributed to inner operations of mind or brain.  He showed, 
furthermore, that pervasive insensitivity to this not only engenders confusions about 
human experience, but also confused conceptions about what counts as “real.”  All of this 
together promulgates subjectivistic attitudes, even to the point where scientists become 
unwitting confederates of sceptical philosophers. 
  
Mutual Adaptation 
Key to Dewey’s account was the notion that perceptual experiences emerge when 
our capacities and sensitivities are organized and synchronized around things encountered 
in the world. In grasping a cold bottle of beer, for example, one encounters a structure 
that plies the hand to its roundness; a structure that resists the squeeze of the hand, not 
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giving inward; a structure that cools the hand; and a structure that lets fingertips glide 
over it without biting into flesh. Consequently one experiences something simultaneously 
round, hard, cool and smooth. It is in this sense that the bottle becomes a locus around 
which the hand’s sensitivities and capacities coordinate into a particular experience.  
Almost as dust clings to contours of a surface, action and therewith experience coalesce 
around the bottle so that various aspects gather into a single form: the bottle. 
Understood thus, perceptual experience is an outcome of interacting, of mutual 
adaptation and participation. It involves an “outward giving” and “giving into,” or, as 
Dewey put it, “an act of the going-out . . . in order to receive” (1934, p. 53; also see pp. 
43-44).  Again, when we explore the bottle with our hand, the bottle, to borrow from 
Merleau-Ponty, “…utilizes the time occupied by our tactile exploration or modulates the 
movement of our hand” (1945, p. 315).9  By patterning movement, the bottle patterns a 
particular experience.  Were the hand to instead encounter the contours of a basketball, 
not only would the patterning of tactile impressions be different, but also the actions of 
the hand, including the possible positions adopted by it, and through these differences 
something else would come into appearance, namely, the basketball. Bottles and 
basketballs select different patterns of activity from among a broader range of 
potentialities. Through these differences we experience different entities—not only 
bottles and basketballs, but the hand itself, for perceptual experience of the hand is 
primarily engendered by the hand’s interactions within the world.  
 
9 I say that I “borrow” from Merleau-Ponty not only in the sense of appropriating his observations, but also 
in the sense applying them to my own example.  He describes an encounter with a woodcarving, whereas I 
discuss an encounter with a beer bottle. 
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That the hand’s actions are shaped by entities it encounters does not mean that the 
hand and, more generally, the human subject simply yield like clay, for they are 
constrained by their own particular capacities, possibilities of action and form.  The 
subject, as Dewey related, “…brings with it through its own structure, native and 
acquired, forces that play a part in the interaction.”  It “…acts as well as undergoes, and 
its undergoings are not impressions stamped upon an inert wax…” (1934, p. 246).  With a 
seemingly endless array of minute variations and possible combinations of action, and 
with the particularities of both the individual subject and the things encountered by the 
subject, possibilities of action are unlimited in number. However, they are not unbounded 
in scope. Finger bones cannot rotate in knuckle sockets like spinning drills: the subject 
enters the encounter already endowed with a certain aggregate of potentialities and is 
consequently incapable of enacting any pattern whatever.  
Thus the subject is not a blank-slate; the subject, wrote Dewey,  “…does not wait 
passive and inert for something to impress itself upon it from without” (1920, p. 86). Yet 
neither does the subject merely “project” perspectives outwards, as if onto an empty 
screen.  While the hand projects itself into an object in the sense of reaching out, touching 
and pushing into it (see 1917, p. 7), the hand does not, as the expression goes, make the 
object in its own image. In projecting out the hand meets the countervailing press of the 
object; it meets resistance; it meets something that limits what actions it can partake in 
and what positions it can adopt. So, for example, whereas one can roll a beer bottle 
between one’s palms, the same action and hence the same experience is impossible with a 
cinderblock. In this instance, therefore, it is a misnomer to say that what appears in 
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experience is merely subjective, and the same, as will soon be seen, applies elsewhere.  It 
is a misnomer because the possibilities of action that delimit particular experiences are 
not merely conditioned upon the subject, but also upon objects encountered.  By the same 
token, perceived qualities are qualities of interactions that occur in the world, as opposed 
to mere representations of it. 
Hitherto the bottle (the “object”) and the hand (the “subject”) have been described 
as “structures.” Yet this is somewhat misleading.  It creates the impression that the bottle 
and hand are fully defined prior to any interaction, when the point of the forgoing 
discussion is to show that the forms and structures that appear in experience are 
constituted through interactions which are themselves delimited by certain structural 
boundaries, that is, by possibilities of action.  The point, in effect, is to show that the 
bottle and hand are “media” through which various forms and structures come into 
appearance.  Just as the bottle and hand set bounds on what sorts of actions are possible, 
different artistic media afford different possibilities of usage so that, for example, 
Michelangelo’s David cannot be rendered symphonically in sound and Beethoven’s 
Symphony No. 9 cannot be sculpted in marble.10  In the same way that the bottle and hand 
come into appearance through the fulfillment of certain possibilities of action, the artist 
brings compositions into appearance by working the potentialities of his or her respective 
medium. 
 
10 Yes, there are senses in which one might interpret a work of art through an alternative medium—for 
example, Richard Strauss renders Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra in music and Emily Carr paints the 
woodcarvings of the Haida. Yet this hardly refutes the above claim. Strauss’ symphonic poem and 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra cannot be substituted for one another, and excepting cases of pathology, no one 
mistakes Carr’s paintings for woodcarvings.  
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A medium, however, is not only something that is “worked,” but something that 
“holds,” “suspends,” “carries” and “conveys.”  Perhaps more than anything, it is 
something that “mediates” (Dewey 1934, p. 200), that is, “transforms,” “converts” and 
“relates.” Sound, for example, is mechanical vibrations converted through an atmospheric 
medium into cycles of compression and rarefaction, which are conduced through the 
same medium to the listener. The hand and bottle might be understood in a similar light. 
Caressing one’s fingertips over the bottle, one actualizes potentialities of movement 
afforded by both the bottle and the hand, and in doing so one experiences, among other 
things, the glassy smoothness of the bottle.  The smoothness is a property that appears 
through a conversion—a conversion, for example, in which certain affordances of the 
bottle translate into fingertips gliding easily in circular motions.  Through this conversion 
and various others, a round, hard, cool and smooth form becomes manifest. Yet this is not 
all.  In pressing into the bottle, one feels the soft padding of the palm and the less 
forgiving skeletal structure beneath; one experiences the dexterity of the fingers, their 
capacity to manipulate things, their sensitivity to temperature, texture and pressure.  The 
interaction, in short, reveals not only the bottle, but also that fleshy, fingered form we call 
the hand. The bottle and the hand realize one another. They make one another manifest.  
They mediate one another into appearance.  This same basic pattern follows regardless of 
whether the hand meets a bottle, a pencil, other parts of the body or even the hand itself, 
as when fingertips of a clenched fist press into the palm.  
Dewey (1934) wrote that a medium, when artistically employed, “is a vehicle 
which becomes one with what it carries; it coalesces with what it conveys” (p. 199). This 
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also characterizes the medial relationship between the hand and bottle. The glassy 
smoothness, for instance, is a property of the bottle; yet in the current context it is 
inseparable from the movements of the hand, save analytically. To be sure, the property 
belongs to the object: both conceptually and phenomenologically it is the bottle—not the 
hand—that is glassy smooth.  However, as friction is a phenomenon that shows up as a 
consequence of materials rubbing, so it is with glassy smoothness: it is a consequence 
undergone in the course of an interaction—a consequence undergone when fingertips 
glide over a surface that does not bite into flesh.  “We speak of perception and its object,” 
wrote Dewey. “But perception and its object are built up and completed in one and the 
same continuing operation” (p. 177). 
Here one almost wants to plead that the bottle really is smooth, and not just when 
we touch it—we can see its smoothness, for example.   True enough, the bottle really is 
smooth, and we can, indeed, see its smoothness.  However, this is still to say that the 
bottle really is smooth within the context of particular interactions—or, to put it another 
way, that the smoothness is an effect of particular kinds of encounters, and the effect is 
real. It is through manipulation that properties of the bottle come into appearance.  This is 
even so when the bottle meets the eye.  The cornea, for instance, modifies the path of 
light reflected from the bottle; the lens modifies it further by adjusting to bring the bottle 
into focus; and modification of this sort is manipulation—or as Emerson put it, a “mutual 
action of [the eye’s] structure and of the laws of light” (1836, p. 14). Dewey made this 
basic point when he wrote that, while an astronomer “…cannot change the stars 
themselves, he can at least by lens and prism change their light as it reaches the earth; he 
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can lay traps for discovering changes [and therewith properties] that would otherwise 
escape notice” (1920, p. 113). 
Some might object this sort of modification is elementary, almost trivial. Dewey 
would have agreed (see 1934 p. 122).  He would have added, however, that when we see 
the bottle, “[i]t is not just the visual apparatus” that becomes active, “but the whole 
organism” (1934, p. 122). Though researchers isolate “…the optical apparatus . . . in 
anatomical dissection, it never functions in isolation.  It operates in connection with the 
hand in reaching for things and in exploring their surface, in guiding manipulation of 
things, in directing locomotion” (1934, p. 100).  The sight of beer in an ice filled cooler 
invites the outstretch of arms, grasping of bottles, twisting of caps, opening of mouths, 
tilting of heads, gulping of throats and more besides.  It is true that we sometimes look 
without reaching and grabbing.  Yet it is also true that we spend most of our waking life 
handling and ambulating, which means coordinating actions around objects and settings; 
and true, moreover, that our eyes participate in most of this.  They and other modalities 
work in concert with motor capacities, as when a jabbering chipmunk beckons us to turn 
our head and gaze; or when legs, feet, arms and hands collaboratively work the pedals 
and steering wheel of a car so as to keep it on the road seen ahead. When we unlock 
doors, stroll on sidewalks, count change, eat lunch, flip through magazines, work on 
computers, sign bills and engage in countless other tasks, “[m]otor and sensory structure 
form a single apparatus and effect a single function” (1934, p. 255).  Therewith our eyes 
enter into overall mobilizations of actions that coordinate around the contours of 
environments and things encountered in them. 
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This does not obviate the fact that we sometimes look without overtly acting, but 
it does show that our eyes—like our hands—are vehicles for action, even if we happen to 
be sedentary at a given moment.  According to Dewey (1934), moreover, it indicates that 
when the eyes are not deployed in overt action, seeing is still “an affair of readiness on 
the part of motor equipment” (p. 98).  Thus when we see the form of a beer bottle, we see 
something we can handle. When we see the layout of a room, we see a space we can 
move through. When we see contour, shape, line and other qualities, we see “…the ways 
in which things act upon one another and upon us; the ways in which, when objects act 
together, they reinforce and interfere” (pp. 100-101).  Seeing means, among other things, 
perceiving what sorts of conduct an environment and things within it allow and disallow.  
If all this sounds merely speculative, consider what would happen if we did not 
see bottles as graspable, rooms as traversable, walls as obstacles and so forth.  We would 
bump about and bumble, and were the condition extreme enough, we would be 
functionally blind. It is for such reasons that Dewey insisted that “seeing involves the 
cooperation of motor elements” (1934, p. 53), and the same can be said of other sensory 
modalities.  Consider how we hear distance and movement, and accordingly make way 
for a rearward-approaching car.  Or consider the emotive side of perception, and how 
emotion can literally move us. The hateful, vile, offensive and odious stench of carrion 
repels and repulses us, makes us recoil and pull away. Our perception of carrion is not 
defined merely by the sensory excitations it elicits, nor even by the ways in which we 
cognize them.  It is defined also by the fact that we usually keep it at a distance, which is 
to say, defined by actions in the world. 
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Thus whereas British empiricists basically regarded perception as an outcome of 
environmental stimuli impacting us, Dewey regarded it as both an outcome of what we 
do to the environment and what it does to us, which often meant as an outcome of how it 
acts on us in consequence of actions we perform on it. For related reasons, he also 
rejected the empiricistic conception of sensations as individual “atomic units” out of 
which knowledge is composed. “Sensations,” he wrote, 
are not parts of any knowledge […]. They are rather provocations, 
incitements, challenges to an act of inquiry which is to terminate in 
knowledge. . . . As interruptions, they raise the questions: What does this 
shock mean? What is happening? What is the matter? How is my relation 
to the environment disturbed? What should be done about it? How shall I 
alter my course of action to meet the change that has taken place in the 
surroundings? (1920, pp. 89-90). 
 
Dewey (1929b) pointed out that we do not, as a matter of record, come to know the world 
by observing it from a static position, but rather by interacting with it, by introducing 
changes to it, by looking around corners, picking up things, prodding, hefting and 
otherwise altering the conditions under which we observe them (see p. 87).  “Sensory 
qualities are important,” but chiefly as provocations to action and as “consequences of 
acts intentionally performed” (p. 112). 
Unlike the British empiricist school, wrote Dewey (1920), the opposing rationalist 
school at least denied “that sensations as such are true elements of knowledge” (p. 89).  
Rationalists also attended more to the fact that we bring certain structures to bear upon 
things, thereby working and arranging them into intelligible orders.  Dewey complained, 
however, that rationalists overemphasized the mental side of all this.  They did so either 
by regarding the aforesaid structures as innate features of mind or by regarding them as 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
90 
logical limits to which things must be made to conform if they are to be cognizable.  It is 
not that these positions were necessarily wrong.  The problem, rather, was that 
rationalists failed to appreciate that “[e]xperience carries principles of connection and 
organization within itself” by virtue of arising out of “adaptive courses of action, habits, 
active functions, connections of doing and undergoing” and “sensori-motor co-
ordinations” (p. 91). Indeed, wrote Dewey, “[s]ome degree of organization is 
indispensable to even . . . an amoeba” (p. 91).  It must interact with its environment, else 
perish; yet it cannot do so any way whatever.  Its powers of locomotion, its capacity to 
move materials in and out of itself, its shape and size all limit its possibilities of action.  
So too do the materials it encounters.  Consequently its activity has “organization,” 
“continuity in time” and “reference to its surroundings” (p. 91).   
That the amoeba’s activity has these commonalities with what we call 
“experience” does not mean that the amoeba enjoys traces of conscious life.  This way of 
thinking, quipped Dewey, would be akin to concluding that because plows “…originated 
from some pre-existing natural production, say a crooked root or forked branch, the latter 
was inherently and antecedently engaged in plowing” (1925, p. 282). What the example 
does show, however, is that long before human experience arrives on the scene, 
conditions for coherent experience are already present by virtue of the fact that 
possibilities of action are limited by what organisms can do and by what environments 
allow them to do.  With the arrival of human experience, new factors become involved.  
Dewey’s intention was not to deny this, but to stress whatever else experience involves, 
“[t]he first great consideration is that life goes on in an environment; not merely in it but 
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because of it, through interaction with it. No creature lives merely under its skin” (1934, 
p. 13). 
To Dewey, this was patently obvious, and he occasionally apologized for 
emphasizing it.  Yet he justified the emphasis on the grounds that many do speak as if 
experience goes on “merely under our skin.”   A case in point is the tendency to 
characterize sense organs as “receptors,” while failing to emphasize that they are also 
vehicles through which we act. This perpetuates the view that perception is a matter of 
receiving the world, against which Dewey insisted “[p]erception is an act of . . . going-
out . . . in order to receive”  (1934, p. 53).  This is so because perception is emphatically 
structured around actions in the world.  It is so in the obvious sense that what we perceive 
relates to what we do and where we go, and also in the more nuanced sense that our 
perceptual faculties mobilize jointly with our motor capacities.  As illustrated by a range 
of examples, this means that our perceptual capacities and therewith our experiences 
coordinate around objects in the same concrete manner that our hand coordinates around 
the bottle—“the same concrete manner” because perceptual faculties and motor 
capacities synchronize into joint action.  Since these coordinations occur through us 
acting on the world and it pushing back, it follows that perception is an act of going out 
in order to receive.  Even in periods of relative inactivity, our perception is still structured 
around actions in the world, for insofar as we perceive at all, we perceive possibilities of 
action that conform to our actual experience of acting in the world.  If we do not perceive 
things so; if we fail, for example, to perceive walls as obstacles, bottles as graspable and 
so forth, then we do not really perceive at all. 
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On this basis, Dewey concluded that all perception entails a thoroughgoing 
integration of subject and object, a mutual shaping or acting of each upon the other.  By 
means of this conclusion, he generalized anti-sceptical implications that I earlier drew 
from the example of the hand meeting the bottle. He softened the subject-object divide—
a divide that fuels scepticism when overdrawn. He showed that perception is 
emphatically a product of actions in the world and hence never an exclusively “inner” 
process.  He challenged the view that perception is an arbitrary projection imposed on the 
world, for worlds do not allow us to act in completely arbitrary ways. Though unfamiliar 
with Dewey, Merleau-Ponty (1945) provided a good summary of all this when he wrote:  
The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two 
mutually exclusive terms, and sensation is not an invasion of the sensor by 
the sensible. It is my gaze which subtends colour, and the movement of 
my hand which subtends the object’s form, or rather my gaze pairs off 
with colour, and my hand with hardness or softness, and in this transaction 
between the subject of sensation and the sensible it cannot be held that one 
acts while the other suffers action, or that one confers significance on the 
other (p. 214).   
 
Outside of encounters in which the subject and object integrate with and mutually adapt 
to one another—“[a]part from the probing of my eye or my hand, and before my body 
synchronizes with [the object]”—the sensible object is a “beckoning” (p. 214), which is 
to say, an invitation to actualize available possibilities.  In the words of Dewey (1920), 
“[i]t is clue in behavior, a directive factor in adaptation of life in its surroundings” (p. 87). 
“It is an invitation and inducement to act in a needed way” (p. 87)—“needed” because 
there are always limits; we cannot act in anyway whatever.   
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An additional conclusion that Dewey drew from the foregoing account is that 
perception is inherently meaningful.  He arrived at this conclusion through an array of 
interrelated observations and interpretations.  Though later chapters address all this, it is 
worth pausing upon the following point: that possibilities of action relate to use and 
value.  An expanse of space, for instance, not only has numerically measurable values, 
but also a value for doing or not doing certain things.  It has, in other words, use-values.  
Examples like this are everywhere around us.  Dewey understood meaning in a variety of 
ways, some linguistic, some not; yet most of his accounts related meaning to value and 
use, albeit “use” never understood as “mere expedience.”  Assuming that his basic 
account is correct, it follows that we can perceive meanings in a situation by virtue of 
perceiving possibilities of action or use-value.  Moreover, if the account is correct, the 
meanings are not “merely subjective.”  They are, to be sure, partly conditioned on 
subjects since subjects and objects jointly delimit possibilities of action.  Yet to conclude 
that possibilities of action and therewith meanings become “merely subjective” when we 
arrive on the scene is equivalent to concluding that the contents of a kitchen become mere 
imaginings when a new table arrives.  The arrival of the table changes possibilities of 
action. Our arrival does the same.  The possibilities of action are no less objective for all 
this.  
 
Systems of Activity 
“In art, as in nature and in life,” wrote Dewey (1934), there are “pushes and 
pulls,” “contractions and expansions” (p. 134).  In an individual work of art, “each step 
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forward is at the same time a summing up and fulfillment of what precedes” (p. 172).   In 
music, “[a] pause . . . is not a blank, but is a rhythmic silence that punctuates what is done 
while at the same time it conveys an impulsion forward, instead of arresting at the point 
which it defines” (p. 172). Perceiving art aesthetically similarly builds upon a 
consolidated base of lived experience. Those with no experience of Western musical 
traditions often struggle to enjoy and make sense of contemporary jazz innovations; yet 
so too do those obsessively fixated on past traditions of the West. Thus while a 
consolidated base of experience (i.e., limits) facilitates aesthetic perception, an utterly 
petrified base—a base, therefore, which cannot be expanded and recast to embrace new 
innovations—arrests it. Dewey summarized this tenet when he wrote: “…in order to 
perceive esthetically, [one] must remake his past experiences so that they can enter 
integrally into a new pattern.  He cannot dismiss his past experiences nor can he dwell 
among them as they have been in the past” (p. 138). 
Dewey (1908) characterized the activities of inquiring and pursuing knowledge in 
similar terms. “To maintain, to expand, adequate function is [the] business” of life, he 
wrote (p. 48); and “…the business of organic adaptation involved in all knowing [is] to 
make a certain difference in reality…” (p. 47). Living and knowing both involve “…co-
operative and readjusted changes in the cosmic medium” (p. 48). Here Dewey’s use of 
the word “cosmic” corresponded roughly to the ancient Greek word kosmos, which might 
be translated as “orderly arrangement” or “system,” and his statement expressed what 
physicists of his day had just come to recognize: that illuminating a system so that it can 
be seen and known actually disturbs the system. In quantum physics this is emphatically 
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so, for as Dewey (1929b) noted, at least one photon of light “…is required to make, say, 
an electron visible,” and the collision between the photon and the electron “…displaces to 
some extent the object observed” (p. 204).  The lesson Dewey took from this is that 
knowing—like experience—is a “…kind of interaction that goes on within the world” 
(pp. 204-205), so that “[w]hat is known is seen to be a product in which the act of 
observation,” which is an act of rearrangement, “plays a necessary role” (p. 204).  
In this regard, quantum mechanics is almost commonsensical, for we frequently 
act on the precept that we observe things by changing or manipulating them.  After all, 
wrote Dewey (1929b), 
[w]hen we are trying to make out the nature of a confused and unfamiliar 
object, we [often] perform various acts with a view to establishing a new 
relationship to it, such as will bring to light qualities which will aid in 
understanding it. We turn it over, bring it into a better light, rattle and 
shake it, thump, push and press it, and so on (p. 87). 
 
Or if we cannot directly jostle an object, we “deliberately alter the conditions under 
which we observe [it], which is the same thing in principle…” (p. 84).  In either case, 
“…the intent . . . is to make changes which will elicit some previously unperceived 
qualities, and by varying conditions of perception shake loose some property which as it 
stands blinds or misleads us” (p. 87).  Thus inquiring—like perceiving—is an act of 
going out in order to receive.  This means, on the one hand, that we garner observations 
from the world in return for acting upon it; and, on the other, that what we receive is of 
little worth when we fail to act within certain limits. If we use ill-suited instruments; if 
we ignore constraints of materials; if we bang about randomly, we elicit a series of 
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observable effects, but the relationship between them will likely appear haphazard and 
meaningless.   
These points reiterate Dewey’s basic rationale for characterizing “knowing” in 
terms of art and building.  Carpentry is an art, and a carpenter a builder, and what makes 
someone a builder, according to Dewey (1920), “…is the fact that he notes things not just 
as objects in themselves, but with reference to what he wants to do to them and with 
them; to the end he has in mind” (pp. 114-115). Put another way, the end the carpenter 
has in view and the objects he encounters limit possibilities of action.   The end, if it is to 
be achieved, limits what materials can be used; and the materials used limit how the 
carpenter can deploy his skills.  Consequently the carpenter acquires the habit of seeing 
things in terms of possible uses: 
Fitness to effect certain special changes that he wishes to see 
accomplished is what concerns him in the wood and stone and iron which 
he observes.  His attention is directed to the changes they undergo and the 
changes they make other things undergo so that he may select that 
combination of changes which will yield him his desired result (p. 115). 
 
So, for example, when the carpenter calls pine “a soft wood,” he indicates that it easy to 
sand and hammer nails into, but also easy to scratch and thus not appropriate for kitchen 
floors.  From his standpoint, things and their properties “…are what they can do and 
what can be done with them” (p. 115), and  “[i]t is only by  . . . processes of active 
manipulation of things in order to realize his purpose that he discovers what the 
properties of things are” (p. 115).  
Note that in these various examples properties appear not only in consequence of 
what the subject does, but in consequence of “changes [things] make other things 
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undergo” (Dewey 1920, p. 115). Dewey’s point, therefore, was one mentioned in the 
previous chapter: that properties of things are effects of relationships. C. S. Peirce (1878) 
illustrated this idea when he asked what it means to call an object “hard,” and answered 
that it means that most other substances will not have the effect of scratching its surface. 
“The whole conception of this quality [or property of hardness] . . . lies in its conceived 
effects” (p. 266).  C. I. Lewis expressed the idea more generally when he remarked that 
“[a]ny appearance of an object is conditioned also on other objects” (1929b, p. 286). Or, 
to re-quote Nietzsche, “[t]he properties of a thing are effects on other ‘things’: if one 
removes other ‘things,’ then a thing has no properties…” (1967 [c. 1885-1886], §557; 
also see Dewey, 1908, pp. 45-46). This is to say, once again, that the distinction between 
so-called “secondary” properties such as colour and “primary” ones such as length and 
mass is misleading, for as seen in the previous chapter, the colour, length and mass of an 
object all depend on the object’s velocity relative to the observer.  In other words, all are 
effects of relationships.  
It is with something like this in mind that Dewey insisted that perceived qualities 
are not mere representations “in” the sensate organism. They are “…never . . . ‘in’ the 
organism at all,” he wrote; “they [are] always . . . qualities [or effects] of interactions in 
which both extra-organic things and organisms partake” (1925, p. 259).  Thus, as Dewey 
(1908) elaborated in another work, qualities such as “red, or far and near or hard and soft, 
or big and little” are undeniably relative (p. 45).  They are so, however, in the literal 
sense that they involve “a relation between organism and environment,” and this is no 
basis for “proclamations of the agnostic ‘relativity’ of knowledge” (p. 45). Instead, it is 
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“…an argument for the ultimately practical value of distinctions” (p. 45). This means 
“they are differences made in what things would have been without organic behavior—
differences made not by ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind,’ but by the organism as the active 
center of a system of activities” (p. 45). 
The combination of this system of activities and the active organism can be 
thought of as a situation. If we are in a kitchen, our situation includes us, and likely such 
things as floors, walls, chairs, counters, sink and stove, and perhaps also a cat sniffing at 
our feet. These constituents delineate possibilities of action and organization. If we 
remove, say, the table, then we can traverse the space it once occupied, but we cannot 
lean our elbows where we once did; nor can the tablecloth continue to rest a metre-and-a-
half above the floor as it once did.  Limits also vary depending on the active centre. The 
cat is one such centre; a person another. Because the two come to the kitchen equipped 
with different capacities, they confront different constraints: they are faced, as the 
expression goes, with different situations. We can imagine, therefore, that they perceive 
their situations differently, yet “perceiving situations differently” is here equivalent to 
“perceiving objectively different situations.”  It is equivalent because the cat and person 
face objectively different constraints—they, like the table and sink, are able to do 
different things. It is no mere variation in mental outlook that differentiates the perceptual 
experience of sipping a glass of milk from that of lapping from a dish while on all fours.  
It is a difference in action.  If the person caresses a table leg while the cat sharpens its 
claws on it, they perform different actions, and different actions, in turn, realize different 
properties as effects.  Easy sweeps of fingertips realize a smooth lacquered finish, while 
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the cat’s claws realize the sinewy toughness of wood, all of which is to say: perception is 
pre-eminently a matter of acting and making differences in the world, as opposed to 
merely representing it.  
Rather astonishingly, some have advanced the reverse of this position by citing 
observations that actually affirm it. Dawkins, for example, in a chapter dedicated largely 
to establishing that perception consists of simulacra, informed his readers that 
Science has taught us, against all evolved intuition, that apparently solid 
things like crystals and rocks are really composed almost entirely of empty 
space.  . . . So why do rocks look and feel solid and hard and 
impenetrable? . . . Our brains have evolved to help our bodies find their 
way around the world on the scale at which those bodies operate. We 
never evolved to navigate the world of atoms. If we had, our brains 
probably would perceive rocks as full of empty space. Rocks feel hard and 
impenetrable to our hands because our hands can’t penetrate them.  The 
reason they can’t penetrate them is unconnected with the sizes and 
separations of the particles that constitute matter. Instead, it has to do with 
the force fields that are associated with those widely spaced particles in 
‘solid’ matter (2006, p. 268).  
 
From Dewey’s standpoint, this passage mostly reduces to the claim that our perception 
reflects the situation we objectively find ourselves in, and if we were to find ourselves in 
another (or evolve in it), our perception would reflect that situation.  Thus, for example, 
we perceive the beer bottle as impenetrable because our hands cannot penetrate it.  In this 
particular situation or relationship, the bottle is, objectively speaking, impenetrable.  
Moreover, we do not merely perceive it so because an “evolved intuition” disposes us to 
represent it this way. If the rules of physics suddenly change so that our hand passes 
through the bottle, we will perceive this too. So shall it be that actions in the world trump 
“mental representations.” Indeed, it is largely by acting on materials in the world—by 
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altering the situations in which they are observed—that scientists have reached the 
conclusions Dawkins conveyed.   
Dawkins summed up his illustration by explaining: “It is useful for our brains to 
construct notions like solidity and impenetrability, because such notions help us to 
navigate our bodies…” through environments (2006, p. 268). Dewey, of course, agreed 
that concepts and suchlike are useful instruments. He added, however, that if they are 
deployed as instruments, then we have little reason to evaluate them on the basis of how 
faithfully they copy or represent reality, and consequently little basis for describing them 
as misrepresentations of reality (see 1908, pp. 45-46).   
Commentators sometimes charge that Democritus misrepresented reality when he 
claimed atoms are indivisible. In doing so, they fail to appreciate that atomas meant 
“indivisible” and that it was modern era scientists who misapplied the term. Dawkins has 
committed the same basic error, for we usually do not use the terms “solid” and 
“impenetrable” to designate the ultimate nature of entities, but rather to indicate what we 
can do with them and they to us. A solidly built chair bears our weight.  An impenetrably, 
solid fog interferes with vision and movement.  Unlike liquid or gaseous water, we can 
handle solid ice, walk upon it or risk falling through it.  In short, when Dawkins claimed 
that “our brains . . . construct notions like solidity and impenetrability, because such 
notions help us to navigate our bodies,” he did not seem to recognize that the concepts—
regardless of how or why they might arise—describe how we act and therewith perceive 
the world.   
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As with James before him and Dawkins after him, Dewey (1920) acknowledged a 
profound debt to the biological sciences, particularly evolutionary science (see pp. 84-
86).  As with Dawkins (2006), moreover, who has suggested that concepts are useful 
ways of adapting to the world and that “[w]hat we see . . . is not the unvarnished real 
world” (p. 371), Dewey held that concepts are instruments and that schemes of 
conceptual classification are not “bare transcript[s] or duplicate[s] of some finished and 
done-for arrangement pre-existing in nature” (p. 154).  They are not, however, because 
representing the real world is not their chief function.  They are used, rather, to negotiate 
realities we encounter.  Dawkins has emphasized just this point.  Yet he has failed to 
emphasize, as Dewey did, that this instrumental view does not, by any means, 
…commit us to the notion that classes are purely verbal or purely mental. 
Organization is no more merely nominal or mental in any art, including 
the art of inquiry, than it is in a department store or railway system. The 
necessity of execution supplies objective criteria. Things have to be sorted 
out and arranged so that their grouping will promote successful action for 
ends (p. 154). 
 
So whereas Dawkins would insist that our perception and conception of the world is built 
“inside our head” (p. 361), Dewey insisted that our conceptual ways of classifying the 
world “…are not restricted . . . to inner consciousness; they concern objective action. 
They must take effect in the world” (p. 154, emphasis added). 
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-Four- 
World-Building and World-Grammars 
 
John Steinbeck (1939) portrayed an instance of world-building that occurred daily 
as victims of the Great Depression flocked to California. “In the daylight,” he wrote,   
[people] scuttled like bugs to the westward; and as the dark caught them, 
they clustered like bugs near to shelter  and to water.  . . . Thus it might be 
that one family camped near a spring, and another camped for the spring 
and for company, and a third because two families had pioneered the place 
and found it good. And when the sun went down, perhaps twenty families 
and twenty cars were there. […]  
                                
Every night a world created, complete with furniture—friends made and 
enemies established; a world complete with braggarts and with cowards, 
with quiet men, with humble men, with kindly men. Every night 
relationships that make a world, established (pp. 264-265). 
 
Steinbeck went on to say that “[a] certain physical pattern is needed for the building of a 
world” (p. 266).  In his example, this included “water, a river bank, a stream, a spring, or 
even a faucet unguarded. And there is needed enough flat land to pitch the tents, a little 
brush or wood to build the fires,” and more besides (pp. 266-267). 
The previous chapter, with its example of hands meeting bottles, argued that 
perceptual experiences pattern around structural loci.  This chapter argues that worlds are 
similarly formed. In the same way that the nighttime world of the migrants gathers 
around a common concern for water, companionship, space for tents, firewood and a 
dream of better life in the west, an entire weekend of late night revelry and early morning 
hangovers may be organized around bottled beer. So too may the agricultural, industrial 
and commercial activities, not to mention the physical space, of a beer-producing town. 
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Martin Heidegger (1949) noted that “…the Old High German word thing means a 
gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter” (p. 172), and 
therefore a matter of concern; and in the just mentioned examples, life activity gathers 
around a concern for particular things.  Insofar as these things are not merely concrete 
entities, but assembling places—insofar as “thing” means “that which gathers”—
Heidegger rightly added that “[t]he thing things [a] world” (p. 178).  
 
World, Meaning and Form 
That worlds gather around things does not mean that things are first there and that 
worlds only appear afterwards.  In the case of bottled-beer, the thing is literally a crafted 
item, a physical and cultural product of the human world. But more crucially, it is made 
into the kind of thing that it is for us by the ways in which it stands as an object of 
practical concern or importance in our lived worlds. Bottled beer is important or 
significant—and hence meaningful—to both the earlier mentioned revellers and the 
townspeople, yet not, on the whole, for the same reasons.  In the world of the former, it is 
perhaps valued most as a social lubricant; in that of the latter, as an economic commodity 
and a product of local pride. Thus it does not mean exactly the same thing in the two 
worlds, and consequently does not show up in the same way.  James wrote that when one 
asks what kind of thing something is, “[t]he living question always is, Where is it found?’ 
(1879b, p. 967).  Grasping what a phenomenon “is,” among other things, means being 
familiar with its place(s) within particular world-contexts.   
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Here it is helpful to recall that James regarded a concept as a “teleological 
instrument” (1879b, p. 952), and  “…the mind as an essentially teleological mechanism” 
(1881, p. 544).  That is, he held that “…essence, the ground of conception, varies with the 
end [or telos] we have in view” (1879b, p. 952), and he characterized the mind as an 
agency that pursues interests, purposes, teloi or ends. It is also important to note that “a 
world” here connotes a teleological centre of life.  It connotes a field of interaction that 
gravitates around certain concerns or purposes; and if “essence”—which here means the 
meaning and general appearance of a thing—is determined by the ends-in-view, then a 
world is a field that allows brute particulars to show up as definite kinds of things, so 
that, as Dewey put it, “we become capable of perceiving things instead of merely feeling 
and having them” (1925, p. 182). To borrow an illustration from Heidegger, our 
concerned or interested involvement in a world is a pre-condition of us encountering 
things as “ready-to-hand” (1927, p. 117/85), which means roughly, though not exactly, as 
instruments or tools. A hammer appears as a hammer—as opposed to a mere stick-like 
think with a metal block on one end—insofar as it is encountered in a world where nails 
are hammered into wood for the purpose of making furniture, houses and so forth, and 
this for the purpose of building habitable spaces.  It is thus that Heidegger asserted that 
the ready-to-hand character of things is grasped only on the basis of prior familiarity with 
a range of concerned involvements that make up a particular world (1927, p. 118/85).  
Along these lines, James and Dewey suggested that we inhabit worlds that are 
organized around practical concerns and purposes, for example, our purposes as 
carpenters, as scientists or as conservationists; that worlds supply a kind of connecting 
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framework within which things interlock meaningfully; and that “[t]o know an object,” 
therefore, “is to lead to it through a context which the world supplies” (James 1895b, p. 
109).  There are a number of junctures, however, at which James’ position on meaning 
departs from Dewey’s, which often resembles that of existential phenomenologists such 
as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.  First, James held that meaning is primarily conceptual. 
Dewey, by contrast, held that conceptual meaning is just a small part of an enormously 
wider field of pre-conceptual or pre-reflective lived meaning—a point addressed in later 
chapters.  Second, James held that purposes direct our attention, so that we selectively 
attend to certain things, and therewith sculpt the world of sense experience into 
meaningful forms. Dewey, while granting that something like this goes on, argued that 
patterns of activity and reciprocal interconnections that constitute a world or lived 
situation are themselves a “form or scheme . . . in which meaning and understanding 
occur” (1925, p. 181). So while James—particularly in his early and middle period—
suggested that meanings are formed through a cognitive process whereby we selectively 
attach sensible effects to objects of conception, Dewey suggested that general ways of 
acting in the world constitute general forms of experience and that this supplies an 
additional basis upon which objects are endowed with meaning.   
In articulating this position, Dewey (1920) remarked that “the key to the matter” 
is curiously found in an “old notion of experience,” an ancient Greek notion (p. 79).  “To 
Plato,” he wrote, “experience meant enslavement to the past, to custom” or engrained 
habit. Dewey largely accepted this notion of experience, albeit with a number of caveats.   
First, he stressed that experience becomes thin and loses significance when actions 
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become overly monotonous, mechanical and blind (see 1925, pp. 358-361).  Second, he 
suggested that habits of interaction underlie (are a precondition of) the general concepts 
and universal forms that philosophers since Plato have so esteemed.  Dewey explained 
that we engage in certain acts, and consequently undergo “…certain sufferings and 
affections. Each of these in the time of its [initial] occurrence is isolated, particular—its 
counterpart is transient appetite and transient sensation” (p. 79). But as separate incidents 
“pile up” and “accumulate,” important regularities “…are selected, reinforced and 
combined. Gradually a habit of action is built up, and corresponding to this habit there 
forms a certain generalized picture of an object or situation” (p. 79). 
Along with the development of this generalized picture, as Dewey went on to 
explain, 
…there grows up a certain regularity of conduct. . . . The skill develops 
which is shown by the artisan, the shoemaker, the carpenter, the gymnast, 
the physician, who have regular ways of handling cases. This regularity 
signifies, of course, that the particular case is not treated as an isolated 
particular, but as one of a kind, which therefore demands a kind of action. 
From the multitude of particular illnesses encountered, the physician in 
learning to class some of them as indigestion learns also to treat the cases 
of the class in a common or general way. He forms the rule of 
recommending a certain diet, and prescribing a certain remedy. All this 
forms what we call experience (1920, p. 80).  
 
More specifically, it forms a kind of experience in which things appear in a general light. 
Yet it does not thereby wipe out particularities, but rather accentuates particularities that 
are in some way relevant or important (see 1922, p. 137). In recognizing an ailment as a 
general disorder called “indigestion,” the above mentioned physician does not become 
insensitive to the specifics of the patient’s sufferings, but instead becomes sensitive to 
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what specific sufferings indicate or mean, and so comes, as it were, to see them for “what 
they are,” namely, symptoms of indigestion.  
It is thus that general ways of dealing with things form a kind of experience in 
which a particular thing or incident comes to have a clear appearance. As organized ways 
of interacting, habits structure our doings and effects undergone in consequence of them, 
so that the two unify into connections of “means-consequence,” thus forming meaningful 
and intelligible relationships, as opposed to haphazard ones. As persistent or enduring 
ways of interacting, habits also help ensure that connections between doings and 
undergoings are not merely fleeting—not, as it were, “this way now, another way an 
instant later.”  This too is a condition of establishing intelligible relationships.  It will 
later be seen that habits—particularly skilled habits—are also intentional.  They are 
directed towards objects and objectives; they are purposeful; and pragmatic philosophers, 
like their classical Greek forebears, held that purpose relates to essence, meaning and 
intelligible appearance.  Of course, whereas classical thinkers maintained that purposes 
are inherent in things, pragmatists asserted that purposes have to do with the ends we 
have in view, which does not, however, imply that things have no “say,” for a given thing 
cannot be put to any purpose whatever.  Ends, like the climax to which a story leads, are 
loci around which actions are structured, sustained and directed towards a common 
purpose. For these reasons, Dewey maintained that habits and the habitats or worlds they 
form supply frameworks within which we come to have “a certain general insight” (1920, 
p. 80). Consequently “[w]e come to know or note not merely this particular which as a 
particular cannot strictly be known at all”; we come rather to recognize it as “an 
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individual of a certain kind” (1920, p. 79).  We come to recognize general kinds not 
because a species of things share a feature or set of features, but because they fit within or 
have a role within a meaningful form of conduct, a teleological centre of life—a world. 
In Experience and Nature (1925), Dewey once again used ancient Greek thought 
to elaborate upon his position. “To the Greeks,” he wrote, 
a kind was an organized system in which an ideal form unites varying 
particulars into a genuine whole, and gives to them distinctive and 
recognizable character.  The presence in things of the generic form renders 
them knowable (pp. 209-210). 
 
The claim that generic forms are present in things—as opposed to minds—is particularly 
important.  It is a reminder that the eidos or form of a thing was not, from a classical 
standpoint, a merely mental way of grouping the thing into a class; it was not an “inner” 
representation that we project onto the world. 
This crucial point, however, is increasingly misunderstood, and the 
misunderstanding probably follows from the Platonic notion that phenomena we 
encounter in this world of sense perception can never be real.  If we draw a circle on a 
chalkboard and measure it with sufficient precision, we inevitably find points on the 
perimeter not equidistant from the centre, and therewith discover that the circle is not a 
real circle, but a semblance of one. And if we observe it through magnified powers of 
perception, we find further that it is changing, for example, that bits of chalk are flecking 
from the board. Thus even if the figure started out as a real circle, it ceased being one 
before we even finished drawing it. So there is a sense in which the real circle does not 
appear physically before the eye, but instead appears ideationally before the mind’s 
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eye—a point reflected in the fact that eidos, in ancient Greek texts, literally connoted the 
appearance of a thing, but could also connote the idea of a thing (see Novak 2004, pp. 1-
3).11 There is a sense, therefore, in which the real circle exists only in the realm of 
ideas—hence the traditional equation of eidos to ideas or ideal forms.  However, it does 
not follow from this that we project our idea of a circle onto the world.  From a Platonic 
standpoint, the idea or ideal form exists independently of the knower in much the same 
way that the Pythagorean theorem continues to hold true (assuming flat space, excluding 
psychologism, etc.) independently of whether anyone is around to conceive of it; and 
from a Platonic standpoint, the imperfect copy of the ideal circle on the chalkboard 
appears as a circle only insofar as we see a resemblance between the copy and the ideal. 
Dewey did not assert that we actually see general forms in particular things (see 
1934, pp. 115-116). Nor did he claim that forms are self-subsistent entities. Yet he did 
argue that forms and meanings are objective and “out there” in the public world.  They 
are, he maintained, 
…because they are modes of  . . . interaction[.] . . .  The regulative force of 
legal meanings affords a convenient illustration. A traffic policeman holds 
up his hand or blows a whistle. His act operates as a signal to direct 
movements. But it is more than an episodic stimulus. It embodies a rule of 
social action. Its proximate meaning [i.e., its status as a means to an 
immediate end] is its near-by consequences in coordination of movements 
of persons and vehicles; its ulterior and permanent meaning—essence—is 
its consequence in the way of security of social movements. Failure to 
observe the signal subjects a person to arrest, fine or imprisonment. The 
essence embodied in the policeman’s whistle is not an occult reality 
 
11 Here I cite Joseph’s Novak’s (2004) “A Sense of Eidos,” which appears in Eidos, vol. 28, pp. 77-81.  The 
journal is not accessible on-line, nor is it widely available in print.  The article, however, is posted on the 
journal’s website, yet with a pagination that does not match the original publication.  The page numbers I 
reference correspond to the internet posting. 
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superimposed upon a sensuous or physical flux and imparting form to it; a 
mysterious subsistence somehow housed within a psychical event. Its 
essence is the rule, comprehensive and persisting, the standardized habit, 
of social interaction, and for the sake of which the whistle is used. The 
pattern, archetype, that forms the essence of the whistle as a particular 
noise is an orderly arrangement of the movements of persons, and vehicles 
established by social agreement as its consequence. This meaning is 
independent of the psychical landscape, the sensations and imagery, of the 
policeman and others concerned. But it is not on that account a timeless 
spiritual ghost nor pale logical subsistence divorced from events (1925, 
pp. 190-191; emphasis added). 
 
Put another way, while essence and meaning are not manifested in isolated things and 
incidents, they are embodied in public forms of interaction in which we encounter 
particular things and incidents, and come to know “what they are,” which is to say, what 
they mean. This is why Dewey suggested that a lived situation or world is a “form or 
scheme . . . in which meaning and understanding occur” (1925, p. 181). 
Some readers—particularly the scientifically minded—may object that any world 
is ultimately made of brute physical stuff; that physical stuff is without inherent meaning 
or purpose; and that meaning, therefore, is not inherent in worldly forms, but imposed 
upon the world by us. Yet here it is worth recalling James’ observation that the 
proposition that the world is ultimately physical is a proposition about what the world 
essentially is,  
…[and] the whole doctrine of essential characters is intimately bound up 
with a teleological view of the world. Materialism becomes self-
contradictory when it denies teleology, and yet in the same breath calls 
atoms, etc., essential facts  (1890ii, p. 336, fn.).  
 
Or as Dewey (1925) articulated the point, what holds in the case of the police whistle also 
holds in the case of “non-human” phenomena such as “gravity” or “fire” (p. 191).  
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Certain consequences of these physical phenomena “concern us,” but “…the 
consequences are not merely physical; they enter finally into human action and destiny” 
(p. 191).  As with the whistle, therefore, the “meaning” or “essence” of physical 
phenomena includes “…the consequences of certain natural events within the scheme of 
human activities, in the experience of social intercourse” (p. 191). Thus if scientists say 
physicality is essential, they in practice mean essential for scientific purposes, which is to 
say, essential within the scientific worlds—the teleological fields of intercourse and 
interaction scientists inhabit.  In making the claim that reality is essentially physical, 
therefore, scientists concede that they never encounter a world of brute facts—a world 
utterly devoid of purpose and meaning.12  They also come close to committing a fallacy 
that “consists in the supposition that whatever is found true under certain conditions may 
forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions.”  This, quipped 
Dewey, is analogous to arguing that “[b]ecause a thirsty man gets satisfaction from 
drinking water, bliss consists in being drowned” (1922, p. 175).  
By revisiting James’ theory of meaning and reinterpreting it through the work of 
Dewey, we learn that meaningful forms or schemes do not first arise in private 
consciousness, and later get “mentally projected” onto the world.  Or rather, meaningful 
forms may sometimes initially arise in private consciousness; yet they do not really 
 
12 In the passage from which the above quoted lines are excerpted, Dewey grants that scientists may to 
some extent ignore meanings that arise out of everyday forms of social intercourse.  However, this does not 
challenge the claim that scientific conceptions about physical phenomena relate to consequences that such 
phenomena have within schemes of human activity.  After all, science—like language—is practically 
impossible in the absence of interactions between sentient beings. Consequently a field of science is, 
among other things, a form of social intercourse. 
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communicate anything and hence do not have genuine meaning until they become public 
forms of interaction. Dewey (1925) thus cautioned us not to confuse pragmatic accounts 
of meaning with the nominalist doctrine that only particular things and incidents are real; 
that general concepts are adventitious and arbitrary ways of carving reality up; and that 
words denoting general concepts are mere names that do not correspond to actual forms 
in the world.  “The defect of nominalism,” he explained, “lies in its virtual denial of 
interaction and association” (p. 184). It treats words 
…not as a mode of social action with which to realize the ends of 
association, but as an expression of a ready-made, exclusively individual, 
mental state; sensation, image or feeling, which, being an existence, is 
necessarily particular. For the sound, gesture, or written mark which is 
involved in language is a particular existence. But as such it is not a word; 
and it does not become a word by declaring a mental existence; it becomes 
a word by gaining meaning; and it gains meaning when its use establishes 
a genuine community of action (pp. 184-185). 
 
By the same token, meaningful forms—even those that initially arise in private 
consciousness—only acquire meaning insofar as they are embodied in public forms of 
interaction.  It consequently remains so that worldly situations are themselves forms or 
schemes in which meaning occurs, so that meaning is no mere mental projection. 
 
World-Grammars and Our Sense of Reality 
For Steinbeck (1939), world-building is a technique, an art, and with greater 
mastery of the art, worlds become increasingly structured.  The Great Depression 
migrants, he wrote,  
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…were [initially] timid in the building and tumbling worlds, but gradually 
the technique of building worlds became their technique. Then leaders 
emerged, then laws were made, then codes came into being. […]     
 
The families learned what rights must be observed—the right of privacy in 
the tent; the right to keep the past black hidden in the heart; the right to 
talk and to listen; the right to refuse help or to accept, to offer help or to 
decline it; the right of son to court and daughter to be courted; the right of 
the hungry to be fed; the rights of the pregnant and the sick to transcend 
all other rights.  
          
And the families learned, although no one told them, what rights are 
monstrous and must be destroyed: the right to intrude upon privacy, the 
right to be noisy while the camp slept, the right of seduction or rape, the 
right of adultery and theft and murder. These rights were crushed, because 
the little worlds could not exist for even a night with such rights alive. 
                                                      
And as the worlds moved westward, rules became laws, although no one 
told the families. It is unlawful to foul near the camp; it is unlawful in any 
way to foul the drinking water; it is unlawful to eat good rich food near 
one who is hungry, unless he is asked to share.  […]          
                                                            
The families moved westward, and the technique of building the worlds 
improved so that the people could be safe in their worlds; and the form 
was so fixed that a family acting in the rules knew it was safe in the rules  
(pp. 265-266).  
 
It might be said that with more mastery in the art of world-building, worlds increasingly 
take on a sort of “grammar.”  In language, grammar roughly delimits what combinations 
of words are permissible, and what combinations have sense or meaning.  In worlds, it 
delimits what sorts of actions are allowed, and it is a precondition of certain things and 
events having certain meanings. That certain sexual unions mean “adultery” for the 
migrants is a consequence of them inhabiting a world in which it is illicit to exchange a 
longtime mate for another.  Indeed, adultery can only exist—can only be a reality—in a 
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world where sexual behaviour is codified, which is to say, arranged around certain social 
boundaries or limits. 
A now reoccurring idea discussed in this work is that limits, by constraining 
certain actions and affording others, shape our sense of reality; and an idea introduced in 
this chapter is that worlds impose structural limits on action and therewith delimit our 
sense of what is real. Steinbeck’s example helps illustrate this.  So too do the accounts of 
scientific principles and spiritual beliefs discussed in Chapter Two. There it was seen that 
the principles of uniformity and causality are so woven into the world lived by most 
scientists that most are wont to “see” them as realities infusing nearly everything. It was 
also seen that the divine too exerts such an organizing influence on the lived world of 
believers that they may similarly sense it in flowers and trees, in life and being—to sense 
all this almost as plainly as one senses the blue of the sky.  
Here the usage of the term “sense” is not exactly literal; yet neither is it merely 
metaphorical.  In the words of James: 
It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a 
feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 
“something there,” more deep and more general than any of the special 
and particular “senses” by which the current psychology supposes existent 
realities to be originally revealed (1902, p. 59). 
 
This “sense of reality” might be understood as a “world-grammar” to which experiences 
habitually conform. In the everyday world, people can walk on garden paths, but not 
water; they can climb stairs, but not columns of air. The everyday world has various 
constraints and affordances; these constitute “grammars” or rules to which actions 
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conform; and to a significant degree these rules about what people can and cannot do 
delimit their sense of what can and cannot be, which is to say, their sense of reality. 
So similarly with scientific and religious worlds.  Inhabiting scientific worlds 
often means acting in conformity with belief in the principles; inhabiting religious 
worlds, with belief in the divine. This means following certain conventions, engaging in 
certain customary ways of handling and interacting. As Dewey (1922) noted, “…customs 
supply standards for personal activities.  They are the pattern into which individual 
activity must weave itself” (p. 75). As such, they shape people’s sense of reality.  They 
do so in the earlier discussed sense of providing a scheme in which people acquire a 
relatively stable and generalized picture of an object or situation. But more pertinently, 
habitual patterns of acting constitute rules or mores for what people can and cannot do (p. 
75), and this, once again, significantly delimits people’s sense of what can and cannot be 
and therewith their sense of reality. Again, the actions of oncologists gravitate around the 
belief that cancer has causes; the notion that it might occur for no reason is almost 
nonsensical in their world; and that which is nonsensical—the nonsense term “skrkl” to 
use an example from James—has not even “the possibility of . . . referring” to any 
particular reality (1907b, pp. 913-914). One assumes the notion of a godless universe is 
similarly without sense of reality for religious figures such as St. Ignatius, who actively 
embraced a painful execution in hopes of emulating the death of Jesus for the sake of 
God.  
The challenge here—and a general challenge pursued in this work—is to show 
that our “sense of reality” is not merely in our heads.  The challenge, to put it another 
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way, is to show that the limits that delineate our sense of reality are not merely mental 
constraints on how we think, much less merely private or personal ways of seeing things. 
When Steinbeck said that “[a] certain physical pattern is needed for the building of a 
world” (1939, p. 266), he suggested, among other things, that we build worlds in the 
same tangible sense that we build houses. A house does not merely limit how we picture 
a particular locale “in our heads”; rather, the house—with its walls, stairways, doors, 
halls, rooms and so forth—imposes structural limits on how we can act within that locale. 
How we can act within that locale constrains how we can experience and know it, and 
consequently how it shows up or appears to us.  
Oikos is Greek for “house” or “living space”; it is also the root of the word 
“ecology”; and a very literal sense in which we bring a world into being is by nurturing a 
sort of ecological system—or what may here be called a “culture,” for instance, a “culture 
of science.” The word “culture”—related to the word “cultivate,” and derived from Latin 
cultura for “growing,” and cult for “inhabited”—carries connotations of life; and when 
one speaks of culture, one often speaks of a way of life, a lifestyle—habits of living. This 
includes customs, styles of expression and comportment; it includes artistic traditions—
not just fine art, but also handicraft, usage of tools, methods of doing and making; it 
includes heritages of beliefs, which, along with everything else mentioned, are also habits 
of interaction. We cannot negotiate and genuinely inhabit a culture without conforming in 
some degree to the grammars—the patterns of doing—of the culture. We cannot, for 
example, negotiate French culture if we speak only English. A culture thus chastens us to 
engage in certain publicly shared forms of interaction. A culture is a highly developed 
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instance of what James (1905) called an “activity-situation.”  By activity-situation he 
means an active human life situation, and consequently a situation that “…comes with 
definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes complicated with 
resistances…” (p. 4).  Activity-situations often function as a sort of environmental tissue 
joining things together, so that the situation manifests a “fundirte inhalte” or 
“gestaltqualität” (p. 5), which is to say, a “consolidated fundament” or “form-quality.” 
The activities of behavioral scientists, to recycle an example from Chapter Two, 
create laboratory environments that pace participants through set sequences of tasks, and 
often limit their responses to checkmarks on scales.  They also create academic 
environments that, among other things, place a premium on statistical interpretations. By 
sequencing actions, and limiting responses to a finite number of alternatives, the 
laboratory environment funnels behaviors into orders that can easily be understood in 
terms of uniform cause-and-effect relations. By insisting on statistical interpretations, the 
academic environment does much the same. This is, in fact, something that the world or 
culture of science generally does—“world” or “culture” here referring to vocabularies, 
concepts, methods and tools through which scientists interact with one another and with 
the objects of their investigations. Seen thus, the principles of uniformity and causality 
essentially name habitual ways in which the activities of scientists are patterned; ways in 
which objects, both conceptual and physical, are made to relate; ways, therefore, in which 
the scientific world knits together and consolidates.  
Hence while the principles of uniformity and causality are not experienced as 
substantive facts, they are encountered as overall ways of doing, bringing together, 
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cohering and sense-making. It might be said that they are not observed in the world, but 
are forms that certain scientific worlds take. It might be said, therefore, that the principles 
demarcate a formal limit of certain scientific worlds.  They mark a reach beyond which 
certain scientists do not act and therewith a horizon beyond which they do not see.  
Dewey (1922) expressed this sentiment when he wrote that habits increase the 
“efficiency” of the intellect by “restrict[ing] its reach” (p. 172). “They are blinders that 
confine the eyes of mind to the road ahead.  They prevent thought from straying away 
from its imminent occupation to a landscape more varied and picturesque but irrelevant 
to [the] practice” underway (p. 172). 
The suggestion that scientists “build” or “construct” worlds and that these worlds 
limit their view of reality, combined with the earlier claim that worlds are organized 
around practical interests, has a superficial resonance with certain postmodern and 
sociological outlooks that attack the purported objectivity of scientific beliefs.  But as 
should be evident by now, classical pragmatists meant to undermine the notion that we 
are trapped within bubbles of subjectivity.  An initial point to note is that we construct or 
build all sorts of things—gardens, houses, works of art and more besides.  Yet almost 
nobody concludes that these things are subjective figments of our imagination merely 
because they are constructed. So we should not conclude that beliefs are subjective 
merely because they “occur,” as Dewey put it, in worldly forms or schemes that we help 
construct.  As Dewey explained: 
Knowledge or science, as a work of art, like any other work of art, confers 
upon things traits and potentialities which did not previously belong to 
them. Objection from the side of alleged realism [that this makes 
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knowledge merely subjective] . . . springs from a confusion of tenses. 
Knowledge is not a distortion or perversion which confers upon its 
subject-matter traits which do not belong to it, but is an act which confers 
upon non-cognitive material traits which did not belong to it. It marks a 
change by which physical events exhibiting properties of mechanical 
energy, connected by relations of push and pull, hitting, rebounding, 
splitting and consolidating, realize characters, meanings and relations of 
meanings hitherto not possessed by them (1925, pp. 381). 
 
It may be, to return to the example of behavioural scientists, that laboratory environments 
make human behaviours more ordered than they otherwise would be.  Yet this does not 
alter the fact that human behaviours have a statistically expressible degree of order within 
that setting, nor does it disqualify discoveries that scientists make within that setting.  The 
fact that humans can be made to behave in certain ways tells us something about human 
beings.  
So also with other things we make. The fact that we can build a house that does 
not fall down or a scientific world that allows us to consistently and fruitfully handle 
certain kinds of phenomena tells us something about the realities with which we are 
dealing.  It also suggests that our beliefs about reality have a worldly basis: that they are 
not mere artefacts of how we happen to represent realities in our minds, but indicators of 
how particular forms of reality are tangibly manifested in worlds that we actually live. 
Dewey (1925) captured this point nicely when he wrote that “the whole history of 
science, art and morals”—in other words, the history of human knowledge—shows 
“…that the mind that appears in individuals is not as such individual mind [sic.]” (p. 
219), private, subjective and cut off from “external” realities.  “Mind denotes [a] whole 
system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life” (p. 303). It is 
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“…itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and rejections, 
of expectancies and appraisals of meanings which have been instituted under the 
influence of custom and tradition” (p. 219), which is to say, within the lived settings of 
cultures or worlds. 
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-Five- 
Experience and Subjectivity as Actions of Being in the World 
 
Dewey wrote that “[e]xperience is no slipping along in a path fixed by inner 
consciousness. Private consciousness is an incidental outcome of experience of a vital 
objective sort; it is not its source” (1917, p. 11).  Here, as in many of Dewey’s other 
middle and late works, “objective” roughly meant “concretely in the world”; and 
“experience of a vital sort” connoted experience within which things integrate 
meaningfully, which is to say, into connections of “means-consequence.”  According to 
Dewey, such experience emerges in the following way:   
The organism acts in accordance with its own structure, simple or 
complex, upon its surroundings. As a consequence the changes produced 
in the environment react upon the organism and its activities. The living 
creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences of its own behavior. This 
close connection between doing and suffering or undergoing forms what 
we call experience.  . . . [S]uppose a busy infant puts his finger in the fire; 
the doing is random, aimless, without intention or reflection. But 
something happens in consequence. The child undergoes heat, he suffers 
pain. The doing and undergoing, the reaching and the burn, are connected. 
One comes to suggest and mean the other. Then there is experience in a 
vital and significant sense (1920, pp. 86-87; also see 1934, pp. 43-45).  
 
To borrow words from Merleau-Ponty, experience of a vital objective sort arises when 
doings and undergoings are “…exercised and linked together in the general action of 
being in the world” (1945, p. 234). 
It is worth emphasizing that Dewey did not, in the above quoted passages, claim 
there is no such thing as a private consciousness that is “exclusively mine” and “directly 
accessible only to me.” What he claimed, rather, was that private consciousness is an 
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incidental aspect of experience, not its substance. Elsewhere he added that private 
consciousness or inner experience is without meaning and almost without reality when 
cut off from the lived world. With other phenomenologically oriented thinkers, he argued 
that inner experience is unintelligible if one attempts to understand it in isolation from 
our being in the world.  He also argued that inner experience is the exception rather than 
the norm, and that the increased salience of inner experience is often symptomatic of a 
kind of breakdown or pathology.  
  
Emotional Experience  
We often regard emotions as quintessential examples of “inner phenomena,” 
which is to say, phenomena accessible only through introspection.  Yet as Merleau-Ponty 
(1947) pointed out in a piece published near the end of Dewey’s life,  “introspection 
gives [us] almost nothing” (p. 52). If we try to study love or anger from inner observation 
alone, we “…will find little to describe: a few pangs, a few heart-throbs—in short, trite 
agitations…” that convey little about what these emotions mean (p. 52).    
 A first point to note, therefore, is that we understand the significance of emotions 
such as love or anger by grasping them in relation to objects of love or anger in the 
world.   Emotions, wrote Dewey (1934), “are attached to objects and events,” and “…are 
not, save in pathological instances, private” (p. 42).  An overwhelming anger connected 
to nothing in the world constitutes a kind of breakdown or disorder in the obvious sense 
that it is felt for no reason, but also in the secondary sense that the emotion, in order to 
persist, “demands something beyond itself to which to attach itself” (p. 42).  Hence 
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pathologically angry people lash out at nearly anything; they perceive slights where none 
have occurred, and thus generate “delusion[s] in lack of something real” (p. 42; also see 
1922, p. 140).   To say that emotions are not purely private and that they demand objects 
is to say what is relatively obvious: emotions are manners of comporting ourselves 
towards people, things and events, ways of interacting and being in the world.  They are, 
to be sure, something we feel, but they are also something we do and live  
A second point to note, accordingly, is that emotions are constituted in and 
through life situations.  We say emotions are “in” us.  Yet we also speak of ourselves as 
“being in” emotional moods, and there are times when being in the midst of a situation 
means being in the midst of a public emotional atmosphere. The merry-making that goes 
on at a Christmas party, for example, constitutes a public emotional atmosphere in the 
midst of which merry-makers find themselves.  Some, it is true, may be less than merry, 
but often this is a result of a kind of breakdown, as when people suffer from depression or 
associate a painful past experience with the holidays.  The claim here is not that there is a 
proper way that people ought to feel in given situations, but that situations have a public 
mood, and that we can sense this mood even if we find ourselves unable to partake in it.   
A third point to note, then, is that emotion, as Dewey (1934) put it, is  “a mode of 
sense” (p. 30).  Much as colours are qualities of things in the world, an emotion “is to or 
from or about something objective” (p. 67).  To speak of an emotion as having objective 
reference—as something perceived about the world—admittedly sounds strange, yet we 
actually talk this way in everyday life. “Situations are depressing, threatening, 
intolerable, triumphant” (p. 67), we say.  The earlier discussed example with the hand and 
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the beer bottle illustrated how perceived qualities appear through a mutual participation 
of subject and object.  Dewey argued that the emotional qualities of lived situations 
likewise build, develop and come into appearance through “an interpenetration of self 
with objective conditions” (p. 67).   
The beer bottle example and the related example about the yellow of the lemon 
also illustrated how perceived qualities are effects of interrelationships, and Merleau-
Ponty (1947), by invoking a famous cinematic experiment, suggested that emotional 
expressions are to be similarly understood:  
One day [the filmmaker and theorist] Pudovkin took a close-up of [the 
actor] Mosjoukin with a completely impassive expression and projected it 
after showing: first, a bowl of soup, then, a young woman lying dead in a 
coffin, and, last a child playing with a teddy bear.  The first thing noticed 
was that Mosjoukin seemed to be looking at the bowl, the young woman, 
and the child, and next one noted that he was looking pensively at the dish, 
that he wore an expression of sorrow when looking at the woman, and that 
he had a glowing smile for the child.  The audience was amazed at his 
variety of expression although the same shot had actually been used all 
three times and was, if anything, remarkably inexpressive (p. 54).13 
 
A body of psychological literature claims that people cannot fake emotional facial 
expressions. Yet in light of the above incident, one wonders if psychologists have 
confused something.  It is true that Mosjoukin is not completely in charge of what he 
expresses, yet this is not because his facial muscles jerk involuntarily into different 
expressions.  Although this happens in everyday life, it does not happen here since the 
same shot of Mosjoukin is always used. One might want to dismiss this cinematic effect 
as an illusion, but the word “effect” suggests another interpretation.  As with appearance 
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of colour, length or any other perceived quality, different expressions appear on 
Mosjoukin’s face in consequence of (i.e., effects of) his placement within objectively 
different situations (i.e., interrelationships).  These effects, it is true, can only show up in 
the presence of an observer with certain sensitivities. However, this is also so with 
properties such as colour, length and mass, and most, excepting philosophers, do not 
dismiss the appearance of such properties as illusions.  
  The account offered in this section does not—to repeat an earlier stated caveat—
deny that we have private feelings.  But what it does indicate, as Dewey (1922) 
explained, is that “love,” “fear” and other such words “…do not express elements or 
forces which are psychic or mental in their first intention” (p. 62). What we think of as 
inward movements and dispositions “…are working adaptations of personal capacities 
with environmental forces” (p. 16). “They denote ways of behavior” (p. 62) through 
which love and fear come to be known as love and fear.   
 
Experience, Self and World 
 Although the question of how we can “…ever get outside of our private inner 
experiences so as to come to know the things and people in the public external world . . . 
seems . . . sensible . . . to us now,” the question, as Hubert Dreyfus observed in a 2003 
article, “…has not always been taken seriously” (p. 19).  It seems, for example, that the 
Homeric Greeks regarded inner experience as a rather exceptional phenomenon, as 
 
13 While Merleau-Ponty credits Vsevolod Pudovkin, most of credit really belongs to Lev Kuleshov.   
Pudovkin, indeed, wrote about the experiment, but the experiment was conducted in what is now 
remembered as “the Kuleshov workshop.”   
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evidenced by the fact that “Homer considered it one of Odysseus’s cleverest tricks that he 
could cry inwardly while his eyes remained [dry]” (p. 19).14 “As far as I know,” Dreyfus 
added, “there is no other reference to private feelings in Homer. Rather, there are many 
public displays of emotions, and shared visions of gods, monsters, and future events” (p. 
29). 
Along similar lines, Dewey (1925) claimed that experience, for the ancient 
Greeks, “…was the outcome of accumulation of practical acts, sufferings and perception 
gradually built up into the skill of the carpenter, shoemaker, pilot, farmer, general, and 
politician. There was nothing merely personal or subjective about it” (p. 230).  He 
complained that while the concept of “inner experience” was relatively foreign to Greeks, 
and only really “discovered” in the modern era (p. 172), he could hardly use the term 
“experience” without being asked: “Whose experience?” Dewey indicated that the 
question was put to him in “adverse criticism,” by those who assumed “…that experience 
by its very nature is owned by someone; and that the ownership is such in kind that 
everything about experience is affected by a private and exclusive quality” (p. 231). 
Whereas many modern thinkers would regard this as an obviously warranted 
assumption, Dewey (1925) deemed it patently absurd.  To make this assumption, he 
protested,  
is as absurd as it would be to infer from the fact that houses are usually 
owned, are mine and yours and his, that possessive reference so permeates 
the properties of being a house that nothing intelligible can be said about 
the latter. It is obvious, however, that a house can be owned only when it 
has existence and properties independent of being owned. The quality of 
 
14 Dreyfus cites Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Vintage Classics, 1990), p. 360.  
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belonging to some one is not an all-absorbing maw in which independent 
properties and relations disappear to be digested into egohood. […]  
 
Substitute “experience” for “house,” and no other word need be changed. 
Experience when it happens has the same dependence upon objective 
natural events, physical and social, as has the occurrence of a house. It has 
its own objective and definitive traits; these can be described without 
reference to a self, precisely as a house is of brick, has eight rooms, etc., 
irrespective of whom it belongs to (pp. 231-232). 
 
Again, Dewey did not deny that we have private consciousness, nor even that private 
consciousness may be a condition of us having experience.  What he denied, rather, is 
that experience can only be understood as an essentially inner process. As he suggested in 
the just quoted passage, most experiences can be described without reference to inner 
life; and as in the case of emotion, if we attempt to describe experience without reference 
to the worlds in which we live, we reduce experience to almost nothing.  
Dewey, however, came to sense that his message had consistently fallen on deaf 
ears, and he expressed frustration less than two years before his death when he remarked: 
“Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would entitle the book 
Culture and Nature.” “I would abandon the term ‘experience’ . . . [because] historical 
obstacles which prevented understanding of my use of ‘experience’ are, for all practical 
purposes, insurmountable”  (c. 1951, p. 361).  A syllabus from a course Dewey taught 
nearly three decades earlier—and just a few years before the publication of Experience 
and Nature—indicates what these obstacles were, and what Dewey meant by relating 
experience to culture: 
The word “experience” is here taken non-technically. Its nearest 
equivalents are such words as “life,” “history,” “culture,” (in its 
anthropological use). It does not mean processes and modes of 
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experiencing apart from what is experienced and lived.  The philosophical 
value of the term is to provide a way of referring to the unity or totality 
between what is experienced and the way it is experienced, a totality 
which is broken up and referred to only in ready-made distinctions or by 
such words as “world,” “things,” “objects” on the one hand and “mind,” 
“subject,” “person,” “consciousness” on the other.  Similarly “history” 
denotes both events and our record or interpretations of them; while 
“events” include not only acts and sufferings of human beings but all 
cosmic and institutional conditions and forces which in any way 
whatsoever enter and effect these human beings—in short, the wide 
universe as manifesting itself in the careers and fortunes of human beings 
(1922-1923, p. 351; cf. c. 1951, p. 363).15  
 
For Dewey, “culture” designated  “…reciprocal interconnections, that immense diversity 
of human affairs, interest, concerns, values…” (c. 1951, p. 363). By relating experience 
to culture, Dewey suggested experience is an ecological phenomenon: experiences are 
developed over time through our participation within communities of interrelated 
agencies and things, both human and non-human.   One might say that experience goes 
on in the world as opposed to the mind.  However, this is perhaps a bad way of putting it, 
for Dewey regarded the dichotomous opposition between mind and world as a primary a 
obstacle that had led others to misconstrue what he meant by the word “experience.”    
In the parlance of the previous chapter, a culture is a world or oikos—oikos being 
Greek for “house” or “living space,” and the root of the word “ecosystem”; and in 
Dewey’s parlance culture is almost equivalent to experience—“almost” because Dewey 
(1925) granted that the “modern discovery of inner experience” (p. 172) has changed how 
we experience things, and in some ways for the better.  The discovery “…of a realm of 
 
15 In using this quotation to help explain Dewey’s reasons for relating experience to culture, I borrow from 
Thomas M. Alexander, who does the same in his (1987) John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience, and 
Nature (pp. 70-71). 
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purely personal events that are always at the individual’s command, and that are his 
exclusively as well as inexpensively for refuge, is . . . liberating…” (p. 172).  It is 
liberating, Dewey explained, because “[i]t implies a new worth and sense of dignity in 
human individuality, a sense that an individual is not a mere property of nature, set in 
place according to a scheme independent of him…” (p. 172).  It implies that the 
individual “…adds something, that he marks a contribution” (p. 172).  It reflects a trend 
in modern western culture “…where individuality is given room and movement”—a 
trend that stands  “…in contrast to the ancient scheme of experience, which held 
individuals tightly within a given order subordinated to its structure and patterns” (p. 
173).  Yet this view of subjectivity also reflects a distortion: a failure to recognize that an 
individual ego or self is made and discovered through participating in worlds or cultures; 
and this, Dewey asserted, has “…led to the subjectivistic, solipsistic and egotistic strain 
in modern thought” (p. 173). 
Here Dewey used the term “egotistic” in a number of related senses.   He used it 
to emphasize that modern philosophy holds that we access and know the world from the 
vantage point of the ego, the “inner self” or the “I am.”  He also used it to insinuate that 
there is something unhealthy about this, for to be an egotist is to be pathologically 
focused on self. That this is so, according to Dewey (1922), is reinforced by the fact that 
[m]any good words get spoiled when the word self is prefixed to them: 
Words like pity, confidence, sacrifice, control, love. The reason is not far 
to seek. The word self infects them with a fixed introversion and isolation. 
It implies that the act of love or trust or control is turned back upon a self 
which already is in full existence and in whose behalf the act operates. 
Pity fulfils and creates a self when it is directed outward, opening the mind 
to new contacts and receptions. Pity for self withdraws the mind back into 
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itself, rendering its subject unable to learn from the buffetings of fortune. 
Sacrifice may enlarge a self by bringing about surrender of acquired 
possessions to requirements of new growth. Self-sacrifice means a self-
maiming which asks for compensatory pay in some later possession or 
indulgence. Confidence as an outgoing act is directness and courage in 
meeting the facts of life, trusting them to bring instruction and support to a 
developing self. Confidence which terminates in the self means a smug 
complacency that renders a person obtuse to instruction by events (pp. 
138-139; emphasis added)  
 
Dewey suggested, therefore, that we at least tacitly sense that a high degree of inward 
focus is symptomatic of unhealthy functioning.  Since unhealthy functioning is, by most 
definitions, contrary to normal functioning, we should also recognize that the self is not, 
under normal circumstances, a strictly inner phenomenon.  According to Dewey, 
however, we moderns generally fail to see this.  We fail, as he put it, to see that “[t]here 
is no one ready-made self behind activities.”  What there is, rather, is a host of 
“…complex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to 
terms with one another…” (p. 138) through a person’s ongoing processes of living. 
Thus, for example, while we moderns might think that a woman becomes a civil 
rights activist because of “who she is” independently of the world, Dewey would argue 
that she is “who she is” by virtue of her being and acting in the world.  He would grant, to 
be sure, that the woman enters life already equipped with a range of inclinations and 
capacities, and that these shape her worldly interactions. However, a mere bundle of 
propensities does not constitute that integrated kind of being we call “self,” and Dewey 
would add that the woman only ever develops a self by participating in worlds.  Like the 
hand meeting the resistance of the beer bottle and subsequently coordinating its actions 
around the bottle, the women directs her energies against socially oppressive barriers. 
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This shapes the overall course of her life, giving it purpose, direction and form.  She 
cultivates a personal disposition—a self—by developing habits, for habits are 
dispositions towards certain forms of worldly interaction. They are, as Dewey (1922) put 
it, “…demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self” (p. 25).  There is 
even a sense in which they are what we call personal “will,” for they are inclinations to 
do certain things, to move towards, seek, chase after and want them (p. 25). “Were it not 
for the continued operation of all habits in every act, no such thing as character could 
exist. There would be simply a bundle, an untied bundle at that…” (p. 38).  Here it is 
important to note that participation is not surrender, a mere giving into worlds. The 
woman resists certain customs, certain entrenched cultural habits or worlds, and resisting 
“…existing custom[s] is the beginning of individuality in mind” (pp. 87-88). It gives the 
woman something against which to define herself. Thereby she not only becomes an 
integrated subject, but also an individuated one. Thus the being of subjects presupposes 
the being of worlds in a variety of ways: it presupposes worlds to coordinate with, to 
resist, to reform and remake. 
Since the time of René Descartes, many have supposed that we can know 
ourselves as subjects, but never know for certain that the “external” world exists—never 
be sure, that is to say, that the world is not a fabrication of mind. Dewey regarded this as 
a misleading way of speaking, for it employs concepts that we only possess by virtue of 
already being in worlds. The world of stonemasonry, for example, exists only insofar as 
stonemasons employ their practiced habits. But while the world of stonemasonry 
consequently presupposes the existence of stonemasons, the reverse also holds, for the 
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habits that make stonemasons what they are also make the world of stonemasonry what it 
is.  In phenomenological parlance, therefore, the habits are intentional: they are to or 
about or of something, directed towards it.  In Dewey’s language (1922), they “implicate” 
worlds.  They do so in much the same way that “[w]alking implicates the ground as well 
as the legs,” and “digesting” and “breathing” implicate “food” and “air” as much as they 
do internal “tissues of stomach” and “lung” (p. 14). In short, that which is “inside” 
implicates an “outside,” and the former is only conceptually grasped through its 
relationship with the latter.  
Descartes declared cogito, ergo sum—a statement usually translated as “I think, 
therefore I am.”  But on Dewey’s account, unitary beings that can legitimately say “I am” 
only emerge by virtue of their involvement with the world or worlds. Furthermore, when 
philosophers under the sway of Descartes have said that we can never be certain that the 
world exists, they have presupposed that the world is an objective entity that exists 
independently of us.  While it is sometimes useful to speak of the world in this way, and 
while it is likely true that we can never know for certain that such a world exists, it is well 
to remember that we do not experience worlds in this way.  We experience ourselves in 
the midst of them, entangled in them. It is only through an intellectual effort—a stepping 
back from our experience—that we come to regard ourselves as detached observers of an 
independently existing world. The concept of an independently existing world is what 
Merleau-Ponty called a “second order expression.”  This means, on the one hand, that it 
does not describe the worlds we actually live; and, on the other, that it presupposes 
concepts derived from lived experience.  
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Whereas modern thinkers, particularly those under the sway of Descartes, see the 
self or subject as a sort of bubble inside of which the world is represented, Dewey 
suggested that a world is a setting in which the individual subject comes to be.  On the 
former account, experience is a kind of “inner space” in which the world appears; on the 
latter, the world is a field in which experience is had, thus diminishing the need to 
conceive of experience in terms of “inward representations.” On the former, the 
appearance of the world depends on there being a subject to measure or gauge it; yet the 
appearance of the subject to itself does not depend on there being a world.  On the latter, 
the appearance of the world also depends on there being a subject to gauge it—or, more 
accurately, to engage with things within it; yet since the subject only knows itself as a 
subject—an integrated being—by virtue of being in a world, the appearance of the 
subject to itself also depends on there being a world. “Through habits formed in 
intercourse with the world, we also in-habit the world,” wrote Dewey, and the world 
“…becomes an integral part of the self that acts and is acted upon” (1934, p. 104). 
 
Pre-reflective Intelligence  
As Nietzsche complained in the late 1800s, a “ridiculous overestimation . . . of 
consciousness” has cultivated the impression “…that it constitutes the kernel of man; 
what is abiding, eternal, ultimate, and most original in him” (1882/1887, p. 85).  His 
account of how this impression took hold is complicated, and at some points debatable. 
However, as a matter of historical record, there is no doubt that consciousness has 
enjoyed an elevated status in modern western culture; that great human feats—
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particularly feats of intelligence—have ubiquitously been attributed to the power of 
consciousness; and that the conscious, thinking mind has been popularly conceived as the 
dwelling place of the “I am” or the self, a view Descartes succinctly expressed with the 
slogan: I think, therefore I am.   
The notion that intelligent activity is quintessentially conscious activity troubled 
Dewey.  It did so, first, because he regarded the notion as patently false; and, second, 
because he believed it engendered sceptical theories of knowledge that lead to the 
confused question of how it is that we can ever get outside our own private consciousness 
so as to come to know the world. “As long as theories of knowledge are framed in terms 
of organs assigned to . . . consciousness,” wrote Dewey, “there will continue to exist such 
generalized skeptical philosophies” (1929b, p. 193).  Against the view that “knowing” is 
essentially an internal conscious process, Dewey asserted that “knowing is literally 
something which we do” (1916, p. 331). This account, as will be discussed in this section, 
has been reinforced by contemporary psychological research and also by the work of 
leading twentieth century philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Heidegger.  
That life is largely composed of pre-reflective doings and that these doings are 
intelligent is demonstrated nearly everywhere, and yet nearly everywhere ignored.  We 
assume, for example, that the activities of great composers, chess players and surgeons 
are highly reflective when, in fact, such individuals report operating “without conscious 
thinking” (Dietrich 2004, p. 749). It is actually when obstacles prevent us from handling 
tasks competently—which is to say, intelligently—that we tend to become most reflective 
(see Dewey 1925, p. 314). Wittgenstein wrote that people learning to read painstakingly 
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“spell words out,” and “[i]f we think of this sort of reading,  . . . we shall [indeed] be 
inclined to say: it is a special conscious activity of mind” (1953, §156).  Yet for the 
literate, reading mostly just happens. Along similar lines, Heidegger noted that we use 
tools automatically and with little thought, and that tools tend to become objects of 
contemplation only when they breakdown (1927, pp. 103-104/73-74).  It is when tasks 
progress poorly, when we confront difficulties in our practical or personal lives that we 
stop to think and ruminate.  
As Wittgenstein (1953) observed, “[t]he grammar of the word ‘knows’ is 
evidently closely related to that of ‘can’, ‘is able to’.  But also closely related to 
‘understands’ (‘Mastery’ of a technique,) [sic.]” (§150). A mathematics student says: 
“‘Now I can go on, I mean I know [and understand] the formula,’ as we say, ‘I can walk, 
I mean I am already strong enough’” (§183). The student, moreover, often acquires 
mathematical strength through repeated drill, and as a trained boxer reflexively answers 
blows, the student almost reflexively answers questions. The student’s hand dances 
across the paper scrawling out computations. Consciousness does not direct the specific 
contractions and extensions of muscles, nor, if the student is skilled, does it play much of 
a role in directing what gets laid down on the page.  Numbers, variables and equations 
pour fourth at a rate exceeding the relatively narrow capacity of the conscious mind. 
The conscious mind’s narrow capacity, though seldom acknowledged, is fairly 
evident. People can only keep a small number of things in mind at a given moment—
between five and nine items is established as typical (Miller 1956), though the number 
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may be even less (Cowan 2001).16 And although language and mathematics—things 
particularly associated with consciousness, albeit somewhat misleadingly—are presumed 
complex, they are arguably among the simplest human activities.  Computer science 
provides an excellent illustration. For decades computers that process mathematical 
problems and written language have been ubiquitous. As yet, however, no computerized 
robot possesses anything like the perceptual-motor capabilities of humans, and not simply 
because the mechanics are lacking, but because the computational complexity is 
staggering:  
Consider, for instance, what it would take to write a computer program 
that specifies each muscle twitch in the correct order and intensity to make 
a world-class tennis serve.  The computational difficulty of complex 
motion is enormous, a fact that is readily recognized by the artificial 
intelligence community (Dietrich 2004, p. 752). 
 
The author of this passage added that one need not seek world-class athletes to discover 
the “mind-boggling complexity” of motor-skills (p. 754).  Even the movement of 
squirrels defies computation, for at any given instant, “…the number of possible next 
moves is so astronomically high that future projections would quickly bifurcate into 
infinity” (p. 755). 
Psychologists have debated the notion of pre-reflective intelligence or 
“unconscious cognition,” a controversy that one psychologist framed in terms of the 
question: “How smart is unconscious cognition?  Compared to conscious cognition, is it 
smart or dumb?” (Greenwald 1992, p. 768) A couple of things stand out about how 
 
16 There is often little point in providing page references when citing findings from a scientific article, for 
in many cases the article as a whole is the report of the findings.  In such cases, I simply reference authors 
and dates. 
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psychologists have responded to the question.  First, there is no consensus.   Answers 
range from “not very smart” (Bruner 1992) to “it depends” (Kihlstrom, Barnhardt & 
Tataryn 1992) to “extremely smart” (Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewsk 1992).  Second, 
psychologists have arrived at these disparate views despite having the same basic 
empirical data at their disposal.  This suggests that the controversy is largely a conceptual 
matter—a debate about what “intelligence” means. If we relinquish definitions that 
restrictively locate intelligence in the consciously thinking mind, then we relinquish any 
serious doubt that many intelligent activities are carried out in unconscious, semi-
conscious, automatic, habitual and other pre-reflective ways. If, by contrast, we cling to 
such definitions, then we are forced, by definition, to grant the dubious conclusion that 
great composers, chess players and surgeons exercise their intelligence least when 
performing the very tasks that have won them the accolade: “genius.”    
None of this is to say that consciousness is utterly unrelated to intelligent action 
and knowledge.  By most accounts, consciousness helps us respond flexibly and 
intelligently when the novel and unexpected obtrude.  By most accounts, it also 
participates in the acquisition of new knowledge. And whatever the ultimate resolution to 
the debate over epiphenomenalism may be, it is hard to imagine “intelligent 
conversations” in the absence of consciousness.  The point is not that intelligence 
vanishes when consciousness arrives, but rather that intelligent activities need not be 
highly reflective. In practice, “intelligence” names certain kinds of purposeful handlings, 
as does “knowing,” and both persist regardless of whether they be highly reflective. In 
the words of Dewey (1929b): 
…we may say that the worth of any object that lays claim to being an 
object of knowledge is dependent upon the intelligence employed in 
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reaching it. In saying this, we must bear in mind that intelligence means 
operations actually performed in the modification of conditions, including 
all the guidance that is given by means of ideas, both direct and symbolic. 
(p. 200).  
 
Hence the difference between the conventional modern Western view of intelligence and 
knowledge and that of Dewey is not that the former grants the existence of private 
thoughts, mental representations and suchlike, while the latter denies it. Instead, 
[t]he essential difference is that between a mind which beholds or grasps 
objects from outside the world of things, physical and social, and one 
which is a participant, interacting with other things and knowing them 
provided the interaction is regulated in a definable way (pp. 200-201). 
 
Dewey allowed that conscious processes play a role in generating knowledge.  He only 
pointed out that they do so by regulating interactions in the world, and furthermore, that 
patterns of interaction often constitute basic patterns of conscious thought. So while we 
have inner experiences, there is never really a question of how we get outside our own 
private consciousness so as to come to know the external world.  
An additional point worth emphasizing is that Dewey regarded purposeful action 
as a pre-condition of there being intelligence and knowledge, and purposes, on many 
accounts, are dependant on consciousness. Yet purpose driven actions are still actions in 
the world.  It may be that certain phenomena—certain changes or effects in the world—
would never come into appearance were consciousness not there to direct certain 
purposeful interactions.  However, this does not make such phenomena any less 
objective.  It merely reiterates the point that it is through worldly interactions and 
interrelationships that objects come into appearance. 
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Body-Mind 
In his 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty developed a concept 
that has come to be known as the “body-subject.” The concept has been widely discussed 
by Merleau-Ponty’s admirers, and both he and they use it to emphasize that 
consciousness, perception, experience, knowledge and self—in short, the phenomenon of 
subjectivity and mind—are not separate from or opposed to the body, but rather found in 
and through embodied patterns of acting and interrelating in the world (see pp. 408-409).  
Twenty years earlier, in Experience and Nature (1925), Dewey introduced a comparable 
but largely ignored concept of “body-mind,” which he similarly used to redress confused 
ways of thinking and speaking that divide “…the body and mind from each other, making 
separate existential realms out of them…” (p. 284).  
Dewey explicated the term “body-mind” by breaking it into its constituent parts. 
He explained that “body” here refers to “…the continued and conserved, the registered 
and cumulative operation of factors continuous with the rest of nature, inanimate as well 
as animate” (1925, p. 285).  It refers to a lived process—a lived process, for example, of 
actions settling into habits, of capacities coordinating around things in the world and vice 
versa.  “Mind,” in turn,  
…denotes every mode and variety of interest in, and concern for, things: 
practical, intellectual, and emotional [sic.].  It never denotes anything self-
contained, isolated from the world of persons and things, but is always 
used with respect to situations, events, objects, persons and groups.  
Consider its inclusiveness. It signifies memory. We are reminded of this or 
that [emphasis added]. Mind also signifies attention.  We not only keep 
things in mind, but we bring mind to bear on our problem and perplexities.  
Mind also signifies purpose; we have a mind to do this and that.  Nor is 
mind in these operations something purely intellectual. The mother minds 
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her baby; she cares for it with affection.  Mind is care in the sense of 
solicitude, anxiety, as well as active looking after things that need to be 
tended; we mind our step, our course of action, emotionally as well as 
thoughtfully. […] 
 
Mind is primarily a verb.  It denotes all the ways in which we deal 
consciously and expressly with situations in which we find ourselves 
(1934, p. 263). 
 
Mind, then, is “…indicative of features which emerge when ‘body’ is engaged in a wider, 
more complex and interdependent situation” (1925, p. 285), and the activity of “minding” 
things “is the activity of the body-mind organizing itself and the world around and within 
it…” (Wilshire 1993, p. 264). The hyphenated term “body-mind” consequently 
“…designates what actually takes place when a living body is implicated in situations of 
discourse, communication and participation” (1925, p. 285). 
Dewey’s concept of “body-mind” arose in the context of Dewey’s ongoing efforts 
to circumnavigate the debate between rationalists and empiricists (e.g., 1906, pp. 469-
475; 1920 pp. 81-91; 1922 pp. 30-31)—the debate, to put it crudely, about whether the 
mind imposes form on the world or whether it is the other way around.  Against 
rationalists, Dewey (1922) argued that our ways of cognizing worlds follow from our 
ways of inhabiting them, which is to say, from our habits. To a significant extent, 
therefore, habit precedes thought.  “Ideas . . . are not spontaneously generated. There is 
no immaculate conception[,]” he wrote. “Reason pure of all influence from prior habit is 
a fiction” (pp. 30-31).  But so too are the “pure sensations” of empiricists, for they “are 
alike affected by habits” (p. 31).  Empiricists, Dewey went on to say, 
…who attack the notion of thought pure from the influence of experience, 
usually identify experience with sensations impressed upon an empty 
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mind. They therefore replace the theory of unmixed thoughts with that of 
pure unmixed sensations as the stuff of all conceptions, purposes and 
beliefs. But distinct and independent sensory qualities, far from being 
original elements, are the products of a highly skilled analysis[…]. To be 
able to single out a definitive sensory element in any field is evidence of a 
high degree of previous training, that is, of well-formed habits. A 
moderate amount of observation of a child will suffice to reveal that even 
such gross discriminations as black, white, red, green, are the result of 
some years of active dealings with things in the course of which habits 
have been set up. It is not such a, simple matter to have a clear-cut 
sensation. The latter is a sign of training, skill, habit (p. 31). 
 
In sum, Dewey attacked rationalists for not being empiricists, that is, for not recognizing 
the priority of experience; yet this is, strange to say, also why he attacked empiricists.  
“Our ideas,” he writes, “truly depend on experience, but so do our sensations.  And the 
experience upon which they both depend is the operation of habits” (p. 32).  
Having said that Dewey criticized both rationalism and empiricism, it should also 
be noted that he sympathized somewhat with the rationalistic view that the world has 
structure that conforms to the structure of mind; that it is because of this that the world is 
an object of possible knowledge; and that it is by virtue of minds sharing the same 
structure that minds come to have similar experiences of the world, making the it an 
object of shared knowledge. However, whereas rationalist proposed that the world 
conforms to the structure of mind because the mind imposes rational structure on the 
world or because the world is an expression of the rational mind of God, Dewey 
contended that the conformity can be accounted for in a much less esoteric way.  “The 
world is subject-matter for knowledge, because [the body-mind] has developed in that 
world” (1925, p. 277).  More than this, the body-mind is itself a participant in and 
contributor to the patterns of acting, interrelating and habits that constitute the structure 
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of worlds. As Dewey explained elsewhere, “habits”—and therewith the self or body-
mind—“incorporate an environment within themselves,” and in this sense conform to it. 
Yet they also bring the environment into conformity with themselves.  “They are 
adjustments of the environment [or world], not merely to it” (1922, p. 52). It is to be 
expected, therefore, that the “…body-mind . . . will . . . find some of its structures to be 
concordant and congenial with nature, and some phases of nature with itself” (1925, p. 
277; also see 1929b, pp. 208-222). 
When it came to the more specific question of how the world becomes an object 
of shared knowledge, Dewey granted the rationalist claim that we share certain native 
capacities; he also granted the empiricist position that we are sometimes exposed to 
similar environments.  Yet he added that many of our shared capacities are not native, but 
acquired through participating in shared cultures or worlds. He also noted that we often 
expose ourselves to similar environments by virtue of jointly contributing to shared 
cultures or worlds.   This line of argument related to his claim that experience is almost 
equivalent to culture. Dewey (1922) explained that the problem of how we come to have 
shared knowledge is only a problem “[i]f we start with the traditional notion of mind as 
something complete in itself…” (p. 61). If we do this, “…then we may well be perplexed 
by the problem of how a common mind, common ways of feeling and believing and 
purposing, comes into existence…” (p. 61). The problem is largely resolved, however, 
“…if we recognize that in any case we must start with grouped action” (p. 61)—if we 
recognize, that is to say, that experience depends on the operation of habits, and habits on 
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worlds or cultures and vice versa, and further recognize that worlds or cultures are, by 
definition, shared. 
It has been noted that many philosophical problems are not genuine problems, but 
conceptual misunderstandings that arise from asking the wrong questions.  For Dewey, 
the question of how we can get outside the mind so as to have knowledge of the world 
was such a case. The crucial point to remember, he wrote, is that “[a]ny account of 
experience must . . . fit into the consideration that experiencing means living; and that 
living goes on in and because of an environing medium, not in a vacuum” (1917, p. 8).  
While this is—or at least should be—obvious,  
…this fact is . . . ignored and virtually denied by traditional theories. 
Consider for example, the definitions of life and mind given by Herbert 
Spencer: correspondence of an inner order with an outer order. It implies 
there is an inner order and an outer order, and that the correspondence 
consists in the fact that the terms in one order are related to one another as 
the terms or members of the other order are connected within themselves. . 
. . [B]ut the genuine correspondence of life and mind with nature is like 
the correspondence of two persons who “correspond” in order to learn 
each one of the acts, ideas and intents of the other one, in such ways as to 
modify one’s own intents, ideas and acts, and to substitute partaking in a 
common and inclusive situation [or world] for separate and independent 
performances.  . . . The aim is not to protract a line of organic events 
parallel to external events, but to form a new scheme of affairs to which 
both organic and environmental relations contribute, and in which they 
both partake (1925, pp. 282-283).  
 
Recognize this, declared Dewey, “…and the problem of how a mind can know an 
external world or even know that there is such a thing” becomes analogous to “…the 
problem of how an animal eats things external to itself; it is the kind of problem that 
arises only if one assumes that a hibernating bear living off its own stored substance 
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defines the normal procedure…” (1925, p. 278).  Change the assumption, “…and the 
problems in question cease to be epistemological problems” (1925, p. 265).  
By asking the question of how we can get outside the mind so as to have 
knowledge of the world, we tacitly assert that “mind” denotes an exclusively inner 
phenomenon when, according to Dewey, it actually “…denotes [a] whole system of 
meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life” (1925, p. 303).   Dewey 
did not settle the aforesaid question by answering it.  Instead, he dismissed the question 
as a confusion, as the wrong question to ask.  If body-minds are, in effect, world-
transactions developed over time; if “…knowing is not the act of an outside spectator but 
of a participator inside the natural and social scene inside” (1929b, p. 196); if, in short, 
“…the assumption that experience is something set over against the world is contrary to 
fact, then the problem of how self or mind or subjective experience or consciousness can 
reach knowledge of an external world is assuredly a meaningless problem” (1917, p. 31-
32). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
145 
-Six- 
Aesthetic Experience 
 
In the same way that Heidegger asserted that we become especially reflective 
when equipment fails, Nietzsche conjectured that cultures under siege become 
increasingly cognitivistic. As an example, he noted that Socrates and Plato—founding 
figures in the contemplative traditions of the west—were present when Athens was 
exhausted, broken and finally defeated by the decades-long Peloponnesian war (see 1888, 
p. 478).  While Nietzsche’s example and the claim it supports are admittedly speculative, 
the claim is worth exploring in the context of Dewey’s criticism of the modern western 
emphasis on inner experience. It is, first, because Dewey almost came to equate 
experience to culture; second, because he suggested that historical obstacles, which is 
another way of saying cultural obstacles, led to the overemphasis of inner experience; 
and, third, because Dewey was a lifelong social activist, and his writings on experience 
were, among other things, forms of cultural criticism.  
Nietzsche described breakdown as a form of illness; and illness, understood as 
breakdown, entails dis-integration. In a book on Dewey’s Art as Experience, Victor 
Kestenbaum (1977) accordingly described illness as a condition in which “…the 
integration or interpenetration of habits has been destroyed” (p. 27).  He went on to say: 
If the experience of illness involves a loss of integration of organic habits 
and a resulting loss of integration with the environment, then aesthetic 
experience is an intensification of the integration of habits and also an 
intensification of the organism’s integration with the environment (p. 27).  
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In other words, aesthetic experience not only integrates together like an artistic 
composition; it also involves a “self-world integration” (p. 27), a diminution and perhaps 
extinction of the divide between “inner” and “outer.” 
While it may seem that this sort of experience is highly exceptional, Dewey 
actually composed Art as Experience (1934) in hopes of showing that aesthetic 
experience is commonplace (p. 7), or at least that it should be. He expected hostility to 
this project. Yet in the same way that Nietzsche asserts that hostile attitudes towards 
life—claims about its worthlessness and so on—reflect the unhealthy life lived by those 
making the claims (see 1888, pp. 473-479), Dewey contended that “[t]he hostility to 
association of fine art with normal processes of living is a pathetic, even a tragic, 
commentary on life as it is ordinarily lived.  Only because life is usually stunted, aborted, 
slack, or heavy laden, is the idea entertained…”  (p. 27).   Here and elsewhere he 
suggested that the experience of being insulated within our own individual spheres of 
private consciousness—an experience contrary to aesthetic experience—follows from the 
fact that we live in alienating and oppressive conditions, which is to say, sick cultures. 
But something is missing from the account I have so far offered, for pronounced 
individuality, heightened consciousness and rebellion against engrained cultural habits 
are emphatically associated with artists and their works.  Dewey, in fact, recognized this. 
He recognized that doings and undergoings that constitute experience are, in degree to 
which experience is rich and meaningful, “…a union of the precarious, novel, irregular 
with the settled, assured and uniform—a union,” he added, “which also defines the 
artistic and esthetic” (1925, p. 358; emphasis added; also see 1922, pp. 178-179).  He 
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recognized, therefore, that aesthetic experience not only involves a heightened level of 
integration, but also an interruption of it, albeit not an outright shattering of it.  It 
involves, that is to say, a re-shaping, re-directing and expanding of certain entrenched 
ways of experiencing, interacting and putting things together. Dewey recognized, 
moreover, that aesthetic experience of art involves a heightened level of conscious 
awareness—awareness in which and through which we come to see things more clearly, 
to see them in a new light and even to see things that have heretofore been invisible to us 
(see 1934, pp. 170-175). Indeed, this is something that Plato—who was arguably an artist 
as well as a philosopher—achieved when he composed dialogues against a backdrop of 
social upheaval; and this is also something that his teacher Socrates—that “gadfly” of 
Athens—did: he challenged custom and convention, pricking, stinging and thereby 
awakening that “noble” but “somewhat sluggish” beast called Athens (Plato, Apol. 30e).   
That highly entrenched habits are obstacles to having an aesthetic experience 
suggests that they too can be characterized as forms of illness that cut people off from 
worlds. Consider, for instance, people with obsessive fixations.  As with other 
individuals, they deal with things in habitual ways—ways, however, that are singularly 
narrow and unbending. A fixated condition is commonly understood as a psychological 
illness, and there is a sense in which fixated individuals “lose touch with reality.” After 
all, if habits constitute experience, then narrow sets of habits bring about narrow 
experiences. They instill tunnel vision, that is, a blindness to the “big picture,” an 
inability to see things in new ways. They also cultivate a tendency to experience too 
much of the world in terms of the fixation.  Thus, to repeat an earlier example, 
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pathologically angry people perceive slights where none have occurred.  The sheer 
routine of unbending habits, moreover, leads to what Dewey called “absentmindedness” 
(see 1922, p. 173), for minds trapped in the drudgery of sheer routine tend to withdraw 
from immediate situations and wander into “their own little worlds.”  Unbending habits 
also amount to illness in the sense that they translate into a failure to grow and adapt. 
When threatened by new ideas, we may pour our powers into preserving traditional 
outlooks, so that we become inflexible, limiting growth in both others and ourselves. 
Nietzsche compared endless preservation to embalmment and mummification (see 1888, 
pp. 479-480), and Heidegger, summarizing Nietzsche, wrote that “…life that restricts 
itself to mere preservation is already life in decline” (c. 1943, p 73). Dewey similarly 
claimed that if we merely maintain the gains we have already made, then “our 
experience” and therewith our contact with the world “perishes of inanition” (1934, p. 
56).    
So far I have mostly considered perception, experience and subjectivity as 
phenomena that arise when our doings and undergoings are integrated through the action 
of our being in the world.  In the remainder of this work, I do not abandon this position.  
In fact, I begin by emphasizing the various ways in which aesthetic experience involves 
heightened levels of integration. However, I will also emphasize how Dewey’s 
philosophy of art supplements and qualifies the aforementioned position.  I will 
particularly strive to show how, on his account, the union between the settled and the 
irregular which characterizes the artistic and aesthetic is also indicative of conditions 
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under which we expand our worlds, our experiential horizons, thereby gaining a more 
encompassing and perspicacious vision of things. 
 
Art as Experience: An Overview 
Dewey did not open Art as Experience (1934) by offering a theory of aesthetics. 
In a vein similar to Robin Collingwood, who held that we confuse ideas by ignoring the 
historical context in which they developed, Dewey began the book by arguing that art is 
misunderstood because modern society isolates it “from the human conditions under 
which it was brought into being” (p. 3).  He wrote: 
An instructive history of modern art could be written in terms of the 
formation of the distinctively modern institutions of museum and 
exhibition gallery.  . . . [In the modern era, e]very capital must have its 
own museum . . . devoted in part to exhibiting the greatness of its artistic 
past, and, in other part, to exhibiting the loot gathered . . . in conquest of 
other nations[.] . . . They testify to the connection between the modern 
segregation of art and nationalism and militarism. […] 
 
The growth of capitalism has [also] been a powerful influence in the 
development of the museum as the proper home for works of art, and in 
the promotion of the idea that they are apart from the common life.  The 
nouveaux riches, who are an important by-product of the capitalist system, 
have felt especially bound to surround themselves with works of fine art 
which, being rare, are also costly (p. 8). 
 
Today, Dewey went on to say, we cloister art in showrooms much as clerics hide secret 
rites in temples (p. 9).  This bestows an unearthly status on art, a felt distance between it 
and “…the interests and occupations that absorb most of the community’s time and 
energy” (p. 9). Globalization magnifies this distance. “The mobility of trade and of 
populations . . . [undermines] the connection between works of art and the genius loci of 
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which they were once a natural expression” (p. 9). “Objects that were in the past valid 
and significant because of their place in the life of a community now function in isolation 
from the conditions of their origin. By that fact they are also set apart from common 
experience…” (p. 9).  
The problem, for Dewey (1934), is that we do not merely record this chasm, but 
accept it as natural.  Against this, he insisted “…that theories which isolate art and its 
appreciation . . . in a realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, 
are not inherent in the subject-matter, but arise because of specifiable extraneous 
conditions” (p. 10). Yet because these conditions are so embedded “in institutions and 
habits of life,” we assume them to be “embedded in the nature of things” (p. 10).  We 
forget that many museum pieces were once implements of everyday life (p. 6), and 
others, while not tools, were nonetheless a “part of the significant life of an organized 
community” (p. 7).  By separating “…artistic objects . . . from both conditions of origin 
and operation of experience,” we build “a wall . . . around them that renders almost 
opaque their general significance…” (p. 3).  This impoverishes our appreciation of 
artistic objects. Since aesthetic theories are modelled upon such objects, it also degrades 
our understanding of aesthetic experience. 
Although Art as Experience (1934) begins with an account of how social 
conditions and historical insensitivity corrupt our understanding of art, Dewey did not 
write the book in order “…to engage in an economic interpretation of the history of the 
arts” (p. 10).  He included the historical discussion, however, because it defined “the 
nature of the problem” with which he is concerned: “that of recovering the continuity of 
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esthetic experience with normal processes of living” (p. 10). From the outset, Dewey 
stressed that experience, including aesthetic experience, is transactional: “…it signifies 
active and alert commerce with the world; at its height it signifies complete 
interpenetration of the self and the world of objects and events” (p. 19).  He also stressed 
that worldly transactions integrate into aesthetic experience through a kind of lived 
historical process.  As he put it later in the book, “…experience is a product, one might 
almost say a by-product, of continuous and cumulative interaction of an organic self with 
the world” (p. 220). 
Dewey (1934) thus treated aesthetic experience as a sub-category of what his 
earlier works called experience in the vital sense.  This means the family of features 
characterizing the latter also characterize the former.  As the two are not mere 
equivalents, however, it also means the former encompasses something more.  Aesthetic 
experience is more integrated than generic experience in the degree to which it hangs 
together, involves mutual adaptation of subject and object and unites the subject’s 
capacities into joint action.  As with experience in general, it entails creative and active 
engagement, reconstruction and transformation, yet here too in higher degree.  An 
aesthetic experience is occasioned by what might loosely be called a heightened sense of 
reality: it “…is defined by those situations and episodes that we spontaneously refer to as 
being ‘real experiences’” (p. 36). It has a singular quality: it stands out as unique; it 
stands as a kind of unified whole; and it is literally the sort of experience that we speak of 
in the singular, as when we say, “that was an experience” (see pp. 35-36). It has a kind of 
revelatory character. In developing a heretofore unseen style, 19th century impressionist 
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painters learned to experience and reveal the effects of light in new ways; and their 
paintings challenge many viewers into a richer sense of what light is.  Along these lines, 
Dewey remarked that an aesthetic experience often stands as “an enduring memorial” of 
what some kind of thing or event may be (p. 36).  His concept of an aesthetic experience 
may be summarized thus: it is an experience that builds dramatically in time, culminating 
into a coherent whole, yet a whole within which and through which things are 
transformed into sharper and more meaningful forms. 
 
Having an Experience 
Anything that can be called “experience” in Dewey’s sense of the term has a basic 
level of integration.   Suppose a cross-country skier thrusts her poles and edges her skate-
skis into snow.  In consequence of this doing, of this combination of actions directed at 
the environment, her body undergoes motion.  It propels forward.  She keeps repeating 
the same actions, each time undergoing forward motion.  Her doings and undergoings fall 
into a rhythmic connection of “means-consequence.”  Integrated experience is the result. 
While this basic level of integration is a precondition of experience, it is not 
sufficient for “having an experience,” a phrase Dewey (1934) used to describe an 
aesthetic experience.  He wrote: “…we have an experience when material runs its course 
to fulfillment.  Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general 
stream of experience from other experiences.” Such an experience “…is rounded out so 
that its close is a consummation and not a cessation.” It “…is a whole and carries with it 
its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency.  It is an experience” (p. 35). 
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Imagine, for example, that the aforementioned woman goes skiing on a day when 
the sun shines; when fresh snow sparkles on pine bows; when birds sing, and squirrels 
scurry; when the air is refreshingly crisp, but not bitingly cold; and when the ski 
conditions are optimal. The trail has interesting twists and turns, ups and downs; 
sometimes it burrows through snow-laden trees, sometimes through meadows; at one 
point it crests a steep hill and comes upon a breathtaking view; at another point it 
wanders alongside a gurgling creek. Some portions of the trail are demanding; others are 
traveled with ease.  Imagine further that the woman is engrossed in the activity of skiing 
through this varied environment. Her mind does not wander to the office meeting she has 
tomorrow or to the books she forgot to return to the library yesterday.  She “loses herself” 
in the environment with which she interacts. 
A first point to note is that this experience stands out from the general stream of 
day-to-day experience.  It also stands out from the woman’s general experience of skiing 
in the past.  It is an enduring memorial to what skiing can be.  A second point to note is 
that the woman is especially integrated with her environment. Under normal 
circumstances, her bodily movements coordinate around her interactions with the trail, 
but her attention often drifts elsewhere.  On this day, her movements, her perceptual 
faculties, nearly her entire conscious self coordinates and engages with the things she 
encounters.  A third point to note is that her experience has a highly dramatic structure.  
Shifts between demanding and less demanding portions of the trail introduce rhythms of 
tension and repose, and variations in scenery introduce mini-climaxes.  A particular 
highlight is the view she discovers after struggling so hard to crest the steep hill. For 
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these reasons, her experience stands out as an experience.  To re-quote Dewey (1934), it 
is “demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences” (p. 35). It is 
highly integrated. It runs “its course to fulfillment” (p. 35), or rather a series of 
fulfillments, with especial highlights.  As with focal points in a painting, these 
fulfillments and highlights pull the experience into a unified whole that “carries with it its 
own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency.  It is an experience” (p. 35). 
Though the experience just described does not involve an encounter with an 
object of fine art, Dewey, as one commentator has summarized his position, maintained 
that 
…the arts provide us with exemplary instances of an experience.  They do 
so, moreover, viewed from the standpoint of either the artist or the 
audience.  From the artist’s point of view the experience is chiefly one of 
making or doing something that culminates in an object or a performance.  
From the viewpoint of the audience or the reading public the task is one of 
interpretation, of making sense of the artist’s accomplishment.  . . . In 
either case, the experience, when successful—when it truly is an 
experience—is characterized at its close (and often periodically during its 
course) by feelings of satiety and fulfillment (Jackson, 1998, p. 4). 
 
The author of this passage, Philip Jackson (1998), further explained that what makes such 
experiences special “…is not simply that their parts hang together to form a whole.  Nor 
is it simply that we find them to be momentarily satisfying.  What adds to their 
importance are the enduring changes they produce.  They leave in their wake a changed 
world” (p. 5)—a point the next chapter will particularly pursue. 
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Formal Conditions of Aesthetic Experience 
Some one hundred pages after describing what it means to have an experience, 
Dewey (1934) outlined “formal conditions of esthetic form,” initially identifying them as 
“continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension and anticipation” (p. 138).  Some of these 
conditions overlap with one another, and the Dewey allowed that additional conditions 
might be added, all of which is to say: it presents the list not as a definitive scheme, but 
rather as a useful rubric.  The list is useful, first, because it clarifies why an experience 
falls within the domain of what has traditionally been called aesthetic experience; second, 
because it thereby helps us to see how the former sheds light on the latter; and, third, 
because it helps us to see how studying aesthetics can augment our understanding of 
human experience in general. 
The first of the formal conditions—continuity—involves factors “that endure 
through change” or at least change “more slowly than do surface incidents, and thus are, 
relatively constant” (1934, p. 323).  For Dewey, habits are chief among these factors.  
The earlier mentioned cross-country skier, to consider an example, encounters snow 
conditions that vary wildly from day to day and even with different portions of the trail 
she encounters in a single day. Yet she also enters each encounter already equipped with 
a range of relatively stable habits—the techniques of one-skate, two-skate and offset, for 
instance.  This does not mean that she employs the habits in a mechanized and unbending 
way, for a “habit,” as Dewey (1922) employed the term, is not a conditioned reflex, but 
“an ability, an art, formed through past experience” (p. 66); it is, in other words, an 
“acquired skill” (p. 64), and part of what makes a skill a skill is the fact that it can be 
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adapted to different circumstances.  A skilled guitarist can handle instruments with 
different widths of neck, and the woman can adapt her skills to different conditions.  In 
this way, the guitarist and skier both expand and modify their habits, so that their habits 
grow “more adaptable by practice and use” (p. 72).  Yet because habits are literal 
embodiments of past experiences, they carry the past into the present.  The skier does not 
enact a completely new habit for each new condition she encounters in the present—if 
she did, she would not be employing a habit at all.  Instead, she enacts variations of the 
same habits she has used before.  Hence there is continuity in her conduct and therewith 
in her experience. With something like this in mind, Dewey remarked that “the principle 
of continuity of experience means that every experience takes up something from those 
which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after” 
(1938, p. 35). 
The point here is that habits help us to experience a kind of unity or coherence in 
things—whether they be ski trails or paintings—and that this is a pre-condition of us 
having an aesthetic experience of them.   This is, in fact, a point that earlier chapters 
touched upon. In Chapter Four, it was seen that persistent ways of organized interaction 
are a means through which we come to have a relatively stable and generalized picture of 
an object or situation.  In Chapter Five, it was seen that our ability to perceive colours 
depends on habits we have acquired in the past.  
The remaining formal conditions—cumulation, conservation, tension and 
anticipation—also describe conditions under which an experience develops and coheres 
over time.  As Jackson has (1998) observed, however, there is a general difference 
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between continuity and the other four conditions. Continuity involves a process in which 
embodiments of the past (i.e., habits) structure the development of a current experience. 
Hence continuity involves factors that exist prior to and in this sense external to the 
current experience. By contrast, the other formal conditions usually—though not 
always—refer “…to the internal dynamics of what takes place between the onset of the 
experience and its culmination” (p. 47; emphasis added).  Consider, for example, 
dramatic narratives.  Our ability to encounter a play or movie as a unitary phenomenon, 
as opposed to a mere series of disconnected events, depends partly on what we bring to 
the encounter—that is, on our acquired habits, native capacities and so forth.  Yet it also 
depends on interrelationships between various constituents within the play, which is to 
say, the internal dynamics of the narrative. 
One of these dynamics is the formal condition of cumulation—a term, according 
to Jackson (1998), which refers to “[t]he buildup that attends the temporal unfolding of 
an aesthetic experience…” (p. 48).  This buildup may be experienced as an emotional 
“increase in tension or anticipation” (p. 48). It may also be undergone intellectually as 
“an increase in the internal complexity of the work or as a deepening of its meaning” (p. 
48).  In a play, it may be encountered as a rising action, a quickening of pace, a leading 
and building of one predicament into another until a final crisis is reached; in a painting, 
as a cyclic movement structured by the ways in which the composition keeps drawing the 
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eye to increasingly intense portions of the composition, repeatedly leading it to a focal 
point.17 
The next formal condition—conservation—involves arrangements and 
organizations through which tension accumulates, becomes pent up.  Pauses and 
extended notes in music or melodic phrases that dance around a tonal centre without 
landing on it can have this effect, as can obstacles impeding the progress of a movie’s 
protagonist. So too can rhythmic punctuations in a painting—punctuations that 
temporarily hold the eye, inviting it to dwell upon a portion of the composition before 
moving on. In such cases, wrote Dewey (1934), “[r]esistance accumulates energy; it 
institutes a conservation until release and expansion ensues” (p. 155).  By temporarily 
opposing—but not arresting—movement, it absorbs and sums up what came before while 
simultaneously generating an impulsion to move forward (see pp. 56-57, 155 & 172). For 
Dewey, conservation also relates to the fact that later phases in an aesthetic experience 
build upon earlier ones.  What the culminating stanza of a poem means has to do with 
what earlier stanzas mean. In this sense, earlier meanings enter into and are thus 
conserved within the culmination to which they lead.  On a general level, conservation 
 
17 While the condition of “culmination” fits many artistic experiences, it very likely does not fit them all, 
for art forms such as atonal music can arguably work against this condition. I am of two minds as to how 
Dewey would have responded to this objection.  On the one hand, he did not present his list as definitive.  
As a pragmatist, moreover, one would expect him to be open to amending the list and also to accepting 
exceptions to the rule.  On the other hand, Dewey did not attend particularly to avant-garde art forms, and I 
can imagine he might have held that atonal music is a form that thwarts genuine aesthetic experience. I am 
not sympathetic to this position. Nor am I interested in establishing an absolute boundary on what counts as 
aesthetic experience.  Fortunately Dewey’s account is defensible without me doing so, for at the outset of 
this section I stated that Dewey’s conditions of aesthetic form are useful because they clarify why an 
experience falls within the domain of what has traditionally been called aesthetic experience and why the 
former helps us to understand the latter.  The aforementioned objection does not undermine this claim. 
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works in concert with cumulation to establish rhythm and a sense of expectation, “[f]or 
whenever each step forward is at the same time a summing up and fulfillment [i.e. a 
conserving] of what precedes, and every consummation carries an expectation tensely 
forward, there is rhythm” (p. 172).  
Thus resistances and internal oppositions within works of art also generate 
tension, the fourth condition of aesthetic form in Dewey’s list.  They create tension by 
generating expectations while simultaneously thwarting the realization of expectations 
for a time. Not only does this heighten our emotional engagement with things we 
encounter aesthetically; it also gives our experiences a kind of solidity and substance they 
would not otherwise have.  Put another way, internal opposition and tension allow for the 
appearance of well-defined form.  The Sun, to consider an analogy, is a fairly distinct 
entity because the inward pull of gravity is met by the outward push of kinetic energies 
and nuclear forces.  Where the former not there to oppose the latter, the Sun would 
dissipate into an indistinct haze, and were the latter not there to oppose the former, it 
would collapse into an equally indistinct point-like object.  So similarly in life and art.  In 
life, we face problems that prevent us from immediately reaching an expectant goal; in a 
movie, a protagonist hits obstacles that have the same basic effect; and in a painting, 
there are lines, colours and suchlike that not only lead the eye towards a focal point, but 
also away from it, so that it engages with other portions of the canvas.  This simultaneous 
pulling towards and pushing away from fulfillments is, on Dewey’s (1934) account, a 
pre-condition of having an aesthetic experience, for without this sort of “…internal 
tension there would be a fluid rush to a straightway mark; there would be nothing that 
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could be called development and fulfillment” (p. 138).  Consequently our experience 
would not be an experience, for it would not integrate into a single, dramatic form. 
Dewey offered only vague descriptions of anticipation, the last formal condition 
in his list. It is, however, a condition that arguably parallels what contemporary 
environmental theories of aesthetics call “mystery”—an allure that comes from things 
being partly hidden.  Some Japanese gardens employ this basic principle.  The view is 
never completely obstructed, yet never completely open.  No matter where one stands, 
one can never see the entire garden.  With something always left a little uncertain, hidden 
beyond the next bend in the trail, one is continually drawn further along through the 
setting.  So similarly with other forms of art.  Portions of a painting may perplex viewers, 
leaving them a little uncertain, thereby drawing them into it. A movie may hold attention 
by providing hints about how the story may conclude, while simultaneously not giving 
the ending away. 
The role of anticipation in aesthetic experience may also be understood by 
considering its relation to the other four conditions in the list.  It relates to the first 
condition because the habits that bring continuity to experience also instill future 
expectations.  As discussed in the last chapter, habits are inclinations to move towards, 
seek, want and chase after something; these inclinations are future oriented and in this 
sense anticipatory. Habits, moreover, embody expectations that certain things and 
circumstances can be handled in certain ways.  Thus, for example, the habits of the earlier 
mentioned woman anticipate certain kinds of interactions with the ski trail.  Anticipation 
relates to the second condition of aesthetic form—cumulation—because the buildup that 
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attends the dramatic unfolding of an aesthetic experience is, by virtue of being dramatic, 
also a building of expectations. Anticipation relates to the third condition—
conservation—because artistic works establish patterns of temporal unfolding, along with 
a base of accrued meanings.  These patterns and meanings are conserved in the sense that 
they stay with us, and in staying with us, they shape our expectations of what is to come. 
Anticipation also relates to the internal opposition and resistance that characterize both 
conservation and tension. It does so because opposition and resistance produce rhythmic 
variations in pace and intensity, and these fluctuations, according to Dewey, “…in 
differentiating a part within the whole, [add] to the force of what went before while 
creating a suspense that is a demand for something to come” (p. 1934, p. 155). 
A few additional points are worth mentioning.  First, as a way of being concerned 
with and interested in what is to come, anticipation is a form of emotional engagement; 
and insofar as all the formal conditions of aesthetic form involve anticipation, all stand as 
ways in which we engage emotionally with things. Second, anticipation is a way of 
reaching beyond the confines of the instantaneous here and now.  Anticipation, moreover, 
reaches in two directions, for it is not just a looking forward, but a looking forward that 
builds upon and follows out of what has already come to pass.  As such, fluctuations in 
intensity and other dynamics are not—insofar as they are anticipatory—isolated 
variations.  In the words of Dewey (1934), they are instead “…modulation[s] of . . . entire 
pervasive and unifying qualitative substratum[s]” (p. 155). And again, since all the 
formal conditions of aesthetic form involve anticipation, all are ways in which we come 
to have temporally extended, unified experiences of things—ways, in other words, in 
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which we come to have what Dewey called “an experience.”  A third point to note, 
however, is that fluctuations, variations and other rhythmic modulations do not merely 
unify an artistic work.  They also “accentuate and define” phases within a work (p. 173), 
thereby individuating them. Yet this too contributes to the overall unity of the work and 
our experience of it, for “[t]he series of doings in rhythm of experience gives variety and 
movement” (p. 56).   It saves the work “from monotony and useless repetitions, from 
degrading into “the aimlessness of a mere succession of excitations” (pp. 56-57)—a mere 
succession that is antithetical having an experience. 
 
Perception Revisited 
The formal conditions of aesthetic form capture prominent characteristics of the 
experience of the earlier discussed skier.  However, there is something about her 
experience they do not particularly emphasize, namely, that her movements, her 
perceptual faculties and an array of other capacities coordinate and synchronize around 
the environment she encounters.  This aspect of her experience is crucial to what Dewey 
meant by his concept of an experience.  It is also crucial to his general account of 
perception—and, as will be seen, a parallel account Merleau-Ponty advanced during the 
last decade of Dewey’s life. It shows that perception—especially aesthetic perception—is 
synaesthetic, and it provides a remarkably concrete explanation as to why it is. It also 
reinforces why we should be wary of the old saw that perception is easily deceived.  It 
thereby emphasizes the anti-sceptical nature of Dewey’s philosophical project.  
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Merleau-Ponty (1945) noted that “Cézanne declared that a picture contains within 
itself even the smell of a landscape” (p. 318).18  He argued that Cézanne meant by this 
that the painting reflects “...responses which would be elicited through an examination by 
the remaining senses; that a thing would not have this colour had it not also this shape, 
these tactile properties, this resonance, this odour…” (p. 319). The lesson he drew from 
this is that “a phenomenon” that mobilizes only one of our senses “is a mere phantom,” 
and that “it will come near to real existence only if . . . it becomes capable of speaking to 
[our] other senses” (p. 318).  Thus, to consider another example, seeing a flickering 
orange candle flame as a candle flame might also mean seeing it as something hot, 
something with a waxy smell, something with an intimate emotional resonance.  By 
contrast, to register an isolated fluttering patch of orange—a pure visual sensation 
disconnected from anything else—is to suffer something tantamount to the haloing 
effects and other phantom sensations that people with migraine headaches sometimes 
endure, all of which is to say:  isolated sensory excitations are not perception. 
In Art as Experience (1934), Dewey developed a very similar position.  He wrote 
that 
[t]he eye, ear, or whatever, is only the channel through which a total 
response takes place.  A color as seen is always qualified by implicit 
reactions of many organs…  It is a funnel for total energy put forth, not its 
well-spring.  Colors are sumptuous and rich just because a total organic 
resonance is deeply implicated in them (p. 122). 
 
So while “[w]e see a painting through the eyes, and hear music through the ears,” it is a 
mistake to suppose that 
 
18 Merleau-Ponty references Gasquet (1929) Cézanne, p. 81. 
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 …visual or auditory qualities as such, are central if not exclusive.  . . .  
Nothing could be further from the truth. . . . It is no more true of seeing a 
picture than it is of reading a poem or a treatise in philosophy, in which we 
are not aware in any distinct way of the visual forms of letters and words.  
These are stimuli to which we respond with emotional, imaginative, and 
intellectual values, which then are ordered by interaction with those 
presented through the medium of words. The colors seen in a picture are 
referred to objects, not to the eye” (p. 123).  
 
Thus we can “…perceive, by means of the eyes as causal aids, the liquidity of water, the 
coldness of ice, the solidity of rocks…” (p. 123).  We can do this, as Dewey suggested in 
the above passage, because we primarily experience things and events, not sensations, 
and the qualities of things and events are never purely visual.   When we see by means of 
the eyes, therefore, “…it is certain that other qualities than those of the eye are 
conspicuous and controlling in perception” (p. 123).  It is also “…certain . . . that optical 
qualities do not stand out by themselves with tactual and emotive qualities clinging to 
their skirts” (pp. 123-124). 
On this account, perception is not merely an intersensory phenomenon, for motor, 
intellectual and emotional modalities work with traditional sensory modalities of 
perception. As “…organs through which the live creature participates directly in the 
ongoings of the world,” wrote Dewey (1934), the senses “…cannot be opposed to action, 
for motor apparatus and ‘will’ itself are means by which this participation is carried on 
and directed” (p. 22). Nor can they “…be opposed to ‘intellect,’ for mind is the means by 
which participation is rendered fruitful through sense”  (p. 22); and they cannot be 
opposed to emotion either, for “[t]here is . . . no such thing in perception as seeing or 
hearing plus emotion” (p. 53).   
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If we consider, for instance, what it means to taste something—to really taste it—
we see that it involves a great deal more than taste buds firing signals to the brain.  The 
tongue is obviously involved in taste, as is smell, but consider also the importance of 
texture, temperature and therefore tactile senses. Or consider movement: the different 
actions of the mouth and tongue when sucking a candy, eating stew, biting into a pear, 
licking an ice cream cone. Consider how we sometimes eat with our hands, sometimes 
with chop sticks, how we cradle and swirl a snifter of brandy, and how these patterns of 
motor activity enter into the overall experience. Consider coffee and the deflation and 
inflation of our lungs and diaphragm as we blow cooling breath or inhale its aroma.  
Think about the sights and sounds of food: the vibrant red of ripe bell peppers, the 
aesthetics of sushi, the slurping of soup or crunching of apples versus crunching of 
popcorn.  Food makes mouths water, skin flush, noses run; sometimes it makes us gag 
and sets our stomach pumping; potato skins sometimes produce a tingling around the jaw 
muscles. Plain, boring fare is delicious to bellies pinched with hunger, while a favourite 
dish sickens one already full. Food can evoke thoughts, memories and emotions, and 
thoughts, memories and emotions can shape our taste for particular foods. Dewey posited 
that without “…interaction between the total organism and objects, [objects] are not 
perceived” (1934, p. 54; emphasis added), and, indeed, we experience food through the 
mobilization of our entire body. 
Very clearly a rich array of capacities enter taste experience. However, their 
power to sense does not simply point outward.  One capacity speaks to another, changing 
its “perspective” on things, as when an empty stomach makes taste buds delight in plain 
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fare. That capacities mobilize one another lends credence to Cézanne’s earlier cited 
declaration that a picture contains within itself even the smell of a landscape. It also gives 
credence to the more general claim, as Dewey (1934) put it, that “[n]othing is perceived” 
unless various capacities “work in relation with one another” (p. 175). So long as an 
object stimulates only one sense organ, say, the eye, then “experience is thin and poor” 
(p. 256); we do not really perceive the object, much less perceive it aesthetically.  
However, “[w]hen the tendency to turn the eyes and head is absorbed into a multitude of 
other impulses and it and they become members of a single act,” then “perception”—as 
opposed to “some specialized reaction”—“occurs” (p. 256; emphasis added).  
While perception involves intercommunication between a range of modalities, so 
that there is, for example, a sense in which we can see voices in moving lips, perception 
does not follow out of just any random intercourse. If the eye indiscriminately makes the 
ear hear voices, we are not perceiving, but hallucinating. Remember that Dewey did not 
merely claim that perceptual modalities must communicate, but that they must “work in 
relation to one another.”   Perception occurs when different modalities coordinate with 
one another, and they do so not merely of their own accord. In the same way that the 
hand’s movements coordinate around things it encounters, perceptual modalities, as 
Merleau-Ponty put it, “…intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of the thing” 
(1945, p. 229).  
For Dewy (1934), the manipulation and working of artistic media exemplifies 
how this occurs: 
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As we manipulate, we touch and feel, as we look, we see; as we listen, we 
hear. The hand moves with etching needle or with brush. The eye attends . 
. . the consequence of what is done. Because of this intimate connection, 
subsequent doing is cumulative and not a matter of caprice nor yet of 
routine. In an emphatic artistic-esthetic experience, the relation is so close 
that it controls simultaneously both the doing and the perception (pp. 49-
50). 
  
Here the hands, eyes and other bodily organs are “instruments through which the entire 
live creature, moved and active throughout, operates” (p. 50).  It is with something like 
this in mind that Merleau-Ponty (1945) proclaimed that  “…the body is not a collection 
of adjacent organs, but a synergistic system, all the functions of which are exercised and 
linked together in the general action of being in the world…” (p. 234). Merleau-Ponty 
added that if perception is “a certain mode of movement or form of conduct” and  “the 
synchronization of [the] body with it,” then “the problem of forms of synaesthetic 
experience begins to look like being solved” (p. 234).  
In offering this answer to the question of how and in what forms synaesthesia 
occurs, Dewey and Merleau-Ponty also offered a rebuttal to the occasional tendency to 
equate the occurrence to an illusion, a kind of perceptual breakdown. Some news 
reporters, for example, citing research showing that chips seem extra crispy when people 
hear crackling, have intimated that perception is less than trustworthy. From the 
standpoint of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty, however, the conclusion comes from a failure 
to recognize that a food is crispy not solely because it fragments easily, but also because 
it has a certain a look, sound and manner of mobilizing the jaw muscles and tongue—an 
overall way of synchronizing our sensitivities and actions.  For this reason, both thinkers 
dismissed the notion that synaesthesia typically results from a kind of perceptual 
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breakdown.  Both maintained, on the contrary, that nothing is really perceived except 
when different sensitivities and capacities work together and coordinate into a single joint 
action.  They maintained, moreover, that this occurs insofar as actions are organized and 
synchronized around things encountered in the world. 
 
Temporality and Reconstruction 
“The living being is characterized by having a past and present,” and Dewey 
(1934) asserted “…that it is precisely when we get from an art product the feeling of 
dealing with a career, a history, perceived at a particular point of its development, that 
we have the impression of life” (p. 176).  Dewey allowed that some “recognitions” are, of 
course, 
…virtually instantaneous.  But these occur only when, through a sequence 
of past experiences, the self becomes expert in certain directions, be it 
simply in seeing at a glance that a certain object is a table or that a 
painting is by a particular artist, say Manet.  Because the present 
perception utilizes an organization of energies worked out serially in the 
past [e.g., habits] is no reason for eliminating the temporal quality from 
perception.  And in any case, if the perception is esthetic, an instantaneous 
identification is only its beginning. There is no inherent esthetic value in 
identifying a picture as such and such.  [However, t]he identification may 
arouse attention and lead to dwelling upon the painting in such a way that 
parts and relations are called out to compose a whole (p. 176). 
 
Thereby it may lead the perceiver to have an experience.  
That aesthetic and generic experience are both temporal phenomena should, 
Dewey granted, go without saying.  Yet common ways of speaking obscure just this 
point, so Dewey’s emphasis was warranted. People have often distinguished, for 
example, between painting and cinema by calling the former a non-temporal art and the 
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latter a temporal one, when, as the filmmaker and theorist Sergi Eisentstein (1939) 
observed, there is an emphatic sense in which painting is cinematic, by which he meant 
dramatic and therefore temporal.  To reinforce this claim, he referenced a passage from 
Leonardo Da Vinci’s notes that outlined plans for a painting.19  The description, wrote 
Eisenstein, “…is executed in accordance with features that are . . . characteristic of the 
‘temporal’ . . . arts” (p. 32). It resembles “a shooting-script,” which is to say, it 
“…follows a quite definite movement.  Moreover the course of this movement is not in 
the least fortuitous” or haphazard (p. 32).  On the contrary, it is dramatic; it builds. 
“Beginning with a description of the heavens, the picture ends with a similar description, 
but considerably increased in intensity” (p. 32; cf. Levinson & Alperson, pp. 441-449). 
Dewey (1934) offered a very similar, albeit more detailed, illustration of how we 
experience paintings.  Suppose, he wrote, that a painting depicts “objects in which masses 
point upward” and that this initially catches our eyes. “[T]he first impression” will then 
be “that of movement from below to above” (p. 174).  Suppose the painting also has 
horizontal lines and rhythms.  These draw our eyes “across the picture,” even while “the 
intensity remains in patterns that rise” (p. 174).  Suppose further that a heavy mass 
dominates one of the lower corners, and “that instead of fitting into the vertical patterns,” 
this mass “transfers attention to . . . horizontally disposed” features in the composition (p. 
 
19 The passage in question describes the Deluge, the biblical flood narrated in Genesis 6-8.  Citing the 
editor of his edition of Leonardo’s Trattato della pittura (A Treatise on Painting), Eisenstein (1939) 
claimed that the description was “an unrealized plan for a picture” (p. 32). Leonardo, of course, did 
complete a series of sketches depicting the Deluge.  Whether these sketches and the description Eisenstein 
cited were composed in preparation for a painting is, as I understand it, an open question.  However, the 
general legitimacy of Eisenstein’s remarks about visual arts such as drawing and painting does not depend 
on the ultimate answer to this question. 
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174). When our eyes meet it, “there is a halt, an arrest, a punctuating pause” (p. 174).  
However, this does not “operate as a disturbing interruption” or “break in experience,” 
but rather “as a re-direction of interest and attention” and therewith an “expanding [of] 
the significance of the object” (p. 174). At some point, this phase of perception completes 
itself.  We return to the upward pointing masses that initially caught our eyes. A new 
cycle of perception begins, but with this difference: our eyes have, so to speak, been 
educated by their first tour around the painting, so that they are now sensitive to features 
of the composition that they formerly missed. 
A number of lessons may be drawn from this illustration.  Chief among these is 
that perception is temporal.  Again, Dewey (1934) was somewhat apologetic for 
emphasizing such a commonplace, writing that 
[w]hat has been said may seem to exaggerate the temporal aspect of 
perception.  I have, without doubt, stretched out elements that are usually 
more or less telescoped.  But in no case can there be perception of an 
object except in the process of developing in time (p. 175). 
 
There can, he added, be “mere excitations.”  Yet mere excitations are not perception. A 
view of the world that consists “of a succession of momentary glimpses” is no “view of 
the world nor anything in it” (p. 175), he remarked.  Were the roar of Niagara Falls 
“…limited to an instantaneous . . . peep, there would not be perceived the sound . . . of 
any object, much less of the particular object called Niagara Falls. It would not be 
grasped even as a noise” (p. 175). 
One reason that Dewey stressed the temporality of experience is that temporality 
is a pre-condition of intercommunication between perceptual modalities.  
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Intercommunication, in turn, is a pre-condition of having perceptual experiences that are 
not, as Dewey (1934) put it, “thin and poor” (p. 256).  For this reason, temporality is also 
a precondition of aesthetic experience.  Here there are number of claims to consider.  
First, there is the claim that the absence of intercommunication impoverishes perception. 
Research shows, for instance, that the ear struggles to perceive a waterfall as a waterfall 
if it is unaided by other perceptual modalities: a waterfall that sounds pleasant in the 
context of a park becomes irritating when recorded and played out of context, typically 
being mistaken for “…a subway train, trucks on a freeway, or something just as bad”  
(Whyte 1979, p. 48).  Second, there is the claim that intercommunication between 
perceptual modalities requires time.  Of course, this is an empty tautology if taken 
literally, for time is an a priori condition of human experience. What Dewey meant to 
say, however, is that perceptual intercommunication requires time to develop in much the 
same way that the unfolding of a dramatic narrative does.20   It requires time because it 
entails more than internal nerve firings and sensory excitations.  It occurs when different 
modalities synchronize with one another and “become members of a single act” (256), as 
 
20 There are, to be sure, clear exceptions to this rule. A Nature article titled Hearing lips and seeing voices, 
for example, reports that dubbing the sound /ba/ onto lip movements for /ga/ results in most people hearing 
/da/, and this phenomenon—known as the “McGurk effect”—is practically instantaneous (see McGurk & 
MacDonald, 1976).  Here, however, it is well to note that this effect occurs under highly contrived and 
therefore exceptional circumstances.  As an aside, it is also worth noting that this experiment does not 
demonstrate that intersensory communication entails perceptual breakdown. Consider the following points.  
First, whereas we normally encounter things and events that synchronize our capacities and sensitivities, 
this experiment delivers conflicting stimuli—stimuli designed to pull our sensitivities and capacities out of 
synchrony. What we encounter, therefore, is a situation or world that is already confused and broken down, 
which is to say, the McGurk effect is not a consequence of something being wrong with us, but something 
being wrong with the situation in which we find ourselves.  Second, if we start with the assumption that we 
can see voices and hear lips—that is, if we start with the assumption that perception is in the first place 
synaesthetic—then we cannot even conclude that we misperceive the sound, for on this assumption, the 
isolated ear is not the arbiter of what we ought to hear. 
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when our sensitivities, movements and other capacities coordinate around a food we are 
consuming; and this kind of subject-object interaction is one that emphatically occurs 
over time. 
Another very important reason for stressing the temporality of experience is that 
Dewey understood aesthetic experience as a historical phenomenon, by which he did not 
merely mean temporal, but also reconstructive. Historians use the term reconstruction to 
connote the activity of putting the past together.  In interpreting a past event, however, 
historians always have knowledge of what followed it; they also have access to 
conceptual resources—theories and suchlike—that did not exist at the time of the event.  
This knowledge inevitably qualifies what the past event is understood to mean. Dewey 
made a similar point about means and ends, arguing that while means are temporally 
prior to ends, ends are often analytically prior to means (1896, pp. 66-70; also see 1925, 
p. 379; 1934, pp. 37-38).  That is to say, means and therewith meanings are often only 
grasped from the standpoint of ends finally reached.  In the case of aesthetic experience, 
culminations and fulfillments are end-standpoints from which we reinterpret elements 
within works of art. When our eye falls upon a focal point in a painting, we finally see 
how various other elements within the work function to (i.e., are means that) accentuate 
and direct attention to the focal point.  When we reach the climax of a play, earlier 
portions of it acquire new significance and meaning (1920 pp. 2-3). In these and other 
ways, we reconstruct works of art from the standpoint of where they finally lead.  We 
thereby come to encounter individual elements within works as forwardings (i.e., means) 
that jointly contribute to an overall culmination, which is part of the reason why Dewey 
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claimed that aesthetic experience builds into a unified and meaningful whole (see 1934, 
p. 171). 
There is an additional sense in which Dewey characterized aesthetic encounters as 
reconstructive.  To begin with, he noted that we enter each encounter with a range of 
habits, capacities and so forth. These enable us to interact with and therewith perceive 
things in certain ways. Thus there is a sense in which we thrust our own perspectives onto 
artistic objects. However, in much the same way a beer bottle resists the pressure of 
fingers wrapping around it, artistic objects resist certain perspectives and interpretations. 
That is to say, they do not allow us to engage with and perceive them in any way 
whatever.  One might almost say that they, like us, have there own perspective, and in 
resisting the perspectives that we thrust upon them, they thrust their own perspectives 
back on us. This is particularly so when we have an aesthetic experience.  After all, 
aesthetic experience of an artistic object requires a degree of sensitivity to the object; and 
if we force unyielding perspectives upon it, if we fail to adjust, accommodate and to 
some extent give into it, then we are not really sensitive to it. At the same time, however, 
we cannot be sensitive to the object at all if we do not come to it already equipped with a 
range of capacities. 
Dewey reasoned, therefore, that aesthetic experience of a work of art entails 
mutual reconstruction of subject and object.  On the one hand, subjects come to an artistic 
object—or what might loosely be called an artistic structure—armed with certain 
capacities, which might also be called structures. By engaging with the artistic structure 
through these capacities, subjects play a role in constituting and constructing it in 
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experience, which here means restructuring what the work initially offers. On the other 
hand, the work avails to subjects certain possibilities of interaction. To interact within 
this range of possibilities, subjects accommodate and adjust their own capacities or 
structures. Insofar as the work mobilizes capacities in heretofore unexperienced ways, 
subjects experience a restructuring or what Jackson has (1998) described as  “a 
transformation of self” (p. 5).  They gain “…a broadened perspective, a shift in attitude, 
an increase in knowledge, or any other host of enduring alterations…” (p. 5). Or as 
Dewey (1934) explained, works that are “not of the very ‘easy’ sort” challenge us with 
“dislocations and dissociations of what is normally connected” (p. 173).  This interrupts 
our habitual ways of engaging with things, and since we are often insensitive to that to 
which we are already habituated, this interruption “…brings to definite perception values 
that are concealed in ordinary experience because of habituation” (p. 173).  Such 
encounters thereby expand our capacity to perceive and experience. 
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-Seven- 
Art, Meaning and Appearance 
 
The concept of meaning is diffuse in Dewey’s work.  It is so in the sense that it 
diffused through, which is to say, permeated his accounts of perception, experience, art 
and knowledge, along with his understanding of what pragmatic philosophy is. It is also 
so in the sense that he never settled on a concise definition of meaning.  This is not, 
however, because he lacked philosophical clarity, though his writing was admittedly 
imprecise at times.  Rather, it is because he held that a rich variety of phenomena are 
inherently meaningful. 
Dewey followed James by relating the essence of a thing—which here meant its 
meaning and appearance—to its value and use in human activities.  However, where 
James particularly stressed the role of personal interests in determining use and value, 
Dewey particularly emphasized cultural practice, albeit without denying the importance 
of personal interests. The things we experience, he wrote, come “…clothed with 
meanings which originate in custom and tradition.” We see others “…treat things in 
certain ways, subject them to certain uses.  . . . The things are thereby invested for [us] 
with certain properties… (c. 1951, p. 383).   
Dewey’s account of meaning also anticipated linguistic and analytic schools of 
philosophy that took hold near the end of his life.  It did, first, by relating the meanings of 
words to their uses (see 1925, p. 186); second, by arguing that meaning is public; and, 
third, by rejecting the essentialist theory “…that general ideas or meanings arise by the 
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comparison of a number of particulars, eventuating in the recognition of something 
common to them all” (1925, p. 188; emphasis added).  At the same time, however, Dewey 
deviated from many linguistic and analytic philosophers by denying that meaning is a 
primarily linguistic phenomenon; and by opposing the nominalist position that “meaning 
and essence are adventitious and arbitrary” (1925, p. 184), insisting instead that they 
conform to real structures in the world, albeit ones people help create. He also broke with 
many of the aforementioned thinkers by emphasizing the historical character of meaning.  
In this regard, his approach was similar to that of Collingwood, who argued that we 
acquire a rich appreciation of the meaning(s) of a concept, first, by acknowledging that it 
is a kind of artifact that has been constructed by humans; and, second, by contemplating 
how, at various stages of its development, the concept was used to deal with historically 
specific problems.21    
Dewey’s views on meaning perhaps come closest to those of existential 
phenomenologists, particularly Merleau-Ponty.  Like Merleau-Ponty, Dewey contended 
that perception itself is inherently meaningful, and noted that this is reflected in everyday 
language where the word “sense” connotes both meaning and a mode of perception 
(1934, p. 22).  Also like Merleau-Ponty, he held that meaning is historical.  Yet here 
“historical” is used in a different sense than the one just described.  It expresses the fact 
that people carry a lived history into each encounter in the world.  While this lived 
 
21 Here I borrow words from my 2007 “The Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy: Reading 
Wittgenstein Through Critical Theory” (p. 13), published in Essays in Philosophy.  However, the words I 
borrow from the aforesaid article paraphrase remarks from Evan Cameron’s 2004 “From Plato to Socrates: 
Wittgenstein’s Journey on Collingwood’s Map” (pp. 6-8), published in AE: Canadian Aesthetics Journal. 
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history can take the form of what everyday language calls “memory,” it more generally 
takes the form of what Dewey described as “deep-seated habits or organic ‘memories’” 
(1926, p. 121). Through our past dealings with things, we acquire certain habitual 
patterns of interacting; these affect how we handle things practically; and our practical 
handlings, as already discussed at length, shape what things mean to us and how they 
appear. 
However, Dewey also suggested that established habits can exhaust and deplete 
meaning.  This happens when phrases are overused.  They become rather more like 
auditory burps than linguistically meaningful expressions. This also happens when we get 
caught in the numbing drudgery of sheer routine.  In such cases, we are wont to say that 
one or another of our life activities is meaningless. In his working notes, Nietzsche 
quipped that “[w]e possess art lest we perish of the truth” (1967 [1888], §822)—“truth” 
here referring not to veracity, but to sedimented ways of living that form a basis for that 
which we unthinkingly accept as “true.” Along these lines, Dewey suggested that art is a 
countermeasure to entrenched habits and the decay of meaning that ensues from sheer 
routine.   More specifically, he maintained that aesthetic experience of fine art re-
educates embodied memories and ingrained habits.  When we engage “intimately and 
intensely” with a work of art, he wrote, “…old habits are deployed in new ways, ways in 
which they are adapted to a more completely integrated world so that they themselves 
achieve a new integration.  Hence the liberating, expansive power of art” (1926, p. 121).  
Seen thus, aesthetic engagement with art has two complementary effects: the 
heightened level of integration intensifies meanings and therewith experiences, while the 
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redeployment of habits expands our capacity to encounter things meaningfully, and 
sometimes even frees us to see the world in a new light.  In what follows, I consider each 
of these effects in order.  I consider, in particular, how Dewey’s writings on art delivered 
a theory of meaning that augmented his accounts of perception, experience and 
knowledge, especially his account of scientific knowledge. I also consider how this 
theory of meaning counters the common view that classical pragmatists advance a kind of 
“subjective reason,” which is to say, a method of thinking “…essentially concerned . . . 
with adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted” and relatively 
indifferent “…to the question [of] whether the purposes as such are reasonable” 
(Horkheimer 1947, p. 3). 
It is evident that Dewey’s reflections on art helped him clarify his own 
philosophy, and he suggested that it might similarly aid others.   In Art as Experience 
(1934), he counselled that art “…gives a clew to the nature of things that philosophical 
systems have rarely followed” (p. 288). “The interpenetration of the old and new, their 
complete blending in a work of art, is [a] challenge issued by art to philosophical 
thought” (p. 288). I conclude this chapter by taking up this challenge.  I consider ancient 
ideas found in Plato’s work, which, as Dewey remarked in 1930, “still provides my 
favourite philosophic reading” (p. 21).  I return, more specifically, to the discussion of the 
Platonic concept of eidos that was initiated in Chapter Four.   I do so because the concept 
reminds us of old questions that philosophers have repeatedly tried to answer in an effort 
to account for how it is that things come to appear intelligibly to us, and Dewey’s 
philosophy of art and the theory of meaning it conveys supplies new ways of approaching 
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these questions.  The concept of eidos, therefore, helps us recognize part of what 
Dewey’s philosophy of art achieved; his philosophy of art, in turn, helps us appreciate the 
concept of eidos, which is worth appreciating if only because of its historical importance; 
and the two together help us to better understand how things come to appear intelligibly 
to us. 
Dewey, it will be recalled, maintained that the notion of “inner experience” and 
therewith the notion of “mental representation” were peripheral to ancient Greek 
accounts of experience.  In line with this, Plato’s concept of eidos undergirded a theory of 
knowledge that did not treat knowledge as a mode of mental representation. By 
establishing a dialogue between Dewey and Plato, I aim to expand Dewey’s account of 
how we can access things intelligibly without representing them; and by doing so, I hope 
to explicate additional ways in which classical pragmatists challenged subjectivistic 
strains in modern thought.  
 
Intensified Meanings  
In Art as Experience (1934), Dewey differentiated between two kinds of means, 
namely, “mere means” and “media.”  The former, he explained,  
…are usually of such a sort that others can be substituted for them; the 
particular ones employed are determined by some extraneous 
consideration, like cheapness.  But the moment we say “media,” we refer 
to means that are incorporated in the outcome.  Even bricks and mortar 
become part of the house they are employed in to build; they are not mere 
means to its erection. Colors are the painting; tones are the music. A 
picture painted with water colors has a quality different from that painted 
with oil. Esthetic effects belong intrinsically to their medium (p. 197). 
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The notion that genuine means or media are “taken up into the consequences produced 
and [remain] immanent in them” (p. 197) was crucial not only to Dewey’s philosophy of 
art, but also his pragmatic philosophy. 
The name “pragmatism” or “instrumentalism,” as Dewey preferred to call it, and 
pragmatic methodologies that articulate meanings in terms of “means,” “uses,” “ends” 
and “consequences” have fuelled a mistaken impression that pragmatists esteem 
expedience above all else.  Yet Dewey, especially in his later writings on art, 
emphatically insisted it is an error to judge meaning, indeed, to judge even usefulness on 
the basis of mere expedience. By doing so, wrote Dewey (1925), “…we arbitrarily cut 
short our consideration of consequences” (p. 362), so that we mistake detrimental 
activities for useful ones:   
Thus it is often said that a laborer’s toil is the means of his livelihood, 
although except in the most tenuous and arbitrary way it bears no 
relationship to his real living. Even his wage is hardly an end or 
consequence of his labor.  He might—and frequently does—equally well 
or ill—perform any one of a hundred other tasks as a condition of 
receiving payment (p. 366). 
 
Dewey’s account of art—and all these quotations are from a chapter on art—qualified 
what he meant by terms such as “use” “means,” and “consequence.” Therewith it 
qualified his entire instrumental philosophy. When he spoke of things being related 
instrumentally and therefore meaningfully, he asserted that they are in a relationship 
wherein “…consequences belong integrally to the conditions which may produce them” 
(p. 371).  This was not merely an ideal of how things ought to be.  It was—and still is—
an assertion that captures certain everyday notions of what meaning is, for to say 
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something is accidentally or arbitrarily related to something else is in a variety of senses 
to call the relationship meaningless.  
Note, however, that when Dewey claimed that instrumental and therefore 
meaningful relations entail integral or inherent relationships between means and ends, he 
did not assert that the relationships are coerced or necessary.  Consider, for example, 
brushstrokes (means) in a painting and a focal point (an end) towards which they lead.  
The two are integrally related, yet not because the artist is forced to compose the work in 
one specific way, but rather because neither has independent existence. The end is where 
the means lead, so much so, that an unpainted portion of the canvas will be a focal point 
if that is where brushstrokes lead the eye. Means, in turn, only become means when 
viewed from the standpoint of where they finally lead, for it is only when our eye falls 
upon the focal point that we finally see how the brushstrokes function to (are means that) 
accentuate and direct attention to the focal point (an end).  
  The claim that means and ends belong inherently to one another suggests—to 
employ an overused formula—that a meaningful whole is not reducible to the sum of its 
parts.  This is because the parts are what they are by virtue of how they jointly build into 
a culminating movement: a whole. Two adjacent dabs of paint in a van Gogh composition 
appear differently than either alone.  Orange against a background of blue becomes more 
vibrant; and the many dabs together form a composition that is not reducible to the sum 
of individual brush strokes. Not only does the overall composition modify the appearance 
of elements within it; it also defines them functionally. When one analyzes a composition 
into various elements of design and describes their aesthetic function, one does so on the 
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basis of already being acquainted with the overall aesthetic outcome.  A focal point is not 
a focal point in itself, but in the context of a whole composition, which suggests, once 
again, that the aesthetic outcome is analytically prior to means that lead to it.  One can 
only analyze and ascribe aesthetic functions to elements of design insofar as one has 
already placed the elements within a composition, even if only imaginatively.  
While the whole makes the parts what they are, the process also works the other 
way around.  “The kinds of means used,” wrote Dewey, “determines the kinds of 
consequences actually reached” (1935, p. 259).  It happens that this remark was made in 
reference to political actions, yet the claim holds elsewhere, and it introduces an 
important amendment to the current discussion. Media, elements of design and other 
things potentially designated as means are so integral to artistic outcomes as to be 
inseparable from them. The climactic outcome of a novel is not an isolated element at the 
terminus of a story, but a culminating end to which the events in the story lead. Sever one 
from the other, and both cease to be what they are. So when Dewey said that means and 
ends belong inherently or integrally to one another, he asserted the following: while they 
are conceptually distinguishable, they are existentially inseparable; they name phases of a 
single movement.  In his own words, “[m]eans and ends are two names for the same 
reality.” They “…denote not a division in reality but a distinction in judgment.  . . . ‘End’ 
is a name for a series of acts taken collectively—like the term army.  ‘Means’ is a name 
for a series of acts taken distributively—like this soldier, that officer” (1922, p. 36). 
The point, then, is that art—contrary to what some of the preceding paragraphs 
intimate—erodes fixed orders of priority, along with hard divisions between means and 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
183 
ends, parts and wholes, form and content. It may be, for example, that van Gogh arranged 
the stars and Moon in his Starry Night (1889) as a means of composing an overall form 
or design. Yet it may also be that he crafted the composition as a means of making the 
stars and Moon swim in vibrating eddies and so radiantly burst from the canvas. 
Doubtless he intended both, and in any event, both outcomes are realized.  Dewey (1934) 
maintained that “…what is form in one connection is matter in another and vice-versa” 
(p. 128). He stated more generally that things “do not stand out by themselves” (p. 117).  
A painting does not have colour, then in addition to colour, design; rather, colour 
expresses design, and design colour.  “In . . . degree to which color is really painted,” 
said Dewey quoting Cézanne, “design exists.  The more the colors harmonize with one 
another, the more defined is design.  When color is at its richest, the form is most 
complete” (p. 121). 
That colour and design appear not merely with but through one another points to 
the basic fact that no quality is ever perceived alone—a fact reflected in the realm of 
language where properties are ascribed to nouns by means of adjectives. The word 
“adjective” is itself both a noun and an adjective.  As a noun, it refers to words or phrases 
naming attributes. As an adjective, it means “additional; not standing by itself; 
dependent” (Barber 1998, p. 15), and quite appropriately, for there is no property (or 
adjective) that cannot be qualified by yet another. Heat and cold, for example, are never 
purely thermal. Warmth from a fireplace is a crackling, flickering, spicy, soothing, gentle 
orange-yellow warmth that invites us to turn our heads towards it; and the coldness of 
packing snow is a mouldable, trickling cold that coats the hand and drips through fingers. 
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Some will perhaps object that these examples synthesize into compound forms what are 
rightly basic qualities; and that they consequently take what is initially there and use 
language to contrive what is never directly experienced. Dewey insisted the reverse is 
actually so. To speak of a pure and unadulterated warmth or cold is to describe what is 
perhaps endured in cases of pathology, but never actually perceived in things and events 
encountered in the world (see Dewey, 1934, p. 126).22 To feel a pure, isolated heat in 
one’s hand—a heat therefore unconnected to anything the hand is doing or touching—is 
to suffer illness, for instance, nerve damage. Isolated sensory excitations are not 
perception. 
In the above example of perceptual breakdown, the connections between the 
hand’s doings and the consequences it undergoes as a result of them are literally dis-
integrated. For Dewey, this makes perceptual breakdown equivalent to a breakdown of 
meaning. In his technical vocabulary, this is because the breakdown destroys connections 
of “means-consequence” (i.e., of doing and undergoing), and therewith severs meaningful 
relationships.  In everyday language, it is because regions of the world encountered 
through the hand lose coherence, fall apart, cease to make sense. Aesthetic experience 
stands in sharp contrast to this sort of occurrence.  In everyday terminology, it involves a 
heightening and concentrating of perception, and in Dewey’s terminology, it involves an 
intensified integration of means and ends. This was one of Dewey’s reasons for 
maintaining that fine art functions to intensify meanings.  
 
22 Put another way, it is to use what Chapter Five, under the influence of Merleau-Ponty, called a “second 
order expression.” 
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Expanded Meanings 
In discussing fine art, coherence has been emphasized, and justifiably so, for even 
splashes of paint in a Jackson Pollock piece settle into a highly integrated composition. 
However, while artistic works resolve materials into settled and well-balanced forms, 
they also include twists that unsettle and throw audiences off balance. Quoting Francis 
Bacon, Dewey (1934) wrote: “[t]here is no excellent beauty that hath not some 
strangeness in proportion” (p. 139). “The unexpected turn,” Dewey went on to explain, 
which even artists do not always foresee, “…saves [a work] from being mechanical.” It 
adds interest and intrigue. It “…is a condition of the felicitous quality of a work of art” 
(p. 139), and also of having an aesthetic experience. 
One of the ways that art unsettles and throws us off balance is by subverting 
convention. In everyday life, the word “subversive” often carries unfavourable 
connotations.  By contrast, the world of fine arts has, since the Romantic era, tended to 
disparage “reactionary” artists for their failure to subvert established traditions. This 
points to the emphatically reconstructive character of artistic activity, for one can only be 
subversive insofar as there is something already available to mess about with and rework. 
Early jazz artists, who were considered subversive in any number of senses, used musical 
instruments already available; often they reworked existing compositions into jazzy 
arrangements; and they followed the centuries old practice of employing the equally 
tempered scale, which largely supplanted the Pythagorean scale during the Baroque era. 
So while they subverted tradition, they did not do so by obliterating it, but rather by 
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building upon it, which perhaps explains why Nietzsche remarked that “[c]onvention is 
the condition of great art, not an obstacle” (1967 [1888], §809).  They took what was 
already available, and out of it constructed—or more accurately, reconstructed—new 
means of expression. 
 “Reconstruction”—a term particularly favoured by Dewey—expresses a 
circumstance wherein things are not formed from scratch, but re-formed from what is 
already at hand. The term stands as a reminder that we are always in a medial position, in 
the middle of things, already engaged in a world—a world, wrote Dewey (1934), “…that 
is human as well as physical, that includes the materials of tradition and institutions as 
well as local surroundings” (p. 246).  It is a reminder that experience arises from 
interacting with one’s environment, and by extension rearranging some portion of it: 
A man does something; he lifts, let us say, a stone.  In consequence he 
undergoes, suffers, something: the weight, strain, texture of the surface of 
the thing lifted.  The properties thus undergone determine further doing.  
The stone is too heavy or too angular, not solid enough; or else the 
properties undergone show it is fit for the use for which it is intended. The 
process continues until mutual adaptation of the self and the object 
emerges and that particular experience comes to a close (p. 44). 
 
Mutual adaptation means mutual change; and since the change occurs in entities that pre-
exist the specific interaction, mutual change here entails mutual reconstruction. 
Dewey claimed that what is so in this particular instance “…is true, as to form, of 
every experience. The creature operating may be a thinker in his study and the 
environment with which he interacts may consist of [a certain setting of] ideas…” (1934, 
p. 44). This last sentence indicated that thinking, like art and experience in general, is 
also reconstructive, a point Dewey explicitly made when he wrote that “…thinking is no 
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different in kind from the use of natural [i.e., available] materials and energies, say fire 
and tools, to refine, re-order, and shape other natural materials, say ore” (1925, p. 67); or 
when he claimed that “[w]e cannot lay hold of the new,” nor “…even keep it before our 
minds, much less understand it, save by the use of ideas and knowledge we already 
possess” (1929a, pp. viii-ix). Thus, as Nelson Goodman, would later argue: 
Learning how to think . . . is learning how to construct rather than criticize 
[or negate]; and since we can only construct something from elements 
already at hand, and hence already arranged into a world, it is to learn how 
to reconstruct a better world from a world we encounter… The arts, 
therefore, are the models for science and philosophy, rather than the 
reverse, for they encompass the reconstructions of the world we most 
freely undertake (Cameron 1995, p. 97). 
 
Never is dismantlement complete. No slates are wiped clean. Instead, there are 
reformations, for example, social reformations that re-form, turn, revolve, which is to 
say, reconstruct existing arrangements, institutions and principles into hopefully better 
ones.  Intellectual revolutions follow the same course.  Einstein developed a new concept 
of “space-time,” yet does so only insofar as he can speak about “space” and “time” in the 
first place (see Einstein, 1952, pp. 161-162; also see Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 432).  He 
conceived the new by adapting, adjusting, twisting, mediating and re-working the old. 
Indeed, the word “conceives” suggests this very point: the new—a baby, for instance—is 
conceived, created, yet only with contributions from the old, in this case, the parents.  
The idea that learning to think means learning to reconstruct rather than criticize 
or negate might well puzzle those familiar with Dewey’s many works of social criticism 
and his history of activism, which, in fact, earned him a dossier at the FBI (see Martin 
2002, pp. 351 & 458-459). Another way of expressing the idea, however, is to say that 
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effective criticism is never mere negation, but rather negation that occurs through 
reconstruction. The notion can be illustrated by drawing from the work of Herbert 
Marcuse, who was admittedly ambivalent towards pragmatists, yet nevertheless shared 
common ground with Dewey, including Dewey’s background in Hegelian philosophy, 
which he said “left a permanent deposit in my thinking” (1930, p. 21).  
Marcuse observed that philosophy has historically been an activity that works to 
transcend established discourses.  A standard challenge to his view is that, like it or not, 
we depend on pre-existing discourses. If we construct our own private language, nobody 
will understand us, nor will we understand ourselves. Marcuse (1960) accepted this. He 
agreed that established languages “…are still those of the game (there are no others), but 
the concepts codified in the language of the games are redefined…” (p. 449). The 
philosopher moves outside and therewith negates established discourses not by 
manufacturing language from scratch, but by re-ordering what is already there.  Here the 
crucial and loosely Hegelian point is that the negation does not abolish what came before. 
In the words of Marcuse, “it reveals modes and contents of thought which transcend the 
codified pattern of use and validation.”  However, the critical philosopher “…does not 
invent these contents,” but “assembles and reactivates them” (p. 449). Or as Dewey 
(1929b) said, “[p]hilosophy is . . . a generalized theory of criticism” (p. xvi), and “[t]he 
constant task of [philosophical] thought is to establish working connections between old 
and new subject-matters” (p. viii).23  
 
23 In this paragraph, I once again borrow words from my 2007 “The Totalitarianism of Therapeutic 
Philosophy: Reading Wittgenstein Through Critical Theory” (p. 7), published in Essays in Philosophy.    
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For Marcuse, poetry offers a paradigm example of what he calls “critical” or 
“negative” thinking.  Quoting the French poet Paul Valéry, he wrote “…thought is the 
labor which brings to life in us that which does not exist” (1960, p. 448; 1964, p. 68). 
Poets recombine words in unheard-of ways to express something inexpressible and in this 
sense non-existent in ordinary language. In doing so, they subvert and move beyond what 
is commonly accepted, affirmed and posited. This constitutes the negative, as in non-
affirmative and non-positivistic, dimension of their art. It also accounts for why Marcuse 
hints that critical philosophers might be characterized as poet-philosophers, for they too 
recombine words in strange new ways in order to bring life to concepts inexpressible in 
established discourses. 
On some pragmatic accounts, new concepts engender new ways of perceiving.  
As James (1911) remarked, “[c]oncepts not only guide us over the map of life, but we 
revalue life by their use.” Concepts “…arouse new feelings of sublimity, power, and 
admiration, new interests and motivations” (p. 1019).  New interests and motivations 
direct what we attend to, and thus affect how the world appears.  They also empower and 
ready us to engage in new courses of action.  In this way too they affect how the world 
appears, for perception is a mode of acting in the world.  The relation between concepts 
and perception, wrote James, “…is like that of sight to touch.  Sight indeed helps us by 
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preparing us for contacts while they are yet far off, but it endows us in addition with a 
new world of optical spender…” (p. 1019).24 
 Dewey wrote that “[t]he ‘magic’ of poetry . . . is precisely the revelation of 
meaning in the old effected by its presentation through the new. It radiates the light that 
never was on land and sea but that is henceforth an abiding illumination of objects” 
(1925, p. 360).  By reconstructing old grammars into new forms, poetry expands the 
universe of meaning. For reasons just stated, it also augments our perceptual capacities. 
And what is so of poetry is so of fine art in general: it too expands both meaning and 
perception. Earlier, for example, it was noted that 19th century impressionist painters 
learned to experience and reveal the effects of light in new ways, and that their paintings 
challenge many viewers into a richer sense of what light is. To acquire a richer sense of 
something is to acquire an expanded sense of what it means, and to sense something in a 
richer way is to perceive it more vividly.  One could indeed write volumes describing the 
ways in which art expands meaning and perception. Yet for those who have not had 
considerable experience either making art or engaging intimately and intensely with it, 
these volumes would likely be unconvincing; and for those who have, they would merely 
state the obvious. 
 
 
 
24 To avoid confusion, it is worth noting the above quoted passages come from a posthumously published 
book in which James expressed views that are not completely consistent with his earlier writings.  In 
particular, the divide between “percept” and “concept” was less severe in this work than in earlier ones 
such as The Principles of Psychology. 
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Eidos Revisited 
Earlier it was noted that “instrumental” relationships are, by Dewey’s definition, 
meaningful relationships.  They entail integral connections between means and ends, in 
the absence of which relationships cease to be meaningful. Hence we are wont to say that 
a relationship is meaningless when two things connect in a merely arbitrary way. It was 
also noted, however, that an integral and thus meaningful relationship is not a coerced 
relationship, and this too is reflected in everyday language, for if forced, say, into a job or 
a number of unwanted social relationships, we are wont to complain that our professional 
and personal lives lack meaning. Dewey captured both of these notions about meaning 
when he remarked that 
[t]he doings and sufferings [i.e., undergoings] that form experience are, in 
degree to which experience is intelligent or charged with meanings, a 
union of the precarious, novel, irregular with the settled, assured and 
uniform—a union which also defines the artistic and esthetic (1925, p. 
358). 
  
This points to the fact, on the one hand, that experience becomes pallid and thin when 
there is little or no free play. If actions are forced; if they are unvarying and mechanical, 
things lose significance and withdraw from notice, sometimes even from perception.25 On 
the other hand, if there is no structure; if things are wholly unsettled and unfamiliar; if 
things float completely free, then experience dis-integrates and scatters. This is to say, 
once again, that experience in the “vital sense”—experience charged with meaning—
arises only when structural constraints impose some limits on free play, so that our 
 
25 Perception researchers supply an extreme example of this.  When they place people in conditions that 
neutralize the effects of ongoing micro-saccadic movements of the eye, thereby creating an unchanging 
retinal image, visually perceived objects fade or completely disappear (see Pritchard 1961). 
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doings and undergoings are not “all over the place,” but aligned, synchronized and 
integrated into connections of “means-consequence.” 
 For Dewey (1925), the conditions under which we have experience in the vital 
sense were also conditions under which “we become capable of perceiving things instead 
of merely feeling and having them” (p. 182). The distinction between the former and the 
latter might be compared to the difference between seeing a candle flame as a candle 
flame and merely being aware of a fluttering smear of light.  In the first instance, we do 
not merely register the qualia of the thing; we discern what the thing is; and in traditional 
philosophical parlance, discerning the “what is” or “being” of a thing means discerning 
its “essence.” Dewey, of course, did not speak about “what things are” in an absolute 
sense, but rather spoke about what they are or what they mean in particular world 
contexts. Thus he rejected the essentialist view that a thing—a candle, say—can only 
appear as a candle insofar as there is an immutable and universal form or eidos that 
characterizes the being and therewith the appearance of all candles in all times and 
places.  
It will be recalled from Chapter Four that eidos is a Greek word that “…basically 
means ‘something that is seen’” (Novak 2004, p. 1). It is also a word that Plato poetically 
and quite brilliantly used to signify that which allows the “being” or “what is” of a thing 
to appear to the knowing mind.  Brilliantly, however, does not mean unproblematically, 
especially from Dewey’s standpoint; and yet, while Plato’s concept of eidos entails a 
theory of knowledge Dewey criticized, he was not entirely unsympathetic to the classical 
Greek outlook. First, he retained the classical opposition to nominalism, only where 
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Platonic thinkers would have argued, for example, that a hammer appears as a hammer 
because it participates in an immutable and universal form or eidos, Dewey would have 
said that it appears as a hammer, as a opposed to mere stick-like thing, because of its role 
or place in our lived activities or what Wittgenstein called “forms of life.”  The 
commonality between the two positions is that both reject the notion that forms are 
mental constructions that we project onto the world, which is to say, both maintain that 
forms exist “out there” beyond individual minds.  Second, Dewey retained the notion that 
essence—which here refers to meaningful patterns and organization—is bound to the 
appearance of things, for if we inhabit a world, say, in which hammers are used, we do 
not first perceive stick-like things and only later decide that they fall within the class of 
entities called “hammers.”  Instead, hammers immediately appear as hammers.  Third, 
Dewey retained the classical view that things, as opposed to mere qualia, can only appear 
as perceptible forms if the following criteria are met: there must be structure, unity and 
endurance. 
The previous four chapters have repeatedly illustrated this last point, albeit 
without always emphasizing it.  They have done so by showing that experience and 
therewith intelligible appearance—which Plato’s concept of eidos equates to form—
emerge when doings and undergoings are linked through the action of being in the world, 
so that they integrate in much the same way that incidents in a story cohere into a single, 
narrative structure that endures over time. The current chapter offers additional insight.  
As discussed, Dewey suggested that things come to have certain meanings and thus come 
to appear in certain ways by virtue of their placement within our worlds—worlds here 
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referring to teleological frameworks in which ends, means and therefore meanings show 
up. His philosophy of art reiterated a similar point. It stressed that means and ends, media 
and artistic outcomes, doings and undergoings belong inherently to one another.  Each is 
what it is by virtue of relating integrally to the other; and by virtue of these integral, 
mutually defining relationships, constituents within an artistic composition or some other 
thing we experience aesthetically do not appear as isolated, fleeting bits and pieces, “here 
now, gone an instant later.”  They fuse, become one within a temporally extended and 
integrated movement or narrative structure.  Hence to experience things aesthetically is to 
experience them in ways that satisfy the criteria mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
However, while aesthetic experience exemplifies experience that satisfies the 
aforesaid criteria, anything that can properly be called experience will to some extent 
satisfy them.  After all, if we register nothing more than a fleeting rush of individual 
qualia, we do not really experience or perceive anything at all.  Fortunately this rarely 
happens because we inhabit worlds, and worlds have objects and schemes around which 
our sensitivities and capacities cohere.  Dewey (1934) noted, for example, that we 
perceive that “…properties . . . exist because ‘sensations’ are of objects ordered in a 
common world and are not mere transient excitations” (p. 126)  “The connection of 
qualities with objects is intrinsic in all experience having significance.  Eliminate this 
connection and nothing remains but a senseless and unidentifiable succession of 
transitory thrills” (p. 126). 
Having stressed that Dewey shares the Platonic view that structure, unity and 
endurance are pre-conditions of things appearing to us, it should also be reiterated that he 
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decisively broke with Platonic thinking in a number of ways. He did not locate form or 
structure in individual things as much as he did in the worldly schemes in which we 
encounter them. Along similar lines, he did not equate unity to universal essences that 
bind the many into one, nor did he equate endurance to immutability, but instead 
regarded unity and endurance as outcomes realized when things integrate within a 
movement—for example, a form of life activity—that holds together and in this sense 
endures over time. More strikingly, Dewey held that elements of change, irregularity and 
instability are, along with the other criteria just mentioned, pre-conditions of things 
appearing to us. Or perhaps this is not quite right, for change, irregularity and instability 
do not work alongside the other criteria, but rather contribute to their fulfilment.  They 
do, according to Dewey, because integral connections between means and ends do not 
form if everything is forced, mechanical and unchanging; and absent these integral 
connections, incidents do not integrate in the manner described above. Consequently 
things do not appear in meaningful relationships.  They lose significance and withdraw 
from notice.  In these ways Dewey shifted away from the traditional western 
philosophical view that the intelligible and therewith the knowable are, by definition, 
beyond change. Philosophers have defended this view on the grounds, for example, that 
knowledge is awareness of “what is,” and we cannot point to this or that and say that it 
“is” if it is dissolving, passing away and changing into something else.  On the same 
grounds, philosophers have traditionally argued that reality—or “that which is”—is 
likewise beyond change.  
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Many are inclined to conclude that our modern age of science has, like Dewey, 
dispensed with this view, and while this conclusion is not entirely unjustified, it is 
somewhat misplaced.  After all, Galileo, who we celebrate for inaugurating the modern 
age of science, advanced kinematic laws that are meant to hold across time and place—
laws, therefore, that are immutable and universal. Furthermore, while his laws were 
partly derived from careful observation, for example, of marbles rolling on inclined 
planes, they do not describe motions of marbles that could ever be perceived through the 
senses. What they describe, rather, is how marbles would in theory move over a 
frictionless surface, which is to say, under ideal conditions never actually observed. So 
where Platonic thinkers equated reality to immutable and universal ideal forms, Galileo 
described physical reality in terms of immutable and universal patterns that are only 
realizable under ideal conditions. This is not to say Galileo was a thoroughgoing 
Platonist, but merely to make the case that the modern era has not entirely escaped the 
notion that reality is unchanging.  Nor is it to suggest that Platonic forms are equivalent 
to physical laws.  In point of fact, Dewey argued that a failure to appreciate just how 
different the two are has led many to mistakenly cling to the notion that reality is 
unchanging (see 1929b, pp. 205-206). 
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 Without insinuating that ancient thinkers were mere “armchair speculators,”26 it 
may, however, be said that the modern emphasis on experimental science has given rise 
to the view that we come to know reality by actively manipulating it.  This view, in turn, 
entails a significant reordering of classical values.  Dewey argued, in particular, that it 
entails an adjustment to the classical tendency to think tekhne a lesser form of knowledge 
than episteme.  In the texts of Plato and Aristotle, tekhne encompasses everything from 
statecraft to the medical arts to the art of war, the art of calculating, the art of piloting a 
ship, playing a musical instrument, composing a painting, making shoes and managing 
money.  It entails knowledge about certain kinds of objects, but these objects of 
knowledge are not objectives at which it ultimately aims (e.g. Aristotle, Phys. 193b10-
20). Awls, leather and even shoes are objects of knowledge for the shoemaker, but the 
objective of the shoemaker’s tekhne is not to know what these things fundamentally are, 
but rather to know how to work available materials into shoes. The objective of episteme, 
by contrast, is to discover fundamental forms and principles upon which the being of 
things depends, along with the possibility of us knowing them.  The objective, to put it 
another way, is to discover that which allows for the instantiation and recognition of the 
realities we encounter, and yet does not depend on these realities for its being.  In the 
case of episteme, moreover, the objective or aim and the object of knowledge are one and 
 
26  While ancient thinkers did not engage systematic experimentation in the way that contemporary 
scientists do, many of them were careful observers of the natural world. By experimenting with weights 
and by further observing that a downward stream of water attenuates into separate droplets as it falls, 
Strato—who lead Aristotle’s Lyceum from 286 to 268 BC—discovered what Galileo later rediscovered, 
namely, that falling bodies accelerate. By observing eclipses and noting that a sphere is the only form that 
can always cast a circular shadow, ancients learned that the Earth is round.  Through an experiment 
involving measurements of shadows cast by the Sun, Eratosthenes (c. 276-196 BC) calculated the 
approximate circumference of the Earth. There are many other such examples. 
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the same.  When Plato investigated the ideal form, say, of justice, he did so with the 
objective of securing the ideal as an object of knowledge.  Aristotle did similarly when he 
inquired into first principles and causes.  For Plato and particularly Aristotle, that which 
is independent or free was better than that which is not; an end in itself was the highest 
good; and knowledge of fundamental realities was deemed the highest form of 
knowledge (e.g., Aristotle, Met. 982a5-b30).  Consequently episteme was esteemed over 
tekhne.27 
According to Dewey, the rise of modern science has entailed “a generalized . . . 
adoption of the point of view of the useful arts” (1925, p. 133) and therewith a rethinking 
of classical Greek values.  An initial point to remember is that “science”—from Latin 
scientia for “knowledge”—traditionally refers to any organized field of knowledge. 
Traditionally, moreover, it has designated fields of inquiry held in high esteem.  Thus, for 
example, when Christianity became dominant, Christian theology became a science.  
Then, when systematic observation and experimental study of material nature became the 
preferred mode of inquiry, it was designated as science.  So if, as Dewey claimed, 
modern science adopts the point of view of the useful arts, it follows that esteem for 
tekhne has grown. Dewey suggested, however, that we express our esteem more in deeds 
than words, for we often classify disciplines as “scientific” with the intention of 
 
27 A caveat: the relationship between tekhne and episteme is not necessarily antagonistic, nor is the 
distinction between the two always clear-cut. Plato, for instance, sometimes suggested that the former kind 
of knowledge can help us ascend to the latter.  Sometimes he also suggested the reverse—for example, that 
acquiring knowledge about the ideal form of justice adds to our knowledge of statecraft. On some 
occasions, moreover, Plato seemed to identify a single field of understanding with both kinds of 
knowledge.  Mathematics is a case in point: it can be pursued as an object of knowledge in its own right, 
yet also be pursued as a useful art. 
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distinguishing them from arts.  Dewey obviously thought this distinction was overdrawn, 
and he offered a number of reasons for thinking so. 
First, scientific observation is carried out with the aid of instruments or tools; 
tools are means by which we work upon things; and when workings are skilful and 
intelligent, directed towards an end and efficacious at producing some result, they fall 
within the scope of what we call “art.”   Dewey explained that scientists study an object 
by doing something to it, by bringing “some energy to bear upon [it] to see how it reacts” 
(1920, p. 113) or by “deliberately alter[ing] the conditions under which we observe [it]” 
(1929b, p. 85).  Scientists use instruments to introduce “…changes which will elicit some 
previously unperceived qualities” (1929b, p. 87), as when they reveal a microscopic 
structure by bombarding it with electrons or use a telescope to redirect light from a 
distant galaxy onto an imaging device.  At the outset of this dissertation, tekhne was 
described as a kind of applied knowing that works things into appearance, and scientists, 
through application of art, manipulate materials under study and therewith bring 
heretofore unseen phenomena into appearance. 
Second, a scientist does not typically build or learn a theory with the final 
objective of securing the theory as an object of knowledge.  Rather, the scientist pursues 
the theory with the objective of securing a means through which observable phenomena 
can be rendered intelligible. Assuming, therefore, that it even makes sense to call the 
theory an “object of knowledge,” it is not one in the same way that a Platonic form is, for 
a form is both an object of knowledge and a final objective of an inquiry, though it may 
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incidentally be used to pursue other objectives. Put another way, knowledge of the 
Platonic form—assuming, for a moment, that the form exists—is knowledge of reality, 
whereas knowledge of the theory is possession of an instrument that works to make 
reality knowable or at least intelligible (see 1929b, pp. 205-206).  So while it is perhaps 
going too far to equate the scientist’s knowledge of the theory, say, to the shoemaker’s 
knowledge of leather, the two do share an important commonality: both are used for 
working and making. The shoemaker’s knowledge is applied to the making of shoes; the 
theory is applied as a sense-making instrument; and neither is complete until it works 
upon and re-forms materials, thereby making them appear in new ways.  
Kepler’s theoretical model of the solar system, to return to an example from 
Chapter Two, works into appearance an arrangement of neat, concentric planetary paths.  
It and other scientific theories, moreover, structure how scientists directly and indirectly 
work upon objects of investigation and thereby “shake loose” heretofore “unperceived 
qualities” (1929b, p, 87).  In addition to and by virtue of structuring hands-on work, 
theories also structure how scientists make objects—both conceptual and physical—
relate. Therewith they structure how given fields of inquiry knit together into coherent 
worldviews. Or to clarify, it is not that theories necessarily structure workings and 
makings in the sense of preceding and determining them.  Sometimes theories may 
follow out of already established patterns of doing and handling, and the former are not, 
in any event, entirely separable from the latter. The point is that a scientific theory—
however it may arise—performs work; it performs, more specifically, what Dewey 
(1934) called “the work of art” (p. 214).  In the case of fine arts, this “…work takes place 
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when a human being cooperates with [an artistic object or] product so that the outcome is 
an experience that is enjoyed because of its liberating and ordered properties” (p. 214).  
And in the case of a scientific theory, the work takes place when actions, incidents and 
objects coordinate into instrumental, which is to say, integral and hence meaningful 
relationships, so that orderly arrangements cohere intelligibly into appearance. 
Dewey, in fact, held that all knowledge is “instrumental,” by which he meant a 
work(ing) of art, and he often used examples from science to reinforce this claim.  
However, he did not thereby insinuate that science—here understood in the contemporary 
sense—is the only path to knowledge.  Dewey (1925) emphasized this when he remarked 
that thinking, which is not always scientific, “…is pre-eminently an art; knowledge and 
propositions which are the products of thinking, are works of art, as much so as statuary 
and symphonies” (p. 378). This means that thinking entails building, and since we build 
with materials at hand, using, for example, already available ideas, thinking entails 
reconstruction. This also means that “[i]f defective materials are employed or if they are 
put together carelessly and awkwardly, the result is defective” (p. 379); it will then cast 
“a fog which obscures [things]”  (p. 378). Yet if the reverse is so, then the working of 
thought integrates and illuminates. “Every successive stage of thinking [becomes] a 
conclusion in which the meaning of what has produced it is condensed; and it is no 
sooner stated than it is a light radiating to other things” (p. 378). This suggests that 
thinking is reconstructive not only in the sense just mentioned, but also in the historical 
sense discussed in Chapter Six. There it was seen that antecedents only appear as means 
when considered or re-viewed from the standpoint of culminations finally reached.  It was 
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seen, in other words, that culminations bring ends and therewith means into appearance. 
Dewey’s point about conclusions was similar. “While a conclusion follows from 
antecedents, it does not follow from ‘premises’ […]. Premises are the analysis of a 
conclusion into its logically justifying grounds” (p. 379). That premises “emerge only as 
a conclusion becomes manifest” (1934, p. 38; also see 1925, p. 379) does not imply that 
the conclusion appears in the absence of premises.  It means, rather, that we reach a 
conclusion when we acquire the capacity to see how antecedents interlock and build into 
an integrated whole, and so come to see antecedents as premises leading to a conclusion.  
This is why Dewey asserted that premises are analyzed out of the conclusion, as if to say 
the latter contains the former; and why, moreover, he stated that “condensed” within a 
conclusion is “the meaning of what has produced it” (1925, p. 378). 
A founding principle of classical pragmatism—formulated in Peirce’s landmark 
How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878) and often repeated by James and Dewey—is that 
“the root of every real distinction of thought” is that it makes a practical difference, and 
“…there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible 
difference of practice” (p. 265).  Dewey expanded upon this idea, for when he argued that 
knowledge is a product of art, he asserted that “knowing” means making “a certain 
difference in reality” (1908, p. 47).  On the face of it, this is an uncontroversial claim, 
especially in the modern scientific era. It is nonetheless a claim that challenges our 
intuition that knowledge is awareness of “what is”—our intuition that we cannot say that 
something “is” and hence profess knowledge of it if all we ever encounter is a 
disconnected chaos of transitory qualia.  Dewey, of course, strove to satisfy the last part 
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of this intuition.  After all, he did not claim that knowledge is a product of haphazard 
changes that ensue from random banging about, but rather that it is a product of changes 
engendered by means of art; and art, as discussed, is a means by which we manipulate 
things in such a way that particular incidents integrate into arrangements or structures 
that hold together and in this sense endure as a whole. 
From the standpoint of Platonic philosophy, epistemology and ontology are not 
distinct.  This means that the conditions under which we can know things are also 
conditions under which they can be said to have “reality” (e.g., Plato, Rep. 511d-514a; 
Thea. 186b). So in addition to arguing that knowledge is awareness of “what is,” Platonic 
philosophers have maintained that reality is “that which is.”  Consequently they have 
concluded that reality, like knowledge, is beyond change.  Dewey similarly suggested 
that conditions under which we can know things are also conditions under which they can 
be said to have “reality,” but since he held that knowing means changing things, he 
posited that “reality be itself in transition” and that things can “undergo change without 
thereby ceasing to be real” (1908, p. 40).  In doing so, he made yet another seemingly 
uncontroversial claim, especially when considered in the context of the modern scientific 
era.  In actual fact, however, this is a claim that many have affirmed and denied in the 
same breath.   A case in point is that some cite quantum mechanics as an illustration of 
how observing and therewith coming to know reality changes it, yet then insinuate that 
this means we can never know “how things really are.”  For Dewey, this is a 
misunderstanding.  We can know “how things really are,” he insisted, because things 
really are in dynamic, interacting systems of which we are participants, and when we 
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introduce changes to a system, we can observe and therewith come to know how it really 
behaves (see 1917, pp. 43-44).   
Dewey’s account was anti-sceptical for the obvious reason that it affirmed that we 
can know reality.  Yet it was also anti-sceptical because it countered views that lead to 
scepticism.  Some, for example, hold that the everyday world of change is a merely 
apparent world, arguing that the real world is a domain of fixed laws and mathematical 
certainties.  That we can come to know reality by discovering laws and suchlike is meant 
to be of consolation, but it does not alter the fact that we are asked to mistrust firsthand 
experience. Others grant that reality is in transition.  They add, however, that we cannot 
talk coherently about anything if our concepts constantly change to keep pace with the 
flow of reality; that concepts must to some extent be fixed if we are to develop bodies of 
knowledge; and that knowledge, therefore, is a perversion of reality, albeit a useful one. 
According to Dewey, both of these outlooks arise from a failure to appreciate that 
knowledge is a product of art.  The first fails to recognize that laws do not express “any 
matter of fact existence” (1925, p. 148). Rather,   
…their ultimate implication is application; they are methods and when 
applied as methods they regulate the precarious flow of unique situations. 
Objects of natural science are not metaphysical rivals of historical events; 
they are means of directing the latter. Events change; one individual gives 
place to another. But individually qualified things have some qualities 
which are pervasive, common, stable. They are out of time in the sense 
that a particular temporal quality is irrelevant to them. If anybody feels 
relieved by calling them eternal, let them be called eternal. But let not 
“eternal” be then conceived as a kind of absolute perduring existence or 
Being (1925, p. 148). 
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The second view similarly fails to recognize that concepts are not principally 
representations of reality, but instruments through which we cognitively and physically 
interact with reality, changing and rearranging it in such ways that it becomes intelligible 
and therewith potentially knowable (see 1929b, p. 206). 
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Conclusion 
 
Menand’s “Story” 
In 2001 Farrar, Straus and Giroux of New York published what proved to be the 
most celebrated non-fictional book of the year, Louis Menand’s The Metaphysical Club: 
A Story of Ideas in America. By year’s end the book had been reprinted six times, and in 
2002, the author won both the Pulitzer Prize in history and the Francis Parkman award 
from the Society of American Historians for the best book on history published the year 
before. Menand was appointed Professor of English and American history and literature 
at Harvard University in 2003, reinforcing the esteem his work had garnered. 
The breadth and depth of appreciation for the book was unprecedented for a text 
of its kind, for despite its subtitle, the “story of ideas” told by Menand centered 
specifically upon ideas that were philosophical. Although an historian of English 
literature at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York at the time, rather 
than a philosopher, the author had written a sweeping yet detailed account of how the 
“way of thinking” of pragmatism took root, grew and flowered into dominance from 
within the lives of four philosophers during the half-century after the Civil War: Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, William James, Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey.  
It was Menand’s view that these men  “…together . . . were more responsible than 
any other group for moving American thought into the modern world” (pp. x-xi).  They 
were responsible, however, not only because of what they said, but also because of how 
what they said answered the concerns of the Post-Civil War culture in which they lived: 
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The Civil War swept away the slave civilization of the South, but it swept 
away almost the whole intellectual culture of the North along with it. It 
took nearly half a century for the United States to develop a culture to 
replace it, to find a set of ideas, and a way of thinking, that would help 
people to cope with the conditions of modern life (p. x). 
 
If we strain out the differences, personal and philosophical, [that Holmes, 
Peirce, James and Dewey] had with one another, we can say that what 
these four thinkers had in common was not a group of ideas, but a single 
idea—an idea about ideas. They all believed that ideas are not “out there” 
waiting to be discovered, but are tools—like forks and knives and 
microchips—that people devise to cope with the world in which they find 
themselves. They believed that ideas are produced not by individuals, but 
by groups of individuals—that ideas are social. They believed that ideas 
do not develop according to some inner logic of their own, but are entirely 
dependent, like germs, on their human carriers and the environment. And 
they believed that since ideas are provisional responses to particular and 
unreproducible circumstances, their survival depends not on their 
immutability but on their adaptability (pp. xi-xii). 
 
But what kind of idea was this? How in the most general sense, that is, ought we to 
construe its nature and effect? Menand was unequivocal: the “idea about ideas” of 
Holmes, James, Peirce and Dewey was a form of scepticism.  
The idea was, to put it another way, “…that ideas should never become 
ideologies—either justifying the status quo, or dictating some transcendent imperative for 
renouncing it,” and this, as Menand went on to say 
 [was i]n many ways . . . a liberating attitude, and it accounts for the 
popularity Holmes, James and Dewey (Peirce is a special case) enjoyed in 
their lifetimes, and for the effect they had on a whole generation of judges, 
teachers, journalists, philosophers, psychologists, social scientists, law 
professors, even poets. They taught a kind of skepticism that helped people 
cope with life in a heterogeneous, industrialized, mass-market society, a 
society in which older bonds of custom and community seemed to have 
become attenuated, and to have been replaced by more impersonal 
networks of obligation and authority. But skepticism is also one of the 
qualities that make societies like that work. It is what permits the continual 
state of upheaval that capitalism thrives on (xii; emphasis added). 
                                                                                                            
  
                                                                       
 
 
                                      
208 
 
Remarkably, Menand had come to this conclusion without arguing in any way, save in 
passing, for the validity of any of the philosophical claims that Holmes, James, Peirce or 
Dewey had made.  He was open about this, describing his book as  
…an effort to write about these ideas in their own spirit—that is, to try to 
see ideas as always soaked through by the personal and social situations in 
which we find them. Holmes, James, Peirce and Dewey were 
philosophers, and their work is part of the history of abstract thought. Its 
philosophical merits were contested in its own time, and they are contested 
today. This book is not a work of philosophical argument, though; it is a 
work of historical interpretation. It describes a change in American life by 
looking at the change in its intellectual assumptions (p. xii). 
 
Having studied carefully what the four men said, when they said it, and having become 
clear thereby—or so he thought—about what they had meant, Menand had then 
summarized what seemed to him the unequivocal consequence of it. Valid or not, the 
claims of pragmatism had been sceptical. 
 
The Moral of the “Story” 
Why have I concluded this dissertation by recounting the method, substance and 
reception of Menand’s book? For reasons that may enable readers of this dissertation to 
delimit the scope and nature of what I hope to have accomplished by writing it, how and 
why. 
Menand’s account of the origins of pragmatism and of the supposedly sceptical 
nature of its effects will almost assuredly dominate the consciousness of literate readers 
for years to come. His book on the ideas of James, Dewey and the others, that is, has 
proven through its design and construction to be accessible, informative and thus publicly 
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influential.  It has done so in a way that both James and Dewey believed the best works 
of philosophy ought to be, Menand having represented what he took to be their 
philosophical ideas by combining something like the historical sense of Dewey with the 
linguistic fluency of James.  
Pragmatically speaking, therefore, Menand did something right by attempting to 
capture what pragmatists meant by saying what they said when they said it, while 
refusing to succumb to the temptation to argue prematurely for or against the validity of 
it. He seems to have sensed, albeit unknowingly, that Collingwood had been correct when 
insisting, three-quarters of century ago, that we cannot—without begging the question—
test any claim for validity until we comprehend what a person meant by saying it; and to 
comprehend this, we must register beforehand the unique problem that the person 
intended to solve. Our problems determine the meaning of whatever we say or do to solve 
them, not the reverse. 
Having reconstructed my own account of the problems that provoked James and 
Dewey to say what they said, however, and touched upon those that incited Peirce, I am 
compelled to conclude that Menand drew the wrong conclusion about what pragmatists 
understood themselves to have been doing. Classical pragmatists, to be sure, held that we 
can never be certain that an idea is true. They maintained, moreover, that ideas should be 
accepted on a provisional basis and renounced if they become unserviceable. James 
captured this attitude in his notion of  “will to believe,” for by virtue of inviting us to 
accept beliefs that “work,” his notion also encourages us to abandon those that do not. 
The notion, to put it another way, was intended to expand the range of what we can 
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rationally believe, without dictating what we specifically ought to believe. Yet if 
scepticism is, as Menand has suggested, an attitude that cultivates a “continual state of 
upheaval,” then classical pragmatists were profoundly anti-sceptical.  James, after all, did 
not call his notion the “will to disbelieve,” and Peirce did not title one of his most famous 
essays, “How to Render Our Ideas Doubtful,” but rather How to Make Our Ideas Clear. 
While James and Peirce did, in these instances, invite us to relinquish unserviceable 
beliefs, their specific aim was to supply means by which we might become more secure 
in our beliefs—means, therefore, by which we escape the personal state of upheaval that 
would come if we found ourselves unable to believe anything at all. 
Earlier in this dissertation, I suggested that James might have renamed his notion 
the “will to make,” and this too is instructive. Pragmatists emphasized that we make the 
worlds that we encounter, and by suggesting that the making of art exemplifies how we 
do so, they emphasized building over demolition. When located in the context of the 
problems they were trying to answer, the claims of pragmatists were constructive tools.  
They were intended to diminish rather than reinforce sceptical habits of thinking, 
philosophical and otherwise. Pragmatists did, as Menand observed, respond to upheaval.  
He emphasized the Civil War.  I have mentioned traditional philosophical ideas that had 
lost their constructive power, and had, contrary to the intent with which earlier thinkers 
deployed them, become a source of hopelessly sceptical outlooks. Pragmatists thus 
pursued an expressly anti-sceptical program when, on the basis of the claim that we make 
our worlds, they denied we can secure universal and immutable essences, that we can 
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know reality without altering it and that we can judge truth on the mere basis of 
correspondence to facts. 
I have attempted within this dissertation to unpack within their historical context 
the claims of James and Dewey with respect to the centrality of the reconstructive 
practices of art to those of experience. I have worked hard to position what they said 
within the debates of their time—to measure them, that is, against the concerns that 
occasioned them—for, as Collingwood would have insisted, what James and Dewey 
meant by saying what they did would otherwise be undeterminable. At the same time, I 
have considered what they meant to do and what they achieved from the standpoint of 
debates, outlooks and circumstances that persist in our own time, for as Dewey would 
insist, it is only from the standpoint of where we have arrived and with the aid of 
currently available resources that we can coherently register anything at all. By 
connecting what classical pragmatists have said to what others have said since, I hope to 
have conveyed to readers a secure and provocative sense of how useful their suggestions 
remain, when understood exactly, as precursors to the answers that we in turn must 
construct to the questions of comparable kind that we face. 
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